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Abstract 
 Tool use is essential and culturally universal to human life, common to hunter-
gatherer and modern advanced societies alike. Although the neuroscience of simpler 
visuomotor behaviours like reaching and grasping have been studied extensively, 
relatively little is known about the brain mechanisms underlying learned tool use.  
 With learned tool use, stored knowledge of object function and use supervene 
requirements for action programming based on physical object properties. Contemporary 
models of tool use based primarily on evidence from the study of brain damaged 
individuals implicate a set of specialized brain areas underlying the planning and control 
of learned actions with objects, distinct from areas devoted to more basic aspects of 
visuomotor control. The findings from the current thesis build on these existing 
theoretical models and provide new insights into the neural and behavioural mechanisms 
of learned tool use. 
In Project 1, I used fMRI to visualize brain activity in response to viewing tool 
use grasping. Grasping actions typical of how tools are normally grasped during use were 
found to preferentially activate occipitotemporal areas, including areas specialized for 
visual object recognition. The findings revealed sensitivity within this network to learned 
contextual associations tied to stored knowledge of tool-specific actions. The effects were 
seen to arise implicitly, in the absence of concurrent effects in visuomotor areas of 
parietofrontal cortex. These findings were taken to reflect the tuning of higher-order 
visual areas of occipitotemporal cortex to learned statistical regularities of the visual 
world, including the way in which tools are typically seen to be grasped and used. These 
areas are likely to represent an important source of inputs to visuomotor areas as to 
learned conceptual knowledge of tool use.  
In Project 2, behavioural priming and the kinematics of real tool use grasping was 
explored. Behavioural priming provides an index into the planning stages of actions. 
Participants grasped tools to either move them, grasp-to-move (GTM), or to demonstrate 
their common use, grasp-to-use (GTU), and grasping actions were preceded by a visual 
preview (prime) of either the same (congruent) or different (incongruent) tool as that 
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which was then acted with. Behavioural priming was revealed as a reaction time 
advantage for congruent trial types, thought to reflect the triggering of learned use-based 
motor plans by the viewing of tools at prime events. The findings from two separate 
experiments revealed differential sensitivity to priming according to task and task setting. 
When GTU and GTM tasks were presented separately, priming was specific to the GTU 
task. In contrast, when GTU and GTM tasks were presented in the same block of trials, in 
a mixed task setting, priming was evident for both tasks. Together the findings indicate 
the importance of both task and task setting in shaping effects of action priming, likely 
driven by differences in the allocation of attentional resources. Differences in attention to 
particular object features, in this case tool identity, modulate affordances driven by those 
features which in turn determines priming. Beyond the physical properties of objects, 
knowledge and intention of use provide a mechanism for which affordances and the 
priming of actions may operate. 
Project 3 comprised a neuroimaging variant of the behavioural priming paradigm 
used in Project 2, with tools and tool use actions specially tailored for the fMRI 
environment. Preceding tool use with a visual preview of the tool to be used gave rise to 
reliable neural priming, measured as reduced BOLD activity. Neural priming of tool use 
was taken to reflect increased metabolic efficiency in the retrieval and implementation of 
stored tool use plans. To demonstrate specificity of priming for familiar tool use, a 
control task was used whereby actions with tools were determined not by tool identity but 
by arbitrarily learned associations with handle colour. The findings revealed specificity 
for familiar tool-use priming in four distinct parietofrontal areas, including left inferior 
parietal cortex previously implicated in the storage of learned tool use plans. Specificity 
of priming for tool-action and not colour-action associations provides compelling 
evidence for tool-use-experience-dependent plasticity within parietofrontal areas.  
 
Keywords: tool use, action priming, affordances, grasping, action planning, fMRI, 
visuomotor control, inferior parietal cortex, ventral and dorsal visual streams 
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Chapter 1  
1. General introduction 
1.1. Why study the cortical basis of human tool use?  
From an evolutionary perspective, the study of human tool use and the brain is an 
extremely fascinating topic. In a span of less than one million years, brain size nearly 
doubled between Homo habilis (600-700 cc) and Homo erectus (900-1100 cc), and 
continued to increase with the emergence of modern Homo sapiens (approximate brain 
size of 1350 cc) (Holloway, 1996; Wilson, 1998, p. 18). The fossil evidence indicates 
concurrent advancements in tool-using and -making, generally agreed upon to have 
played a driving force in brain expansion (K. R. Gibson, 1993; Marzke, 1996; Washburn, 
1960; Wilson, 1998; Wynn, 1996). In Wilson’s The Hand, a compelling argument is 
made for how anatomical modifications to the hand of early humans greatly increased the 
flexibility and potential for far more complex object manipulation, which in turn helped 
drive new neural representations (see also Napier, 1993). Wilson highlights deep 
connections between language, thought, and complex tool use. Continuing interest in the 
neuroscience of human tool use alongside comparative studies of tool use in nonhuman 
primates is likely to reveal new insights as to the fundamental nature and evolutionary 
origins of human cognition. 
The study of tool use and the brain is also interesting as a model of functionally 
distinct but interacting cortical systems. Both contemporary (Buxbaum, 2001; Johnson-
Frey, 2004; Rothi, Ochipa, & Heilman, 1997) and longstanding (Geschwind, 1965; 
Liepmann, 1980) models of human tool use indicate functionally distinct brain areas 
underlying distinct types of knowledge. The strongest evidence for dissociable 
representations stems from the study of patients with brain damage. A wide variety of 
distinct neuropsychological conditions lead to problems with tool use, and the kinds of 
problems that arise following brain damage differ greatly depending on which areas have 
been compromised. Separation between systems underlying conceptual versus procedural 
motor representations of tool use is common. However, a clear picture of the cortical 
basis of tool use based on neuropsychological evidence appears to be exceedingly out of 
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reach. Incredible variation in the number of distinct manifestations of disorder that bear 
relevance to the study of tool use, somewhat ironically, stands as a significant roadblock 
to progress. No single neuropsychological model to date can account for all the various 
patient dissociations that have been reported. Human neuroimaging techniques like fMRI 
offer a valuable complement to patient research in this area. In contrast to patient work, 
which provides a window into the functions of a damaged network of brain areas, fMRI 
reveals the activity of widely distributed cortical networks. Findings from the current 
thesis provide clear illustration of how neuroimaging experiments can extend existing 
models of tool use derived from neuropsychology.   
The study of tool use is also the study of relatively high-level action planning. For 
good reason, the vast majority of previous work has focused on simpler visuomotor 
behaviours like reaching and grasping. These studies reveal key principles, essential 
behavioural and neural mechanisms. We now know a great deal about the planning and 
control of grasping according to location, orientation, and physical properties of target 
objects. However, to date, grasping has been primarily addressed within the context of 
actions where the end goal is prehension (to simply grasp). In real life, grasping is almost 
always part of a greater action plan, with specific goals in mind; we rarely (if ever) grasp 
objects just for the sake of grasping. The field is now well poised to advance new 
questions, such as the driving influence of high-level goals and intentions on the 
programming of actions. Tool use is one clear example of this. High level action goals 
supervene requirements for action programming according to low level properties like 
object size, shape, orientation, and spatial location. Tool use also offers a unique 
opportunity to study how stored object knowledge is used to plan actions. These ideas 
represent a focal point of the current thesis – I set out to disentangle behavioural and 
neural mechanisms tied to learned aspects of tool use (identity, function, and use) from 
factors tied to physical object properties. 
The current thesis is framed within the context of existing models of tool use 
based primarily on evidence compiled from neuropsychology. The concept of dissociable 
but interacting cortical systems represents a major overarching theme. I begin with a 
review of the two visual streams hypothesis and the distinction between systems 
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underlying vision-for-perception versus vision-for-action (section 1.2). The model clearly 
predicts that tool use must involve the coordination of both visual streams. Specialization 
of inferior parietal areas for tool use is also implicated, developed further in convergence 
with newer more detailed accounts (section 1.4). A left-lateralized inferior parietal stream 
for learned tool use is distinguished from a bilaterally represented superior parietal stream 
devoted to online visuomotor control (Figure 1.3).  
Findings from neural recording studies of grasping and tool use in monkeys 
(section 1.3) also played a distinct role in motivating the current projects. In a general 
sense, given the highly constrained nature of cellular evolution (Krubitzer, 2009), neural 
mechanisms of grasping and tool use in monkeys are likely to have at least partial 
correspondence in humans. Further, several distinct findings from monkey 
neurophysiology have had a direct impact on the development of specific hypotheses put 
forth in the current thesis. Namely, the response properties of two particular neuron types 
(section 1.3.1) indicate that parietofrontal areas important for grasping are activated by 
merely viewing objects (canonical neurons) and/or object-directed actions (mirror 
neurons) even in the absence of overt movement. Viewing tools (Projects 2 and 3) and 
tool use grasping actions (Project 3) were hypothesized to activate motor areas important 
for tool use. Also, neurophysiological studies of tool use in monkeys provide dramatic 
examples of experience-dependent plasticity (section 1.3.2). Such findings provide an 
important basis for assumptions made about cortical plasticity and learned tool use in 
humans. An overarching hypothesis of the current thesis is that tool use learning gives 
rise to changes in the brain that serve to represent paired associations between tools and 
actions, and that such representations are detectable at the systems level (i.e. at the level 
of gross populations of cortical neurons, visible at the resolution of standard 
neuroimaging methods). 
1.2. The visual brain divided 
 Despite our conscious experience of the visual world as a unitary phenomenon, 
research in psychology and neuroscience has revealed the neural physiology of vision as 
a highly modular process. The beginnings of modular models of vision perhaps best owe 
to the work of Schneider (Schneider, 1969; although see also Trevarthen, 1968, cited in 
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Milner & Goodale, 1995), who with lesion methods in the hamster provided evidence for 
fundamentally different functional roles between the retinal pathways projecting to 
superior colliculus, important for maze navigation, versus those projecting to striate 
cortex, important for pattern discrimination. Also, by re-wiring neural pathways in the 
frog, Ingle (1973) showed that distinct visual channels give rise to the control of distinct 
motor behavior; retinal projections to the optic tectum were found to mediate visual 
control of prey catching, whereas projections to the pretectal nuclei were shown to 
mediate visual control of obstacle avoidance. This early work clearly demonstrates the 
partitioning of visual function along distinct channels; however, the first great steps in 
uncovering functional modularity of vision at the cortical level were made by Mishkin, 
Ungerleider and colleagues in their seminal work with macaque monkeys (Mishkin, 
1972; Mishkin, Lewis, & Ungerleider, 1982; Mishkin & Pribram, 1954; Mishkin & 
Ungerleider, 1982; Mishkin, Ungerleider, & Macko, 1983; Ungerleider & Brody, 1977; 
Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982; Ungerleider & Pribram, 1977). In an important initial 
study by Pohl (1973), lesions were made to either a ventral pathway projecting from 
occipital to inferior temporal cortex or a dorsal pathway projecting from occipital to 
posterior parietal cortex and then performance on two types of tasks was tested. One task 
required the discrimination of two objects based on distinct visual features (shape, colour, 
and texture), while the other task required discrimination between two possible targets 
based on their spatial proximity with respect to a landmark item. Lesions to the ventral 
pathway gave rise to deficits in the object discrimination task but not the spatial landmark 
task; whereas lesions to the dorsal pathway led to the reverse pattern, deficits in the 
landmark but not the object discrimination task. Following these and other related 
findings, Ungerleider and Mishkin (1982) proposed a distinction between ‘object vision’ 
as mediated by inferotemporal cortex and ‘spatial vision’ as mediated by posterior 
parietal cortex (see also Mishkin, 1972; Mishkin et al., 1983). In this view, both streams 
are important for conscious visual perception, but are tuned to different features of the 
visual array: the ventral ‘what’ pathway is tuned to intrinsic object features and mediates 
identification, whereas the dorsal ‘where’ pathway is tuned to spatial relations between 
objects and mediates localization. The model was found to nicely account for a number 
of findings from human neuropsychology (Balint, 1909; Hecaen & De Ajuriaguerra, 
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1954; Kimura, 1963; Ratcliff & Davies-Jones, 1972; Warrington, 1982; Warrington & 
James, 1967) monkey electrophysiology (Gross & Mishkin, 1977; Gross, Rocha-
Miranda, & Bender, 1972; Hyvärinen & Poranen, 1974; Robinson, Goldberg, & Stanton, 
1978), and subsequently carried well with neural computational methods of the time 
(Vaina, 1990). 
The next major advancements were made by Goodale and Milner (1992; Goodale, 
Milner, Jakobson, & Carey, 1991; Milner & Goodale, 1995) who re-characterized the 
roles of the dorsal and ventral visual streams, in what is now known as the two visual 
streams hypothesis. According to this view, the ventral stream provides the rich and 
detailed conscious visual experience of the world around us, critical for the perception 
and recognition of objects (vision-for-perception), whereas the dorsal stream is devoted 
to the visual guidance and control of actions, responsible for the (unconscious) 
transformation of visual information to appropriate motor outputs (vision-for-action) 
(Figure 1.1). The authors formulate a thorough and convincing account, not only backed 
by a wealth of scientific evidence from a wide range of disciplines, but also in confluence 
with a number of sensible theoretical principles that map onto the proposed functions of 
either stream. I will return to this point, and provide some coverage of these basic 
principles in my discussion of tool use and the two visual streams hypothesis below. But 
first, consideration of a particular set of findings from the work of Goodale and 
colleagues derived from testing a single patient, DF, provide a nice illustration of the 
contrasts between dorsal and ventral stream functions (Goodale & Milner, 2004). Indeed, 
these discoveries with patient DF have come to represent a kind of centrepiece of the two 
streams model. DF suffered from carbon monoxide poisoning, and as a result has 
bilateral lesions to her lateral occipitotemporal cortex (ventral stream). Consistent with 
the two streams model and the proposed functions of the ventral stream, DF can no 
longer perceive the form or orientation of objects, and thus cannot recognize objects on 
the basis of vision alone. What is truly remarkable about DF is that she can nonetheless 
use vision to accurately guide her actions; for example, to grasp those same objects she 
fails to recognize. Indeed, the way DF shapes her hand when grasping demonstrates that 
she has access to visual information about the size of objects, opening and closing her 
hand on route to an object (in ‘flight’) just as neurologically healthy individuals do, with 
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appropriate extent (‘scaling’) and timing according to object size and location. However, 
when asked to indicate the size of these same objects by simply opening her hand to an 
extent that reflects perceived object size, without actually executing a grasp, 
paradoxically, she performs badly. Similarly, DF chooses appropriate points on an object 
to place her fingers and thumb when grasping in accordance with object shape, but yet 
when asked to discriminate two of these same objects based on whether or not they are 
the same shape or different, her performance is again very poor; showing chance levels of 
accuracy, as if she was simply guessing. Likewise, DF is able to access information about 
the orientation of a visual stimulus, but only when that stimulus is the target of an action. 
In all of these examples, visual information about the physical properties of objects (size, 
shape, and orientation) is clearly accessible to DF’s motor system for the guidance of 
action, but at the same time she appears ‘perceptually blind’ to this same information. 
Presumably, it is DF’s largely intact dorsal stream that allows her to use vision for action 
in the absence of conscious visual recognition.  
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 Figure 1.1. The two visual streams hypothesis (Goodale & Milner, 1992). The dorsal stream, 
shown with orange arrows, projects from occipital to posterior parietal cortex and is specialized 
for the control of actions. For example, a dorsal stream area at the anterior extent of the 
intraparietal sulcus, area AIP, shown in yellow, is critical for object grasping (Culham, 2003). 
The ventral stream, shown with blue arrows, projects from occipital to lateral and inferior 
temporal cortex and is specialized for visual perception. For example, a collection of areas within 
the ventral stream, known as the lateral occipital complex (LOC), shown in cyan, is critical for 
object recognition (Malach et al., 1995).  
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Milner and Heywood (1989) provide the first descriptions of DF’s deeply 
impaired perceptual deficits, with a later description of her astonishingly good 
visuomotor abilities in the face of such impairments presented a few years later (Goodale 
et al., 1991). Since these fascinating discoveries, our group has studied a second patient, 
MC, with extensive damage to early visual and ventral stream areas, who shows similarly 
startling dissociations between impaired vision-for-perception and spared vision-for-
action (Culham, Witt, Valyear, Dutton, & Goodale, 2008; Goodale et al., 2008). 
Likewise, Karnath and colleagues (2009) recently describe a patient with focal damage to 
the ventral but not dorsal pathway who, like patients DF and MC, shows preserved 
grasping and visuomotor control in the face of severe perceptual recognition deficits.  
Importantly, with damage to the dorsal but not ventral stream, the opposite 
patterns of deficit and preserved function often emerge. Patients with optic ataxia as a 
result of damage to posterior parietal cortex (dorsal stream) show problems with online 
control of actions such as reaching and grasping, but yet are able to perceive and 
recognize objects perfectly well (Goodale et al., 1994; Milner & Goodale, 1995, pp. 92-
101; Perenin & Vighetto, 1988). Visual form agnosia versus optic ataxia therefore 
constitutes a double dissociation between vision-for-perception versus vision-for-action, 
in strong support of the Goodale and Milner two visual streams account.  
1.2.1. Visuomotor control and the dorsal stream 
The dorsal visual stream originates in primary visual cortex and extends to 
posterior parietal cortex (PPC), which is densely interconnected with both dorsal and 
ventral premotor areas of frontal cortex. A number of studies have comprehensively 
mapped monkey parietofrontal connectivity (Andersen, Asanuma, Essick, & Siegel, 
1990; Cavada & Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Goldman-Rakic, 1996; Lewis & Van Essen, 
2000a; Seltzer & Pandya, 1980; Wise, Boussaoud, Johnson, & Caminiti, 1997), and 
cytoarchitecture (Lewis & Van Essen, 2000b); as well as more recent mapping efforts in 
humans (H. J. Choi et al., 2006; Eickhoff, Grefkes, Zilles, & Fink, 2007; Petrides & 
Pandya, 1999). With visual cortex situated just posterior and somatosensory cortex just 
anterior, PPC is well positioned to receive and integrate visual and somatosensory inputs. 
The intraparietal sulcus (IPS) divides the superior parietal lobule (SPL) from the inferior 
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parietal lobule (IPL). Extensive research using neural recording methods in the macaque 
monkey have identified a complex arrangement of areas within PPC that show functional 
specialization for the control of specific effectors (body parts). Together with 
interconnected frontal areas, these circuits make up the cortical machinery critical for the 
planning and online control of actions. Since the arrival of neuroimaging, similar patterns 
of functional specificity have been identified in human PPC (Culham, Cavina-Pratesi, & 
Singhal, 2006; Culham & Valyear, 2006).  
Figure 1.2A shows the key dorsal stream areas involved in the control of reaching 
and grasping as identified with human neuroimaging methods, and Figure 1.2D provides 
an illustration of putative functionally equivalent areas in the monkey as identified with 
neural recording methods. Also depicted are the locations of parietal activations 
specifically associated with tool use (Figure 1.2B) and action observations (Figure 1.2C), 
again, along with comparisons in the monkey brain (Figure 1.2E and F, respectively). For 
simplicity, several other functionally defined areas important for action programming and 
control have been omitted. The purpose of Figure 1.2 is to simply provide a few 
examples of functional similarities between dorsal stream pathways of man and monkey 
– in both species, PPC comprises a constellation of functional areas devoted to the 
control and representation of action. In section 1.3, neurophysiology of grasping and tool 
use in monkeys is reviewed, while in section 1.4, I revisit human PPC with a specific 
focus on the putative functional organization of areas critical for learned tool use. 
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Figure 1.2. Schematic representation of action-related areas of parietal cortex shown on the 
cortical surface of a human brain (a, b, c) and a macaque monkey brain (d, e, f). The cortical 
surfaces were defined at the gray-white matter boundary and have been partially inflated to reveal 
regions within the sulci while preserving a sense of curvature. White lines indicate labelled sulci. 
Human neuroimaging has identified areas involved in: (a) reaching (mIPS/mOPJ) (Prado et al., 
2005) and grasping (aIPS) (Culham et al., 2003), (b) planning and execution of tool use (Johnson-
Frey, Newman-Norlund, & Grafton, 2005), and (c) action observation (Buccino et al., 2004).  
Neural recording methods in macaque monkeys have identified areas involved in: (d) reaching 
(MIP/V6A/V6) (Galletti et al., 2003; Rizzolatti et al., 1998) and grasping (AIP)(Rizzolatti et al., 
1998), (e) tool use (Hihara et al., 2006), and (f) action observation (Fogassi et al., 2005).  
Areas are coded with similar colours to suggest possible functionally equivalent areas between 
species; however, such comparisons must always be undertaken with considerable caution (for an 
extended discussion of the issues, see Culham et al., 2006). Only parietal areas are shown. 
Reprinted with permissions from Culham and Valyear (2006). 
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1.2.1. Visual object recognition and the ventral stream 
The ventral visual stream originates in primary visual cortex and extends to 
inferior and lateral temporal cortex. At its anterior most end, the ventral stream interfaces 
with lateral and medial structures of the temporal lobe known to be particularly critical 
for various aspects of memory formation, storage, and retrieval (Eichenbaum, Yonelinas, 
& Ranganath, 2007; Martin & Chao, 2001; Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007; Squire & 
Zola-Morgan, 1991). With visual cortex situated at its posterior end and temporal cortex 
at its anterior end, the ventral stream is well positioned to receive and integrate visual 
information with long-term memory representations. 
We have already seen how patient DF, and others like her (e.g. patient MC), 
provide powerful insights into the functions of the ventral stream. DF suffers from a type 
of agnosia, known as visual form agnosia. The literature on visual agnosias is long and 
extensive (Farah, 1990; Grüsser & Landis, 1991), well beyond what I will discuss in this 
thesis. Instead, I intend to simply introduce a single rather broad distinction that stems 
from this literature, before I move on to provide short coverage of some recent highlights 
from neuroimaging on this topic.  
Patients with ventral stream damage and object recognition deficits may differ 
fundamentally in what they can and cannot perceive. For some patients, like DF, the 
problems are with constructing coherent percepts, bringing together the various features 
f objects so to perceive them s meaningful wholes. For other patients, it seems not so 
much a failure to construct coherent percepts, but rather to ‘match’ such percepts with 
internal, memory-bound representations so as to recognize and retrieve their meaning 
(Hillis & Caramazza, 1995; Riddoch & Humphreys, 1987). The distinction maps onto 
what was originally referred to as ‘apperceptive’ versus ‘associative’ agnosia (Lissauer, 
1890). A simple method to reveal such distinction is to ask patients to try and copy 
pictures of objects; an apperceptive agnosic will be unable to do so, while associative 
agnosics will perform reasonably well. Likewise, if you ask an associative agnosic patient 
to draw an object from memory, they will typically be unable to do so, simply because 
they often cannot associate object name and meaning to its visual appearance. 
Conversely, a patient with apperceptive agnosia may perform appreciably well at drawing 
o  a
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from memory, indicating that for these patients recognition failure is not a matter of 
failed a rent 
 scheme fits quite well with more 
recently pro
ensus on how object meaning is stored, 
represented, and retrieved has not yet been reached (for various models, see Barsalou, 
2007; C
, 
continuum, and places its emphasis on the separation of visual information types, like 
ccess to stored representations, but rather a failure to perceive objects as cohe
meaningful images in the first place. Apperceptive agnosia is classically associated with 
damage to more posterior ventral stream regions while associative agnosia corresponds 
more closely with damage to anterior ventral stream areas. While a straightforward, 
stepwise processing scheme is now thought to be overly simplistic (Humphreys & 
Riddoch, 1987; Riddoch, Humphreys, Gannon, Blott, & Jones, 1999), the basic notion of 
a posterior-to-anterior continuum of processing complexity within the ventral stream 
remains useful, and, as I will discuss next, this simple
posed organizational principles evident from neuroimaging work. Given the 
general layout of the ventral stream, it would certainly seem sensible if more anterior 
areas abutting temporal lobe structures specialized for long term memory formation and 
retrieval played a closer, more intimate role in ‘matching’ visual percepts based on 
bottom-up processing with stored representations based on top-down knowledge. This 
line of thinking necessarily merges with theories on the organization of conceptual 
knowledge in the brain, for which a cons
ree & McRae, 2003; Damasio, 1989; Humphreys & Forde, 2001; Mahon & 
Caramazza, 2009; Martin & Chao, 2001; Patterson et al., 2007; Simmons & Barsalou
2003; Tyler & Moss, 2001; Warrington & McCarthy, 1987; Warrington & Shallice, 
1984).  
Since modern neuroimaging methods have come on the scene, progress in 
mapping the functional organization of the ventral stream has moved forward rapidly. In 
a recent review, Grill-Spector and Malach (2004) highlight and provide convincing 
support for two main organizational principles that have emerged from this work: 
hierarchical processing and functional specialization. Hierarchical processing describes a 
continuum, from simple, feature-based representations, to more complex, holistic, 
multimodal representations within the ventral processing pathway, and fits rather well 
with the distinctions between apperceptive and associative agnosia noted above. The 
second principle, functional specialization, goes along in parallel with this hierarchical 
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colour, motion, and form, along distinct processing channels. Again, where and how 
separation of information types ultimately ‘binds’ together and interfaces with stored 
representations to instantiate deep conceptual knowledge of objects is not yet well 
established (see also Kourtzi & DiCarlo, 2006). 
With respect to the functional characterization of particular areas in the ventra
stream important for object recognition, neuroimaging has identified a collection of 
activation foci within lateral and inferior temporo-occipital cortex known as the lateral 
occipital complex (LOC). Two main divisions of the LOC separate its lateral aspects 
from its more inferior/anterior activity, within posterior fusiform cortex. The LOC is 
activated by intact objects (and shapes) versus scrambled-up or non-sense counterparts 
(jumbled images without coherent form), independent of the type of cue used to define 
object shape (e.g. Grill-Spector, Kushnir, Edelman, Itzchak, & Malach, 1998) and 
regardless of image format (Ishai, Ungerleider, Martin, & Haxby, 2000). Moreover, 
various studies have shown that parts of LOC, in particular anterior fusiform components, 
show size, position, and orientation invariance (Grill-Spector et al., 1999; James, 
Humphrey, Gati, Menon, & Goodale, 2002; Valyear, Culham, Sharif, Westwood, & 
Goodale, 2006; Vuilleumier, Henson, Driver, & Dolan, 2002), a useful and expected 
property for a brain region(s) underlying object recognition (i.e. since recognition sh
be achievable despite variations in object size, position, and observers’ viewpoint). Most 
important, several studies dem
activation patterns in L
such 
l 
ould 
onstrate that recognition performance closely aligns with 
OC (for review, see Grill-Spector & Malach, 2004, pp. 658-659). 
Consis 003) 
ms 
tently, when James et al. (James, Culham, Humphrey, Milner, & Goodale, 2
compared the locations of LOC activations from normal participants with the lesion 
patterns carefully defined in patient DF, close overlap was observed, reinforcing clai
that LOC activity is critical to successful object recognition.  
Finally, an area of continuing focus and contention among neuroimagers 
interested in ventral stream function is the issue of object categorization and the ventral 
stream (Grill-Spector & Malach, 2004; Martin, 2007; Reddy & Kanwisher, 2006). 
Several areas considered part of the ventral visual pathway have been shown to activate 
rather selectively for particular object categories, most notably faces, scenes, and human 
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bodies. The main debate centres around whether or not such activations reflect areas truly 
specialized for processing a particular category of objects (modular coding), versus the
idea that these activations instead represent nodes of a wider distributed network, th
collective activations of which instantiate the coding of particular ob
 
e 
jects (distributed 
coding). In s
ples 
f 
 
e 
e, and classification of 
newly seen objects based on stored knowledge 
that divides the proposed functions of the two streams is related to timescales. For action, 
ome excellent work by Malach and colleagues, activations in face and scene 
selective areas are shown to overlap with central versus peripheral processing 
preferences, respectively (Hasson, Harel, Levy, & Malach, 2003; Hasson, Levy, 
Behrmann, Hendler, & Malach, 2002; Levy, Hasson, Avidan, Hendler, & Malach, 2001). 
This has led to a more principled account of higher level object processing and category 
specificity in the ventral stream, one that makes steps towards unifying the concepts of 
hierarchical processing and functional specialization as a coordinated force driving the 
functional organization of visual areas (Grill-Spector & Malach, 2004; Malach, Levy, & 
Hasson, 2002).  
1.2.1. Tool use and the two visual streams hypothesis 
 An attractive aspect of the two visual streams proposal is in how the princi
defined for vision-for-perception and vision-for-action so sensibly differ. The frame o
reference for action must be with respect to the body and must take into account real 
world metrics; an actor must compute the real size, shape, distance, and orientation of 
objects with respect to themselves, in ‘egocentric’ coordinates. In fact, the brain is able to 
transform visual information within and between multiple coordinate frames tied to 
particular body parts (Andersen & Buneo, 2002; Buneo & Andersen, 2006; Graziano & 
Gross, 1998). The frame of reference for perception does not require consideration of the
absolute metrics of objects or relations between them, but instead, to be most adaptiv
perception must operate in relative metrics. Recognition of objects independent of 
viewing conditions, individuation of objects in a cluttered scen
can be achieved much more efficiently 
and reliably if the operations are performed in relative terms. The basic concept is well 
appreciated by considering how easily we make sense of images on TV; objects on the 
screen are perceived and understood in relation to one another, not with respect to real 
world dimensions (Milner & Goodale, 2006, pp. 239-240). A second operating principle 
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it makes little sense to store the computational outcomes of previous actions to guide and 
control new ones, given that, in general, actors and objects in the world are in constant 
flux; for example, the parameters needed to accurately transport and shape the hand to
grasp a given object will change as the actor and/or object moves. Thus, it makes more
sense for the action system to compute parameters de novo; from the bottom-up each time
a new action is carried out. In contrast, the perceptual system needs to construc
operate within long standing representations of the world in order to recognize ob
including people and places, despite various changes in appearances and viewing 
conditions. To recognize old objects as they change over time, and to categorize new 
ones, the perceptual system must ultimately compare what is seen with what is stored in
memory. The systems underlying perception and action appear to operate on 
fundamentally different timescales and frames of reference (Goodale, 2001; Goodale & 
Haffenden, 1998
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 With learned tool use, the separation between vi
for-action would seem to reach its limits. Familiar tools are bound to action plans that 
stretch beyond what is available on the ‘surface’, defined instead by previous experience
unlocked only with successful recognition. How the hand is shaped when grasping-to
tools depends not only on their physical aspects (e.g. size, shape, and orientation), but 
also on stored knowledge of function and use. Once the actions of tools are known, 
identity, and thus visual object recognition, represents an efficient route to learned m
plans. The implications with respect to the two streams hypothesis are clear: familiar too
use is likely to involve explicit cooperation between ventral and dorsal streams. Further, 
the ventral stream is expected to act as a first step in retrieving and activating stored 
motor representations. After all, stored action plans represent the hallmark of skilfu
use. That is to say, for tool use, as with any other learned motor skill, procedural memo
storage, retrieval, and implementation is essential to lasting improvements in motor 
performance. To summarize, the actions of learned tool use extend beyond physical 
object properties and the timeframe by which routine dorsal stream function is thought t
operate, and instead appear to rely on stored object representations and successful 
recognition as mediated by the ventral stream. 
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 In their original account of the two streams dichotomy, Milner and Goodale 
predicted that familiar tool use would require the cooperation of both streams, and that 
the ventral stream would lead the way (Milner & Goodale, 1995, pp. 202-204). In 
particular, in conjunction with recognizing tools, they suggested that the ventral stream 
would also take part in selection of where and how to grasp tools in accordance with 
intended use and known function. Notably, they were also clear to indicate that this 
process of action specification, solving the ‘how to’ part of the puzzle, would critically 
depend on ventral stream cooperation with specialized areas of inferior parietal co
Finally, the end products of this processing would reach the dorsal stream, where actu
sensorimotor transformations critical to motor implementation and control are computed 
and carried forth. The basic scheme fits well with their broader account of how
streams are likely to interact in general. With everyday actions, individual objects are 
parsed from others i
rtex. 
al 
 the two 
n busy crowed environments by the ventral stream, selected for 
potential action, while the dorsal stream then specifies particular motor outputs and 
d 
n 
well, 
tes. 
ly awkward grasping postures if this will 
enable more comfortable postures upon completion of end goals. The tendency to grasp 
governs online control (Goodale & Humphrey, 1998; Milner & Goodale, 2006, pp. 231-
233).  
 What evidence is there for ventral stream involvement in familiar tool use? The 
strongest support has come from testing functional grasping in patient DF (Carey, 
Harvey, & Milner, 1996). When asked to grasp and use familiar tools, DF shaped an
oriented her hand perfectly well with respect to the metrical properties of tools; however, 
she often failed to posture her hand in a way that reflected knowledge of function and 
use. The most obvious example of this functional orienting of the hand when grasping 
tools can be seen with handled tools, when the handle is faced away from the actor. I
this situation, people will typically rotate their hand to end up in a final posture well 
suited for use (see Chapter 2, Figure 2.1A). While control participants were seen to 
follow this tendency, DF did not. The tendency is part of a broader ‘rule’ in motor 
control, identified by Rosenbaum and colleagues (Rosenbaum, van Heugten, & Cald
1996; Rosenbaum, Vaughan, Barnes, & Jorgensen, 1992), whereby the kinematics of 
early aspects of multistep actions are selected in anticipation of comfortable end-sta
Most clearly, people will reliably adopt relative
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handled tools in a way that is appropriate for use was specifically addressed in a stud
Creem and Proffitt (2001), and their findings provided additional evidence for ventral 
stream involvement in tool use. They found that when participants were asked to gr
tools while simultaneously performing a task involving semantic processing, grasping 
actions appropriate for tool use were made less frequently than when participants eith
grasped without performing the concurrent semantic task or when they instead 
simultaneously performed a spatial imagery task. The results were taken to indicate that
planning functional grasps to tools necessarily involves semantic systems, presumably 
including ventral stream areas. When the semantic task was being performed at the same 
time as grasping, grasping did not tend to incorporate functional knowledge, presumably 
because resources from semantic systems were not fully available. Insofar as semantic 
processing involves the ventral stream, the findings nicely converge with those of 
functional grasping in patient DF. Apparently ventral stream functioning is needed to
grasp tools appropriately for use, precisely in line with the scheme initially proposed
Goodale and Milner reviewed above. 
1.3. Parietal mechanisms of grasp
y by 
asp 
er 
 
 
 by 
ing and tool use in monkeys   
1.3.1. Neurophysiology of grasping 
 With respect to neural recording methods, the first indication of an important role 
for PPC in the visual guidance and control of grasping came from a paper by Hyvarinen 
and Poranen (1974), followed by the pioneering work of Vernon Mountcastle and 
colleagues (1975). Recording from single neurons in monkey IPS/SPL, Brodmann’s areas 
(BA) 5 and 7, Mountcastle et al. (1975) described “hand manipulation” neurons which 
fired selectively when objects were grasped and manipulated; in particular, during the 
final stages of grasping, just before and as the hand made contact and during subsequent 
manipulation. These neurons were not activated during the transport phase of grasping, 
by passive peripheral stimulation, or when the monkey actively performed non-object-
directed movements of “an aggressive or aversive nature” (Mountcastle et al., 1975, p. 
881). Since these early discoveries, others have continued to use electrophysiological 
recording methods to further characterize the response properties of neurons within the 
IPS during object grasping and manipulation tasks. Sakata and colleagues made the next 
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major breakthroughs, specifying area AIP at the anterior end of the IPS as the key parietal 
region critical for grasping, and elucidating some of its most important response 
properties (Murata, Gallese, Luppino, Kaseda, & Sakata, 2000; Sakata, Taira, Kusunoki
Murata, & Tanaka, 1997; Sakata, Taira, Murata, & Mine, 1995; Taira, Mine, 
Georgopoulos, Murata, & Sakata, 1990). They looked at the visual and motor responses 
of neurons separately, and showed that many AIP neurons were tuned to particu
configurations in accordance with object shape. Further, visual response selectivity often
matched motor response selectivity, such that a neuron showing selectivity for a given 
object when viewing also showed selectivity for that same object when grasping. The 
significance of these findings were clear: this was exactly the kind of response signature 
that could in principle mediate the transformation of visual information regarding 
physical object properties to corresponding motor programs for grasping (Jeannero
Arbib, Rizzolatti, & Sakata, 1995). More recent recording studies from Gardner and 
colleagues distinguish response properties of AIP neurons from somatosensory driven 
responses in the postcentral gyrus, and
, 
lar grasp 
 
d, 
 show that specific populations of neurons are 
ebowy, Ghosh, 
Ro, & Gardner, 2001; Gardner et al., 2007; Gardner, Debowy, Ro, Ghosh, & Babu, 2002; 
9; Ro, Debowy, Ghosh, & Gardner, 2000). Notably, 
t 
f AIP 
‘motor vocabulary’, with neurons specifying the kinematics of particular actions, but 
tuned to specific temporal phases of object grasping and manipulation (D
Gardner, Ro, Debowy, & Ghosh, 199
earlier work had also looked at grasping responses in somatosensory cortex (Iwamura & 
Tanaka, 1978; Iwamura, Tanaka, Hikosaka, & Sakamoto, 1995), but these authors did no
probe or distinguish responses to grasping in IPS. Finally, the critical importance o
in the guidance and control of grasping was verified by Gallese et al. (1994) who showed 
that inactivation of AIP neurons by injection of GABA-receptor agonist (muscimol) 
results in profound deficits in hand preshaping when grasping. Monkeys performed 
awkward grasps, showing poor anticipatory shaping of the hand in accordance with 
object size and shape, and sometimes even failed to complete grasps altogether. 
 AIP sends outputs to, and has dense reciprocal connections with area F5 in ventral 
premotor cortex (Borra et al., 2008; Luppino, Murata, Govoni, & Matelli, 1999; Matelli 
& Luppino, 2001). The response properties of many neurons in F5 show strikingly 
similar characteristics of those defined in AIP. Rizzolatti et al. (1988) describes F5 as a 
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tuned to action goals, not necessarily to the motoric specifics of constituent movements. 
For example, two actions with similar movement kinematics, but performed in di
contexts and with different goal-defined outcomes will not tend to activate the same F5 
neurons (Rizzolatti & Luppino, 2001). Further, just like AIP, F5 contains neur
show response selectivity for particular objects, with visual and motor response 
specificity tightly matched (Murata et al., 1997; Raos, Umilta, Murata, Fogassi, & 
Gallese, 2006; Rizzolatti et al., 1988; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996). 
Objects that activate these neurons most strongly when viewed are typically of a shape 
that conforms to the neurons’ preferred grasp configuration. These neurons were given
the name ‘canonical neurons’, and alongside functionally equivalent coding in AIP, were 
said to instantiate the neural mechanisms needed to match and transform vision of 
to the motor specifications governing skilful grasping and manipulation (Luppino et al
1999, p. 181). I will return to canonical neurons, as the response characteristics of the
cells have important implications for Projects 2 and 3 of the current thesis. Reversible 
inactivation of area F5 with muscimol injections disrupts hand preshaping during 
grasping (Fogassi et al., 2001); hand shape no longer matched object size or shape, 
similar to the effects seen with inactivation of AIP (Gallese et al., 1994). More recent 
work has shown that multi-unit recordings from area F5, reflecting the pooled activity of 
many neurons, can predict upcoming kinematic features of reach and grasp actions with 
remarkable accuracy (E. Stark & Abeles, 2007). Notably, signals from multiunit 
recordings predicted actions much better than signals from either single neurons or local 
field potentials (which reflect also sub-threshold synaptic events), suggesting that coding 
for grasp type in F5 is achieved through population firing, represented in the coordina
responses of multiple neurons. Also, new work comparing response properties in F5 
primary motor area M1 has shown that object/grasp-specific coding is present in both
regions, but in greater proportions and with earlier activations in F5 (Spinks, Kra
fferent 
ons that 
 
objects 
., 
se 
ted 
with 
 
skov, 
Brochier, Umilta, & Lemon, 2008; Umilta, Brochier, Spinks, & Lemon, 2007). These 
data are consistent with the notion that F5 neurons translate visual information about 
object features into corresponding motor plans, which are then received and refined in 
M1 for delivery to appropriate spinal machinery controlling hand and digit muscles 
(Umilta et al., 2007). 
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 In summary, it has been proposed that macaque AIP-F5 circuitry constitutes the 
cortical mechanisms underlying “pragmatic vision”, responsible for the visuomotor 
transformations critical to the guidance and control of object grasping and manipulation 
(Fagg & Arbib, 1998; Jeannerod et al., 1995; Matelli & Luppino, 2001; Rizzolatti, 
Fogassi, & Gallese, 1997). It should be emphasized, however, that this system op
parallel with other key neural circuitry; many other cortical areas are no doubt impo
for object grasping and manipulation. For example, mounting evidence indicates that
dorsal premotor cortex (area F2) is also critical for the control of grasping (reviewed in 
Castiello & Begliomini, 2008; Grafton, 2010; Matelli & Luppino, 2001; e.g. Raos, 
Umilta, Gallese, & Fogassi, 2004; for connections with parietal areas, see Wise et al., 
1997). Likewise, newer electrophysiological studies indicate that medial posterior 
parietal area V6A, previously thought of as more specifically related to reaching and arm
control, shows response coding for grasping similar to that observed in area AIP (Fattori 
et al., 2009; Fattori et al., 2010). Indeed, widespread parietofrontal control is nicely 
exemplified by monkey neuroimaging studies of grasping, which indicate recruitm
multiple foci spanning much of posterior parietal and frontal cortices (Evangeliou, R
Galletti, & Savaki, 2009; Nishimura, Onoe, Morichika, Tsukada, & Isa, 2007).  
Another type of neuron found in both areas AIP and F5 was shown to fire both when 
the monkey executes and observes an action (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & 
Rizzolatti, 1992; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996). 
These are known as mirror neurons. Mirror neurons share a common property with 
canonical neurons in that the execution of actions are not needed to make them fire, a 
property that relates directly to the methodology used in the current projects. Together, 
these neurons represent sensitivity to purely visual stimuli in areas F5 and AIP; dynamic 
actions in the case of mirror neurons and graspable objects in the case of canonical 
neurons. Moreover, like canonical neurons, for a good proportion of mirror neurons the 
selectivity of visual responses matches that of motor responses. Those actions that ma
these neurons fire most rigorously when observed are the same actions that make them
fire most rigorously when executed (Gallese et al., 1996). This was proposed to provide a 
means by which observed actions can be unders
simulation in the observer (Gallese & Gold
erates in 
rtant 
 
 
ent of 
aos, 
ke 
 
tood, through a process of implicit motor 
man, 1998). Various versions of the motor 
 
21 
 
resonance hypothesis have since emerged, and mirror neuron mechanisms have been 
proposed to underlie a wide range of functions in addition to action understanding 
(Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001), including imitation 
(Buccino et al., 2004; Iacoboni et al., 1999), observational learning (Cross, Kraeme
Hamilton, Kelley, & Grafton, 2009; Frey & Gerry, 2006; Mattar & Gribble, 2005), theory 
of mind (Agnew, Bhakoo, & Puri, 2007; Iacoboni et al., 2005), empathy and social 
cognition (Gallese, 2006; Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Leslie, Johnson-Frey, & Grafton
2004), and even aesthetic experience (Calvo-Merino, Jola, Glaser, & Haggard, 2008; 
Freedberg & Gallese, 2007). Despite the number of plausible (and not so plausible) 
accounts, the true function and significance of mirror neurons is not yet well establishe
(Decety & Grezes, 1999; Hauser & Wood, 2010; Hickok & Hauser, 2010; Jacob &
Jeannerod, 2005). 
1.3.2. Neurophysiology of tool use 
New and fascinating discoveries regarding the neural basis of tool use in monkeys 
have recently been made and are continuing to surface thanks to the brilliant work of a 
group of neuroscientists in Japan, led by Atsushi Iriki. This work is making steps towards 
r, 
, 
d 
 
answering some of the most important questions surrounding evolution of the human 
bra
ieve 
e 
se 
in (Iriki & Sakura, 2008). What brought about the great expanse of brain and mind? 
How and why do human cognitive capacities appear to so greatly outstretch those of our 
closest primate relatives? 
Japanese macaque monkeys were trained to use a simple rake-like tool to retr
food items that were otherwise out of reach (Ishibashi, Hihara, & Iriki, 2000). Macaqu
monkeys rarely use tools in the wild (Tomasello & Call, 1997), and at first, progress in 
training the monkeys to use the rake tool was slow, typically at a rate of more than a few 
months per monkey (Iriki & Sakura, 2008, pp. 2229-2230). However, as the training 
program was made optimal, monkeys learned to use the rake skilfully in about 14 days 
time, and according to a recent review (Iriki & Sakura, 2008), over 50 individuals have 
now been rake-trained, all of which have successfully acquired the skill.  
The first exciting finding was made when Iriki et al. (1996) compared recordings 
obtained from single neurons within the anterior bank of the IPS before and after tool u
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training. The neurons of interest showed bimodal response properties, responding to b
visual and tactile stimuli. Further, the visual receptive fields1 (vRF) of these neuron
were tied to the body, anchored to the tactile receptive fields (tRF) of particular body 
parts. For example, a neuron with a tRF located on the hand, would fire to visual stimuli 
in a radius of space immediately around the hand, and the vRF would ‘track’ with the 
hand as it moved in space. In other words, the vRFs of these bimodal neurons in ante
IPS were bound to specific body parts, independent of where the monkey’s gaze was 
fixed. The remarkable findings came when Iriki and colleagues noticed that after tool 
training, the vRFs of many of these bimodal neurons changed to include the area of s
around the tool. For example, a neuron with its vRF tied to the hand, after training 
showed sensitivity to visual stimuli near the space around the tool, as if the vRF 
properties of the ne
oth 
s 
rior 
use 
pace 
uron expanded to now encompass the space around the tool. 
the monkey actively using the rake; after a 
 back to only include the area of space 
 induced changes in IPS neurons at the molecular level 
(Ishibashi et al., 2002a, 2002b). They had hypothe
synaptic plasticity and transmission, and processes critical to learning and memory (see 
Incredibly, such expanded vRFs depended on 
period of rest (about 5 min), vRFs ‘regressed’
coded prior to training, even though the monkey still held the rake in hand when these 
recordings took place. These findings indicate that the cellular changes induced by tool 
use training are capable of dynamic moment-to-moment alterations depending on the 
active state, or goal-state of the monkey.  
These initial findings were strengthened and extended when the group later 
looked at tool use learning
sized that the vRF changes correspond 
with new synapses; in particular, new contacts to IPS neurons from other areas carrying 
visual information were predicted to correspond with tool use learning. In search for 
support of this hypothesis, they developed a novel method of testing expression levels of 
messenger RNA (mRNA) corresponding to the following neurotrophins: brain-derived 
neurotrophic factor (BDNF), neurotrophin 3 (NT-3), as well as BDNF receptor trkB. A 
variety of previous evidence indicates that these neurotrophins are important for various 
cellular events tied to the formation of new synapses, including neurite arborization, 
                                                 
1 The receptive field of a neuron is the part of space for which stimuli are effective in making the cell fire. 
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Ishibashi et al., 2002b, p. 4 for references). Consistent with their hypothesis, they found 
enriched mRNA expression for BDNF, NT-3, and trkB (and not for control genes) in 
anterior bank of the IPS of monkeys that were sacrificed on day 12 of rake-training, a 
training period known to overlap with skill acquisition and learning (see also Ishibashi et 
al., 2000 for detailed time course of behavioural learning). In contrast, monkeys that w
sacrificed on day 15 of training, a period beyond learning that coincides with already 
established skill, did not show such elevated levels of expression. In other words, 
increased expression of these markers of synaptic plasticity was specific to the learning 
phase of tool use, when skills with the rake were still being acquired and improved. Thus, 
alongside changes in neural response properties, namely dynamic modifications of 
tool use learning was shown to correlate with upregulation of various neurotroph
anterior IPS. The findings support the hypothesis that dynamic vRF modification
following tool use training in monkey IPS neurons comes about through the formation of 
new synapses. Notably, although not the main focus of the original paper by Iriki et a
(1996), tool use training not only showed changes in vRFs of bimodal neurons, but som
neurons were also seen to ‘take on’ visual responses after training (see Ishibashi et al., 
2002b, p. 3). Increased transcription of BDNF, trkB, and NT-3 may mediate cellular 
events underlying these changes. Ishibashi
the 
ere 
vRFs, 
ins in 
s 
l. 
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 et al. (2002b) speculate that the dynamic 
moment-to-mom
ng. 
afferent connectivity patterns within anterior IPS neurons of trained versus untrained 
ent changes in vRFs seen when monkeys switch from active to passive 
tool use may correspond with ‘silent’ synapses, active only upon sufficient depolarization 
of membrane potentials brought about through active tool use. It was argued that 
plasticity at such short timescales is not likely to involve upregulation of BDNF at the 
level of gene transcription, which would explain why monkeys on day 15 did not show 
similar levels of heightened expression (although BDNF and NT-3 may still be important 
for these fast dynamic processes at the protein level). 
The picture of tool use learning induced neural plasticity was made even more 
complete with the work of Hihara et al. (2006), who mapped the presence and 
organization of new connections within anterior IPS neurons following tool use traini
First, the authors used a retrograde tracing technique to test for potential differences in 
monkeys. Labelled cells indicating sources of input to IPS neurons were uniquely 
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identified within the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and ventral prefrontal cortex of tool 
trained monkeys. No such labelling was observed in naïve untrained monkeys. TPJ 
neurons were located in the superior temporal sulcus (STS), in a region that appeared j
caudal to motion area MSTda and TPOc and lateral to area 7a according to the 
cytoarchitectonic divisions defined by Lewis and Van Essen (2000b). Also, according to 
the connectivity maps of Lewis and Van Essen (2000a), this area normally projects to 
area VIPm and LIPv, located in the fundus and posterior bank of the IPS. Based on
comparisons, tool use learning led to the extension of connections from this region to 
more anterior IPS neurons. The TPJ populations are believed to correspond with higher 
level visual processing of motion and location, information that could be vital to the 
guidance of body part movements in space. The new inputs to IPS neurons from ventral
prefrontal cortex were localized within the ventral sector of the principal sulcus (BA
The authors speculate that these new connections may support added levels of cognitive 
and contextual flexibility that may accompany newly acquired tool use behavior.  
To gain a sense of the changes in synaptic connectivity patterns within anterior 
IPS after tool use training, and to complement their findings with retrograde tracing, the 
authors next injected an anterograde tracer within the TPJ region identified as a new 
source of visual information. This technique tracks forward the new connections from
TPJ to IPS and provide details about the functional architecture of these connections 
within IPS. First, the density of labelled cells was much stronger in the IPS of trained 
versus untrained monkeys. Second, the distribution patterns of labelled fibres were also 
different. Whereas both trained and untrained groups showed inputs to deep layers in the 
fundus of the IPS (layers 4-6), inputs identified within the superficial layers (layers 2-3) 
and towards the crown of the postcentral gyrus were unique to trained animals. Lastly, 
single axon reconstructions specific to trained animals showed dense spreading of 
ust 
 these 
 
 46). 
 
termina
erficial 
l fields and extensive branching throughout all layers of the IPS, and electron 
microscopy confirmed the presence of active excitatory synapses within the sup
layers of trained monkeys only. Altogether the findings indicate that tool use learning 
gives rise to incredibly elaborate changes in the underlying cellular architecture of 
anterior IPS, with new long-range connections originating from TPJ and ventral 
prefrontal cortex. 
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Additional studies by Iriki and colleagues have pushed the boundaries of their 
initial findings to new and surprising extents. With training monkeys were able to lea
use images of their hand/tool shown on a video monitor to guide their actions to retrieve 
otherwise inaccessible food rewards (Iriki, Tanaka, Obayashi, & Iwamura, 2001
RFs of IPS neurons were shown to map onto the video screen, to track with the hand and 
expand to the tool, and, most remarkably, when the image of the hand/tool on the scree
was position-translated and/or changed in size, the vRFs of IPS neurons followed suit. 
The neurons were tied to the visual characteristics of the screen image, when these 
images changed, so too did the vRFs of neurons. Such a mapping illustrates a profound 
level of abstraction; cells tied to the hand and arm were essentially ‘detached’ from re
space and physical properties of hand and arm. The authors then slowly erased the image
of the hand and tool on the monitor screen, until eventually a single spot corresponding to 
the functional end of the tool was sufficient to track with vRFs. Importantly, with all of 
these findings, correlated motion of real hand/tool and screen image/representation
rn to 
). Visual 
n 
al 
 
 was 
necessary for vRFs to transfer and track. 
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y to 
 on 
 
. 
have 
city to 
atent in wild monkeys untapped through the unique pressures of their 
The findings indicate unprecedented flexibility 
in the kinds of associative cues monkeys can use to guide their actions and in the extent 
to which such external cues may come to represent specific parts of the body.  
Upon concluding, the predominant theory put forth by Iriki et al. to account for 
tool-training-induced changes in the RF properties of IPS refers to the concept of bod
schema (Head & Holmes, 1911). The bimodal neurons at the anterior extent of the IPS
are viewed as critical to encoding the body and near body space, and tool use learning is 
seen as leading to dynamic incorporation of the tool into the body schema (see also 
Umilta et al., 2008). Neural RF expansion translates into expansion of body 
representation, as if the properties of the tool were now represented as part of the body. 
According to Iriki and colleagues, this capacity underscores a more abstract capacit
represent the self as an independent entity (Iriki, 2006; Iriki & Sakura, 2008). They go
to argue that once reached, such capacities open the door to new cognitive progressions,
and evolution of brain and mind is sped forward (see also, Hihara et al., 2006, p. 2645)
The onset and continuing complexity of tool use behaviours in early hominids may 
served to catalyze the great expanse of cortex that followed. It is argued that capa
objectify the self, l
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tool us l 
 
PC 
 knowledge 
e paradigm represents vital cognitive precursors necessary for subsequent neura
expansion and specialization, key steps forward in the evolutionary history of the human 
brain and mind.  
Do the findings just reviewed suggest that the complexity of tool use behavior in 
humans evolved through the expansion of pre-existing parietal mechanisms related to 
more basic visuomotor control? While there is evidence of similar expansion-of-space-
encoding effects in humans after the use of tools that extend the reach (Berti & 
Frassinetti, 2000; Maravita & Iriki, 2004; Maravita, Spence, Kennett, & Driver, 2002), 
tool use in humans far exceeds that of other primates (Frey, 2007; Johnson-Frey, 2003b; 
McGrew, 1993), and expanded space is not sufficient to explain the transformations of 
more complex tool use (Arbib, Bonaiuto, Jacobs, & Frey, 2009). It appears as though 
while neural mechanisms revealed with tool use studies in monkeys undoubtedly lay the 
foundation for mechanisms present in humans, the remarkable extent and capacity of 
human tool use must rely at least in part on newly evolved brain areas (Frey, 2007; 
Peeters et al., 2009).  
1.4. Parietal cortex divided  
In a number of recent review papers, several different authors have put forth a 
similar message: the functions of PPC in action extend beyond the visuomotor 
transformation and sensorimotor control (Buxbaum & Kalenine, 2010; Creem-Regehr, 
2008; Culham & Valyear, 2006; Daprati & Sirigu, 2006; Frey, 2007; Jeannerod & Jacob, 
2005; Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003). In general, these newly emphasized functions of P
are considered higher level cognitive-motor functions, which include tool use
and action understanding. In the following I will cover some of the key ideas that have 
recently surfaced regarding the functional organization of areas specialized for tool use.   
1.4.1. Parallel parietal streams to action: Grasping versus using 
The central theme of these more recent discussions of parietal function in action is 
that the PPC is divided, with separate channels devoted to online control of actions versus 
the planning and use of tools (amongst other dissociations). As shown schematically in 
Figure 1.3, a lateral stream projecting to inferior parietal areas (lateral-IPL stream), is 
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distinguished from a medial stream projecting to superior parietal areas (medial-SPL 
stream) (Buxbaum & Kalenine, 2010; Johnson & Grafton, 2003; Rizzolatti & Matelli, 
2003).  
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Figure 1.3. Parallel parietal routes to action. A schematic of the two proposed routes to action, 
shown on a partially inflated cortex. The left hemisphere is shown from a lateral view (left), and 
dorsal lateral view (right). The lateral parietal stream specialized for learned tool use is shown in 
green, with two main areas specified, inferior parietal lobule (IPL) and posterior middle temporal 
gyrus (pMTG). Also, ventral stream areas comprising the lateral occipital complex (LOC) 
important for object recognition and the anterior temporal poles important for stored 
conceptual/semantic knowledge of objects are included as putative additional components of the 
lateral parietal stream. The medial parietal stream specialized for online motor control is shown in 
orange. The superior parietal lobule (SPL) and medial parieto-occipital (mPO) cortex are 
important nodes within this stream, shown to be critically involved in reaching and grasping. 
Grasping-defined anterior intraparietal area AIP is shown on the side of the medial stream; 
however, AIP may represent a common end-point for both streams.   
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The functions of the medial-SPL stream correspond with the classic dorsal stream 
as described by Milner and Goodale (1995). The main purpose of this stream is the online 
control of actions. The mechanisms of the medial stream operate in ‘real time’, within 
egocentric, effector-specific coordinates, tuned to veridical object metrics directly 
accessible from information available on the retina. Superior parietal cortex represents 
the main processing module of this stream, with key connections stemming from areas 
along the medial surface of parieto-occipital cortex (Gamberini et al., 2009). Conversely, 
the lateral-IPL stream is specialized for learned tool use, more closely aligned with 
mechanisms devoted to high level action planning, accessible to conceptual knowledge of 
objects and actions. Inferior parietal cortex represents the main processing module of this 
stream, with specialization for tool use thought to be primarily left lateralized. The 
lateral-IPL stream is hypothesized to involve key connections with ventral stream areas, 
including areas of the lateral occipital complex (LOC) specialized for object recognition. 
More inferior ventral stream areas, within fusiform cortex associated with category-
selective object vision (Martin, 2007), as well as semantic knowledge stores within 
 actions 
of tool 
Evidence for the theory of two parallel parietal streams to action starts with the 
recognition of distinct connectivity patterns to inferior versus superior parietal areas in 
the macaque. Areas within the IPL have connections with areas in the superior temporal 
sulcus (STS), not present in the pathways to SPL (Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003). This is 
important in the context of tool use because STS neurons are endowed with high-level 
visual form and motion properties and are heavily interconnected with inferior temporal 
areas of the ventral processing stream. Indeed, both IPL and inferotemporal cortex have 
dense connections with areas in STS (Harries & Perrett, 1991; Morel & Bullier, 1990; 
anterolateral temporal cortex (anterior temporal poles, aTP) (Patterson et al., 2007) may 
also be critical to the conveyance of high level conceptual object information within this 
stream. In contrast with the medial-SPL stream, the lateral-IPL stream must operate in 
both past and present. Somehow stored knowledge of tools and their associated
must interface with real time effector-based mechanisms necessary for the guidance and 
control of actions. How this is accomplished is not yet known, but current theories 
use suggest that the solutions are unravelled within inferior parietal cortex, within the 
lateral parietal stream to action. 
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, 
erhaps it is of some significance that STS neurons have 
been shown to not only differentiate between motion of the self versus others, but also 
, 1992). Communication between IPL areas and the ventral stream may also be 
bridged through the dense reciprocal connectivity these regions both exhibit with 
prefrontal cortex (Goldman-Rakic, 1996; Petrides & Pandya, 1984) which is also 
interconnected with medial temporal lobe structures (Blatt, Pandya, & Rosene, 200
Lavenex, Suzuki, & Amaral, 2002; Morris, Pandya, & Petrides, 1999). Finally, the IPL 
itself has direct connections with medial temporal lobe structures (e.g. parahippocampal
cortex) (Clower, West, Lynch, & Strick, 2001; Munoz & Insausti, 2005; Rockland & Van 
Hoesen, 1999; Suzuki & Amaral, 1994). Cells in the STS are important for high leve
multimodal integration of visual form and motion (Barraclough, Xiao, Baker, Oram, & 
Perrett, 2005; Oram & Perrett, 1996; Oram, Perrett, & Hietanen, 1993), object (Baker, 
Keysers, Jellema, Wicker, & Perrett, 2001; Hietanen & Perrett, 1996) and face proc
(Harries & Perrett, 1991; Perrett et al., 1991; Perrett et al., 1985), and demonstrate 
remarkable selectivity when observing others’ actions (Barraclough, Keith, Xiao, Oram, 
& Perrett, 2009; Perrett et al., 1989; Perrett, Mistlin, Harries, & Chitty, 1990). For 
example, some cells not only discharge selectively when observing particular action
(e.g. grasping), but also show sensitivity to the gaze direction of actors. Such response 
specificity may implicate a special role for STS areas in encoding intentionality of others’
actions (Jellema, Maassen, & Perrett, 2004; Jellema & Perrett, 2006). Further, I have 
already reviewed the evidence from tool use training in monkeys: new connections were
found to sprout from STS neurons to reach anterior IPS following expertise with tool use
in parallel with changes in the molecular and physiological properties of the intraparietal 
neural circuitry. Presumably these new connections carry forward visual information 
important for tool use behavior. P
show selectivity for responses to self movements when an object is in hand (Hietanen & 
Perrett, 1993, 1996). Such differentiation could indeed be useful for coding self-
controlled actions with objects. STS areas receive heavy inputs from motion specialized 
areas MT and MST, both of which show comparatively little connectivity with medial 
posterior parietal areas V6/V6A; which, as noted above, are key processing nodes along 
the medial-SPL stream to action (referred to as the ‘dorsal-dorsal’ pathway by Rizzolatti 
& Matelli, 2003). Thus, in the monkey, IPL has privileged access to high level visual 
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motion, object, and action encoding within temporal cortex; information that may be 
particularly critical for tool use. Indeed, liken to what Iriki and colleagues have im
(Hihara et al., 2006, p. 2645; Iriki & Sakura, 2008), this route may represent a key
evolutionary stepping stone in the progressive specialization of human tool use behavi
To this end, it is notable that the IPL in particular underwent significant expansion in the
course of human evolution (Bruner, Manzi, & Arsuaga, 2003; Orban, Van Essen, & 
Vanduffel, 2004); even with full brain volume controlled, human IPL is 
disproportionately larger than both monkey and chimpanzee IPL (Eidelberg & 
Galaburda, 1984, as cited in Johnson-Frey, 2003, p.206).  
 That learned tool use and online visuomotor control separates in human parietal 
cortex is actually, in general, a very old idea. The origins of the disorder known as 
ideomotor apraxia (IM) trace back to the early 1900s and the work of Hugo Liepma
(see Goldenberg, 2003 for a historical account of Liepmann's work; Liepmann, 1977, 
1980). Liepmann was the first to explain IM as a selective impairment in performing 
learned skilled actions, not explained by any elementary motor or sensory deficit, or 
related to general problems with cognition, comprehension, or attention. Although these 
patients can recognize tools and typically understand what it is they are supposed to do 
with them, they have great problems when it comes to actually carrying out proper 
movements. Specifically, these patients make gross spatiotemporal errors when 
attempting to perform tool use actions (Poizner et al., 1998). Most common, errors are 
more profound when asked to pantomime tool use actions; many patients show 
improvements with actual tool use (Goldenberg & Hagmann, 1998; Hermsdorfer, Hentze, 
& Goldenberg, 2006). Liepmann established that ideomotor apraxia predominantly 
follows left inferior parietal damage, a finding that has largely stood the test of time 
(Goldenberg, 2009; Goldenberg & Spatt, 2009; Haaland, Harrington, & Knight, 2000). 
Liepmann also maintained that apraxia and aphasia, although commonly overlapping, are 
in fact distinct, reliant on distinct neural systems, a precedent also confirmed in more 
recent times (Alexander, Baker, Naeser, Kaplan, & Palumbo, 1992). Critical to the 
current discussion, apraxia is also distinct from optic ataxia (OA). I made mention to OA 
above in the context of the two visual streams. I noted then that OA follows damage to 
the dorsal stream and results in problems with reaching and grasping. The disorder was 
plied 
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first described by Bálint (1909), who examined a patient that showed problems reachi
to visible targets with his right hand following bilateral damage to PPC. Bálint correctly 
deduced that the deficits with OA are visuomotor in nature, not explained by genera
impairment of basic sensory or motor functions. Although still most commonly 
associated with deficits in arm control and reaching to targets in space, when tested, 
patients with OA typically also show problems with grasping (Goodale et al., 1994; 
Jakobson, Archibald, Carey, & Goodale, 1991; Jeannerod, 1986). Accord
and Vighetto (1988), the IPS is most commonly damaged in patients with OA, m
encompassing aspects of the SPL rather than the IPL (see a
ng 
l 
ing to Perenin 
ore often 
lso Ratcliff & Davies-Jones, 
oci 
 
e 
y (PET 
u et al., 
L’s 
ed 
f the 
 
1972; Rondot, 1989). With newer lesion subtraction methods Karnath and Perenin (2005) 
highlight a total of three distinct foci of maximal lesion overlap in OA patients: two f
near the junction of occipital and parietal cortex, extending medially in the precuneus and 
superior occipital gyrus, and a third focus in the SPL. Thus, while IM and problems with 
tool use are associated with damage to left IPL and the lateral-IPL stream to action, OA
and problems with reaching and grasping are associated with damage to bilateral SPL and 
the medial-SPL stream to action (Figure 1.3)(Goldenberg, 2009). 
 The new, more surprising part of this story is that depending on a person’s goals 
and intentions, grasping itself may depend on distinct parietal systems. The evidenc
begins with a single patient, LL, who showed signs of posterior parietal patholog
and SPECT imaging both revealed evidence of bilateral occipito-parietal 
hypometabolism) and had problems pantomiming and using familiar tools (Sirig
1995). The patient complained of troubles performing daily activities with objects, like 
brushing her teeth, locking a door, and using a fork and knife to eat. When tested 
formally in the lab with a set of 20 common objects, four independent raters judged L
performance in the use of objects as severely impaired. Beyond this initial evaluation 
based on more global scoring of actions, the judges were asked to rate both the 
correctness of hand posture and reach trajectory separately, based on a set of well defin
expectations. For example, in the case of a soup spoon, for hand posture, the stem o
spoon was expected to be held “between the thumb, index and middle fingers, with the 
palm of the hand turned slightly upward and towards the subject’s body” (p. 44). Such 
specifications nicely illustrate the concept of functional grasping of tools as distinct hand
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shaping for grasping-to-use (see Chapter 3). For reach trajectory, the spoon “had to be 
moved in a back and forth manner between the table and the subject’s mouth” (p. 44).  
Thus, reach trajectory was evaluated on the basis of more global movements of body 
parts, their spatial localization, directionality and timing. To my knowledge, this
first study to distinguish and closely evaluate the constituent components of grasping
reaching in a tool use task in an IM patient. The results showed that while LL was 
profoundly impaired at shaping her hand correctly for object use, her reach trajectories 
(and the coordinated movements of both arms when needed) were unimpaired. Further, 
the authors then asked LL to grasp the same set of 20 tools and looked closely at both the
trajectory and smoothness of her grasping movements, as well as the distance between 
her index finger and thumb as a measure of the anticipatory scaling of her grasp in flight. 
With all tools, LL showed smooth and well directed grasping, her wrist orientation in 
flight was matched with that of the tools’ orientation, and her grasp aperture was highly 
correlated with the size of the grasped portion of tools. Altogether, the findings were 
clear: LL was able to shape her grasp according to physical object properties when 
grasping-to-move, but when asked to grasp-to-use those same obje
 was the 
 and 
 
cts her hand shaping 
nd 
s, whereas with 
ing. 
ts) that 
l 
was severely perturbed.  
 Since this study, Sirigu and colleagues (2003) went on to test grasping-to-use a
grasping-to-move common tools in a group of five IM patients with damage to left IPL. 
In the grasping-to-move task, participants had to simply grasp and lift tool
grasping-to-use they also had to demonstrate conventional use. To characterize the 
detailed kinematics of grasping according to task, they used a specialized glove with 
multiple sensors that read out real time information about finger joint angles 
(CyberGlove; Virtual Technologies). Following the work of Santello et al. (1998), 
principle component analysis was used to identify specific kinematic features of grasp
These analyses use the data itself to identify statistical structures (i.e. componen
can account for the greatest amount of variance. In healthy subjects, grasping-to-move 
was characterized by two main components, whereas grasping-to-use included an 
additional component, thought to underlie the finer motor adjustments necessary for too
use. Analysis of grasping in IM patients lacked this third ‘use-specific’ component but 
grasping-to-move was similar to controls. Thus, as with patient LL, these findings 
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indicate selective impairments in the kinematics of grasping based on function and 
intention of use. In contrast, grasping-to-move tools based on physical object metrics wa
preserved in IM patients with left IPL damage. More recently, Randerath et al. (2009) 
also tested IM patients when grasping-to-move versus grasping-to-use. Again, 
impairments were found for grasping-to-use only, and performance with subsequent tool 
use was predicted by performance with functional grasping; failure to grasp tools 
functionally was always followed by impaired tool use (i.e. apraxia). Consistent with thi
general theme, Buxbaum and others (Buxbaum, Sirigu, Schwartz, & Klatzky, 2003) 
showed that IM patients typically demonstrate appreciably better knowledge of hand 
postures based on physical structure versus function. 
 So far, the evidence presented has shown that grasping based on knowledge of 
tool function and use can dissociate from grasping based on structure, but what about the 
reverse pattern? Is it possible to have impairment in grasping-to-structure but not 
grasping-to-function? Jeannerod and colleagues (1994) described a patient, AT, who had 
bilateral damage to parieto-occipital cortex, disrupting the medial-SPL stream to action. 
The patient showed impaired grasping, inappropriately scaling his grasp to the size of 
s 
s 
objects. However, when tested with size and shape matched objects familiar to the patient 
 
ntral 
ay be 
 when 
t 
ction 
tored 
(e.g. lipstick), grasp scaling was considerably improved. Evidently, the familiarity of 
objects allowed the patient to better program his grasping in flight. The authors attributed
these improvements as compensation stemming from the patient’s intact “semantic” 
visual system (i.e. ventral stream). Indeed, the patient did not have damage to the ve
stream and could visually identify objects perfectly well. The findings were taken to 
suggest that impairments in grasping due to disruption of the dorsal pathway m
compensated to some extent based on object-centred inputs from the ventral stream
the targets of action are familiar. However, such a hypothesis is incomplete without 
consideration of the findings from patient LL (and others like her, just reviewed). Objec
recognition and the ventral stream are spared in patient LL, yet she nonetheless shows 
selective impairments in shaping her hand for grasping based on learned object fun
and intention of use. Thus, an account of ventral stream involvement in familiar tool use 
can only be complete if the left IPL is considered; indeed, I believe a key aspect of IPL 
specialization for familiar tool use is its unique propensity to receive and integrate s
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object knowledge stemming from ventral stream sources. Taken together, the findin
reviewed suggest independent parietal routes to grasping, a medial route tuned to the 
metrical scaling of hand posture based largely on bottom-up sensory information, and a
lateral route needed for eliciting functional hand postures dependent on top-dow
knowledge (Daprati & Sirigu, 2006; Johnson-Frey, 2003a; Johnson & Grafton, 2003). 
1.4.2. Evidence from neuroimaging of grasping and tool use 
 In principle, human neuroimaging techniques like fMRI should provide a rather 
straightforward means for testing theories of divided parietal function for tool use versus 
grasping. In practice, however, the way is not so easy. First and foremost, the study of 
real actions with fMRI is inherently very challenging. In
gs 
 
n object 
 any fMRI study, subject head 
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motion is likely the number one cause of poor data quality; even very small movements 
of the head, especially if in time with the experimental paradigm, can lead to spurious 
activations and render results unreliable. Hand and arm movements can easily tran
head motion, leading to signal artifacts that coincide with actions and contaminate 
responses of interest (i.e. neural driven responses tied to action performance). Also, even
if the head is kept completely still during action performance, movements of the arm 
itself (indeed, any mass) in the magnetic field can also lead to MR signal perturbations 
(Barry et al., 2010). A second set of challenges relate to the limitations imposed by spa
The bore size of typical MR units is very small (typically ~ 60 cm), limiting the range of 
arm and hand movements that can be performed; and in the case of tool use, space iss
also put physical constraints on the size of tools that can be tested. Also, the subject 
configuration for most MR units is to lie supine in the scanner, making direct vision o
real objects impossible without the use of mirrors. Even if subjects could tilt their hea
so that viewing of objects and the manual workspace might be possible, standard whole-
head radio frequency coils used in most MR setups do not easily allow for such tilted
head configurations. 
Fortunately, these technical hurdles can be overcome, and our lab has developed 
the strategies, resources, and equipment to do so. First, to solve issues of mass-
movement-related signal artifacts we use slow event-related methods such that potential 
signal perturbations due to arm/hand movements occur in real time, whereas neural-
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related, blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) changes occur with a temporal lag.
Thus, by spacing actions well apart in time, we can resolve neural-related signal chang
from movement-related artifacts. Second, with specialized radio frequency coils and 
custom built stimulus presentation equipment we are able to scan participants in a head-
tilted configuration to allow for direct viewing of objects while they perform real action
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Finally, a combination of careful head ‘packing’, simple biofeedback m
recru ent of participants who are well informed and experienced with fMRI, and the 
use of small amplitude movements to limit transfer of arm motion to the head have 
proven successful in solving problems with action-induced head motion.  
Unfortunately, challenges with comparisons of grasping and tool use with fMRI
go beyond solving such technical hurdles. Case-in-point, consider an experiment aimed 
to test theories of divided parietal streams for grasping and tool use by comparing grasp
to-move actions directly against grasp-to-use actions. While the predications of such an 
experiment are clear based on the patient work reviewed above, interpreting the res
such a subtraction is not without its problems. The two types of actions, grasping and tool 
use, differ so greatly in kinematics (e.g. complexity, duration, and extent), greater 
activations for grasping-to-use may relate to such differences in general, rather than 
anything specific to tool use per se.  
The problem stated above underscores a major weakness common to all tool use 
imaging studies to date. Of the few studies that have used real objects, tool use has been 
compared with conditions involving no object manipulation (i.e. pantomime tool use) 
(Hermsdorfer, Terlinden, Muhlau, Goldenberg, & Wohlschlager, 2007; Imazu, Sugio, 
Tanaka, & Inui, 2007), no overt action (i.e. imagined tool use) (Higuchi, Imamizu, & 
Kawato, 2007), or, quite specifically, the use of chopsticks to pick up objects versus 
grasping with the hand (Inoue et al., 2001). Thus, ‘tool use activations’ may relate to 
differences in motor complexities, durations, 
any instances, all of the above. More common, studies do not involve object 
manipulation at all, but instead look at tool use pantomimed actions as a proxy f
tool use (e.g. S. H. Choi et al., 2001; Johnson-Frey et al., 2005; Rumiati et al., 2004). 
Here again, control actions are not carefully equated for kinematic complexity. In Pr
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3 (Chapter 4) of the current thesis, I present a novel tool use paradigm that solves this 
incessant problem of controlling for kinematic complexity. I use a visual priming 
paradigm to probe the neural substrates of learned tool use, while at the same time 
comparing trial types that involve the same tool use actions and thus the same motor 
outputs. My findings (and this new improved approach) serve to push the field forward, 
and provide a more selective account of the neural substrates of learned tool use
previously available. 
In a recent review, Lewis (2006) performed a meta-analysis compiling the reports 
from 35 imaging studies across 64 distinct paradigms involving tools. The types of tasks 
 than was 
have ra
 main 
rtex, and posterior middle temporal cortex. Areas of 
the production network were bilaterally repr
Patterson, 2003). Conversely, ventral stream activations in tool use production tasks have 
nged from more perceptual/conceptual (answering questions, reading words, 
viewing pictures) to more motor-related (imagined tool use, pantomiming tool use), to 
actual tool manipulation (with real tools used; discussed above). Lewis distinguished 
between a conceptual versus production tool use network based on the number of 
paradigms showing activation overlap and the type of task used (conceptual versus 
production). The main areas of the conceptual network comprised left inferior frontal 
gyrus, left posterior middle temporal gyrus, and bilateral fusiform cortex, while the
areas of the production network comprised PPC (both IPL and SPL), dorsal lateral 
premotor cortex, ventral premotor co
esented, but with clear left hemisphere 
prevalence in strength and extent of activity. While this separation is useful, the same 
data may also be taken quite differently. That is, with these same data one might instead 
highlight that activation patterns across a number studies show surprisingly high 
proportions of overlap for both conceptual and action tasks. Indeed, as Scott Frey has 
emphasized in his reviews of the neuroimaging literature on tools, both dorsal and ventral 
stream areas are often activated for both motor and conceptual tasks (Frey, 2007; 
Johnson-Frey, 2004). Dorsal stream activations for conceptual tasks have been taken as 
support for distributed accounts of conceptual knowledge stores (Barsalou, 2007). In this 
view, it is worth noting that several independent groups have shown that left IPL is 
activated more strongly during explicit retrieval of manipulation versus functional 
knowledge of tools (Boronat et al., 2005; Canessa et al., 2008; Kellenbach, Brett, & 
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been taken as support for the cooperative role of both dorsal and ventral streams 
underlying familiar tool use (Frey, 2007), in line with the basic model shown in Fi
1.3. However, this interpretation may be confounded. Defining contrasts often invo
object versus non-object conditions, and thus ventral stream activity may be attributed
visual object activity (or imagery). Also, most of these studies employ tool use 
pantomime which may specifically recruit ventral stream resources independent of real 
tool use, as do other m
gure 
lve 
 to 
emory-guided actions (Cohen, Cross, Tunik, Grafton, & Culham, 
2009; Singh
ents 
 
less 
ither 
ed 
 role of 
n for 
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al, Kaufman, Valyear, & Culham, 2005) (however, see also Kroliczak, 
Cavina-Pratesi, Goodman, & Culham, 2007). In fact, pantomime in the absence of real 
3D objects also obscures interpretation of parietal activations; added conceptual elem
may ‘push around’ patterns of activity, giving rise to findings not otherwise 
representative of real tool use. In summary, additional work is clearly needed to: i) verify 
the role of ventral stream areas in real tool use planning and implementation, and ii) 
identify potential differences between real and pantomime tool use. 
Before concluding, a few additional imaging findings demand specific attention
(despite some of the caveats just discussed). First, Johnson-Frey et al. (2005) showed that 
posterior parietal activity for tool use pantomime was strongly left-lateralized regard
of which hand was used (see also Bohlhalter et al., 2009; Kroliczak & Frey, 2009). This 
contrasts with activation for grasping, which shows bilateral activations in AIP for e
hand, although typically stronger activity in the hemisphere contralateral to the hand us
for grasping (Begliomini, Nelini, Caria, Grodd, & Castiello, 2008; Culham et al., 2006; 
A. Stark & Zohary, 2008). The pattern is consistent with the proposed specialized
the left lateral-IPL stream for learned tool use and its separation from the medial-SPL 
stream devoted to online control of more basic actions. With a clever “go”-“no-go” 
design, Johnson-Frey and colleagues (2005) were also able to tease apart activatio
tool use pantomime planning versus execution. They showed a posterior-to-anterior 
continuum of planning-to-execution-related activity in inferior parietal cortex, 
remarkably consistent with the findings of another imaging study that independently
surfaced at the same time (Fridman et al., 2006). Finally, Vingerhoets et al. (2009) u
motor imagery task to compare the following conditions: imagined pointing-to, imag
grasping-to-move, imagined grasping-to-use, and imagined grasping-and-using tools. 
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They also varied these conditions across familiar tools, unfamiliar tools, and simp
shapes. In short, they report a collection of activation foci within the left IPS that are: i) 
more active for use versus move tasks, and/or ii) show sensitivity to tool familiarity. 
Again, these findings are consistent with the general idea that left inferior parietal cortex 
is specialized for learned tool use, and suggest that spatially distinct IPS populat
contribute to distinct aspects of tool use knowledge.  
1.4.3. Viewing tools: A theory of use-based affordances 
The first neuroimaging study to discover that PPC was selectively activated by 
simply viewing pictures of familiar tools was made by Chao and Martin (2000). Their 
findings were to make a considerable impact on the field, reaching the interests of many 
subsequent authors, as evident from the paper’s impressive current count of 337 citations 
(Web of Science, August 2010). Viewing (and silently naming) familiar tools was 
compared with viewing animals, a contrast that overlaps directly with a rich history of 
neuropsychological evidence whereby patients with selective percep
le 
ions may 
tual/semantic 
impairm
 
 
-
ered non-
h 
ents for man-made vs. natural object categories (and vice versa) have been 
frequently noted (Humphreys & Forde, 2001; Warrington & Shallice, 1984). From this 
perspective the contrast of tools versus animals was a sensible comparison to explore. 
However, from the perspective of interpreting parietal activations for tools, the 
comparison was problematic. Did the activations reflect the fact that tools are graspable 
(versus animals), or, as the authors suggested, did this parietal activity represent stored 
manipulation knowledge of tool function and use? After all, their tool-related activity 
appeared close to where our lab has identified grasp-selective activity, and canonical 
neurons in monkey area AIP respond to the graspable properties of viewed objects (see
section1.2.1). To resolve this uncertainty, we put forward our own version of this 
experiment (Valyear, Cavina-Pratesi, Stiglick, & Culham, 2007). We tested responses to
viewing the following categories of familiar objects: tools, graspable objects, and non
graspable objects. Graspable objects were clearly manipulable, but were consid
tools, having much weaker and less clearly defined actions associations compared wit
the objects we selected as “tools”. If parietal activity for tools reflects object graspability, 
then both categories were expected to show similar activation levels. Instead, if parietal 
activity is sensitive to the strength and extent of action associations, then tools should 
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activate these areas more strongly. With three independent approaches, we found 
convergent evidence for the latter account. First, we replicated the findings from Chao 
and Martin (2000), and then showed that activity in the parietal tool area is indeed 
selective for tools versus other graspable objects, and no differences were evident 
between graspable and non-graspable objects (Figure 1.4). Next, we found distinct 
intraparietal activations for tools > graspable objects and for graspable objects > non-
graspable objects (Figure 1.5). Finally, in a subset of the same subjects we aligned data 
from previous studies of real object grasping and showed that parietal activations for 
viewing tools were distinct from those selective for grasping (Figure 1.6).   
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Figure 1.4. Results of ROI analysis from Valyear et al. (2007). Areas were identified within 
each individual by contrasting the naming of tools with the naming of animals based on localizer 
scans. Each subject’s ROI is superimposed on the anatomy of a single individual, shown in a 
unique colour. Notice how closely the foci cluster together which indicates a good amount of 
functional-anatomical consistency across individuals. (a) Anterior intraparietal tool areas (AIPC) 
localized within the left anterior intraparietal sulcus of all eleven subjects. (b) The event-related 
averaged time course illustrating the pattern of activity during experimental scans, averaged 
across each individual’s AIPC ROI. (c) The mean percent signal change from area AIPC for each 
experimental condition, shown for each subject and as the group average. (d) Lateral temporo-
occipital tool areas (LTOC) localized within the left lateral occipital sulcus/posterior middle 
temporal gyrus of all eleven subjects. (e) Group event-related averaged time course, for LTOC 
ROI. (f) Mean percent signal change, per subject and as group average. (g) Inferior frontal tool 
areas (IFC) localized within the left inferior frontal gyrus of eight individuals. (h) Group event-
related averaged time course, for IFC ROI. (i) Mean percent signal change, per subject and as 
group average.  
Reprinted with permissions from Valyear et al. (2007). 
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Figure 1.5. Results of voxel-wise analysis from Valyear et al. (2007). Section I (top) shows
activation maps corresponding to each of our comparisons of interest: the blue coloured 
activation indicates those areas showing significantly higher activity during the naming of tools 
relative to graspable objects; the green coloured activation indicates those areas showing 
significantly higher activity during the naming of graspable relative to non-graspable objects; t
red coloured acti
 the 
he 
vation indicates those areas showing significantly higher activity during the 
e. the opposite of green). Section II 
ach area aligned to the onset of 
each epoch. For both sections : a. left anterior intraparietal cortex (AIPCGO); b. left anterior 
intraparietal cortex (AIPCTOOL); c. bilateral anterior cingulated cortex; d. left lateral frontal 
cortex; e. left posterior intraparietal cortex; f. left lateral occipital cortex; g. bilateral 
parahippocampal cortex.  
Reprinted with permissions from Valyear et al. (2007). 
naming of non-graspable relative to graspable objects (i.
(bottom) shows the averaged time course activity extracted from e
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Figure 1.6. Comparisons of tool naming with object grasping from Valyear et al. (20
Two activations maps are shown for each individual, with grasping activity (grasping versus 
reaching) shown in green, tool naming activity (tools versus animals) shown in blue, and t
extent of overlap highlighted in yellow. The principle anatomical area of interest, the left anterior 
intraparietal sulcus near the junction of the postcentral sulcus, is marked and shown in closer 
detail to the left of each individual. The percent overlap between the two independently defin
ROIs is indicated, computed as the number of overlapping voxels divided by the mean of the total 
voxels from each ROI combined. Notice how in each individual the activity associated with 
naming is reliably posterior to that associated with object grasping. Notice also that the ante
parietal activation for tools is largely left lateralized whereas the activation for graspi
bilaterally in most subjects
07). 
he 
ed 
tool 
rior 
ng is evident 
.  
Reprinted with permissions from Valyear et al. (2007). 
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The findings indicate that parietal responses to viewing tools do not reflect 
processing of affordances for grasping, nor do they overlap with activations for real 
grasping. Notice that this distinction fits well with the theory of divided parietal streams 
for grasping and tool use just discussed; although, notably, our observations revealed 
separation in posterior-to-anterior aspects of IPS, rather than distinctions between lateral 
and medial PPC. More importantly, these findings led me to develop a theory of what I 
call use-based affordances, which I have since continued to formulate and test in the 
projects of the current PhD thesis. The ideas are quite simple. As a psychological 
concept, I take the term affordances to mean the properties of objects perceived as 
important for action, as a natural and intrinsic part of visual processing, in line with the 
original ideas of Gibson (1979). As a physiological concept, I take affordances to mean 
the corresponding activation of motor-related representations. Thus, for me affordances 
mean both the visually processing of object properties relevant for action and the 
concurrent activation of motor-related cortical areas. From this, the theory of use-based 
affordances is simply a distinction between two types of affordance effects based on the 
properties of objects for which these effects originate. On the one hand, affordances can 
be driven by the structural properties of objects, like size, shape, and orientation, and 
corresponding motor (e.g. parietal) activations relate to action plans that map onto these 
object features. These effects are independent of object familiarity, driven solely by the 
structural properties of objects, just as Gibson (1979) had originally described. A 
physiological correlate of these affordance types, which I call structure-based 
affordances, corresponds with canonical neuron responses in monkey AIP (and F5), and 
overlaps with grasp-selective parietal circuitry. In contrast, use-based affordances are 
. 
ge, 
 
ve additional properties that cannot be detected unless one 
 use it; yet, once they are known (by 
driven by learned object properties corresponding with known function and way of use
Such affordances are not directly accessible to vision without access to prior knowled
built up from previous sensorimotor experience, defined by specific motor interactions 
beyond what are called for by structural object properties. Such affordances directly 
correspond with familiar tools. As Jeannerod and Jacob (2005) so elegantly describe:  
Tools, as well as musical instruments or sport materials, are objects which cannot
be characterized merely by their geometrical properties like size, shape or 
orientation. They ha
knows what the object is for and how to
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observation, training or verbal instructions), they do supervene upon the pure 
asic 
 to 
g 
 
ed in 
tant for 
ool 
sus 
l 
priming experiments have been used extensively in cognitive psychology. In general, 
priming
due to s
geometrical properties that are part of the non-conceptual content of more b
visuomotor representations (p. 306). 
The distinction between structure-based and use-based affordances explained our 
neuroimaging findings (Valyear et al., 2007); viewing tools activates left posterior 
parietal areas important for tool use by way of use-based affordances. But, these 
interpretations were merely suggestive – activations were not directly tied to the use of 
tools. Projects 2 and 3 of the current thesis involved real actions with tools and aimed
provide further, more direct support for this theory.  
1.5. Current projects  
A central objective of my thesis was to gain new insights as to the processes by 
which stored knowledge and tool use are linked, both cortically, at the level of underlyin
brain systems, and behaviourally, at the level of action planning and kinematics.  
Project 1 (Chapter 2) used fMRI to map brain activity in response to viewing tool
grasping that was either consistent or inconsistent with how tools are typically grasped 
for use. Tool use is expected to involve changes in parietal representations, thought to 
underlie skilled performance. Such changes are thought to encode motor procedures 
typical of tool use. Movies of grasping typical of use were expected to activate parietal 
areas important for tool use skills more strongly by virtue of closer correspondence with 
underlying motor representations. As noted earlier, these predictions were motivat
part by the properties of mirror neurons in monkeys. Mirror neurons are impor
real grasping, and are also activated by the observation of grasping. Preferential activity 
for typical tool use grasping was taken to indicate sensitivity to the learned aspects of t
use.  
Project 2 (Chapter 3) compared behavioural priming and the kinematics of 
grasping tools between two tasks: grasping to move tools, grasp-to-move (GTM), ver
grasping to demonstrate the conventional use of tools, grasp-to-use (GTU). Behavioura
 refers to the facilitation of a current task event (often called the ‘probe’ event) 
ome prior event (often called the ‘prime’ event). In Project 2, prime events 
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involve
task. C  
previou d affordances for tools (section 1.4.3), the 
 prime-
sured 
olved 
 detailed kinematics of functional 
grasping; differences in grasping across tools would reflect differences in the way tools 
 in structural affordances of handles. Priming was taken as 
evidenc y 
but 
tailored
en 
 
 
areas, then specificity of priming for tool-action and not colour-action pairings is 
expected.  
d viewing tools while probe events involved actions, either the GTU or GTM 
ritically, prime-probe pairs were either the same or different tools.  Following our
s work and the hypothesis of use-base
visual cuing of tool identity was expected to activate learned tool use plans. When
probe events involved the same tools, priming for the GTU task was predicted, mea
as faster reaction times to initiate actions relative to when prime-probe events inv
different tools. To help limit the possibility that priming might be carried by structural 
object properties important for grasping in general, we used tools with the same handle. 
This also provided the opportunity to characterize the
are used, not differences
e of facilitation of programming due to the activation of learned tool use plans b
the visual appearance of tools. 
Project 3 (Chapter 4) used a priming paradigm similar to that of Project 2, 
 for testing with fMRI. Following the hypothesis of use-based affordances 
(section 1.4.3), prime events involving the visual presentation of a given tool were 
expected to activate corresponding motor plans for use. If after a short delay the same 
tool is shown again and used, motor programs supporting its use will have already be
activated (primed) and overlapping neural processes will translate to reduced BOLD 
signal. Neural priming is predicted for areas involved in the recruitment and 
implementation of stored tool use plans. Specificity of priming for tool use was tested by
comparison with newly learned arbitrary colour-action pairings. If priming reflects 
differences in correctly versus incorrectly cued actions, then both tool and colour defined
actions should lead to priming. However, if learned tool use is represented in specific 
brain 
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Chapter 2 
2. Observing learned object-specific functional grasps preferentially activates the 
ventral stream2 
troduction 2.1. In
guide a al to inferior temporal cortex, 
ses visual information to construct detailed perceptual representations, including those 
er, 1992). In general, the 
advent of human neuroimaging has led to additional support for this account, describing 
several ventral stream areas as specialized for visual recognition (for review, see Grill-
Spector & Malach, 2004) and various dorsal stream areas as specialized for the visual 
control of actions (for reviews, see Culham, Cavina-Pratesi, & Singhal, 2006; Culham & 
Valyear, 2006). However, as research progresses, the precise functionality of the two 
streams continues to be refined (e.g. Jeannerod & Jacob, 2005; Rizzolatti & Matelli, 
2003). For example, various lines of evidence suggest several additional roles for the 
dorsal stream, beyond visuomotor transformations and the guidance of actions. In this 
study we take a closer look at two such processes, action observation and tool use, and 
consider the potential relationships between them. Specifically, we tested whether or not 
parietal tool use areas would respond to observing others grasping tools and, moreover, if 
such responses would differ depending on the functionality of the grasp (i.e. depending 
on whether or not the grasp was consistent with the use of the tool).  
 With tool use and manual praxis skills, accurate visuomotor control is obviously a 
key component, and areas within the posterior parietal cortex have long been thought of 
as critical (e.g. Haaland, Harrington, & Knight, 2000; for review, see Rothi & Heilman, 
1997). However, several aspects of these types of actions greatly differ from the types of 
                                                
According to one influential view of the human cortical visual system, a dorsal 
stream, projecting from occipital to posterior parietal cortex, uses visual information to 
ctions while a ventral stream, projecting from occipit
u
critical for the visual recognition of objects (Goodale & Miln
 
2 A version of this chapter has been published. Valyear, K.F. and Culham, J.C. (2010). Observing 
learned object-specific functional grasps preferentially activates the ventral stream. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 22(5), 970-984. 
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dorsal stream processing principles that lly been emphasized. For example, 
e absence of conscious object perception and 
ediated by the ventral stream). However, in the case of complex learned 
 use, object recognition and access to stored semantic knowledge is 
likely to play an im
rved 
, 
f 
h the specificity of 
Merino and colleagues (2005; 2006), greater activity within several parietal and frontal 
areas was reported when participants viewed actions that they themselves where able to 
anisms, similar to those noted in the macaque, is an 
 have typica
Goodale and Milner (1992) showed that visually guided actions such as object grasping 
can be carried out independently and in th
recognition (as m
actions such as tool
portant role (Creem & Proffitt, 2001; Frey, 2007; Hodges, Bozeat, 
Lambon Ralph, Patterson, & Spatt, 2000; Hodges, Spatt, & Patterson, 1999; Milner & 
Goodale, 1995). Similarly, Milner and Goodale (1995) stressed that the visuomotor 
transformations performed by the dorsal stream are not likely to call upon stored 
representations of previous actions, but instead should be computed from the bottom-up, 
in real-time. Here again though, tool use is very much thought to rely on stored 
representations of actions (for review, see Rothi & Heilman, 1997). Thus, for Goodale 
and Milner, tool use is a special kind of visuomotor behavior, one that calls for explicit 
cooperation between dorsal and ventral pathways.  
 The role of the parietal cortex in observing the actions of others is a relatively 
recent discovery. In both humans and monkeys, parietal and frontal responses to obse
actions appear to overlap with those areas critical for the control of actions (for review
see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Indeed, activity during both action execution and 
observation is considered a defining characteristic of mirror neurons in the monkey. 
Importantly, many of these parietal and frontal mirror neurons show tight congruence 
between the types of actions they encode motorically and those they encode visually. In 
studies involving action observations in humans, others have shown that the specificity o
areas active when observing particular actions appears to closely matc
areas active when performing those same actions (e.g. Filimon, Nelson, Hagler, & 
Sereno, 2007; Shmuelof & Zohary, 2005, 2006), and, similarly, responses to perceived 
actions appear to depend on the particular motor repertoire of the observer (for review, 
see Shmuelof & Zohary, 2007). For example, in some exciting imaging work by Calvo-
perform than when they viewed actions they could not perform. Whether or not such 
activity truly reflects mirror-like mech
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issue of current contention that has not yet been resolved (Chong, Cunnington, Williams
Kanwisher, & Mattingley, 2008; Dinstein, Thomas, Behrmann, & Heeger, 2008; Turella,
Pierno, Tubaldi, & Castiello, 2009).   
 Perhaps the most compelling evidence for the importance of parietal cortex in 
perceiving and recognizing actions comes from case studies of patients with parietal 
damage. Here, others have noted that deficits with action imitation often co-occur with 
problems in recognizing actions, and this particular pattern is most strongly associated 
with left inferior parietal lesions (Buxbaum, Kyle, & Menon, 2005; Heilman, Rothi, & 
Valenstein, 1982; Wang & Goodglass, 1992).  Indeed, based on their close analyses of 
these types of patients, Buxbaum and colleagues (2005) suggest that the same parietal 
representations may be critical for both the production and recognition of complex 
actions, consistent with a “direct matching hypothesis” underlying action recognition 
(Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 
1996; for review, see Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). From
, 
 
 a theoretical 
 
 
perspective, an active role in perceiving and understanding actions may be particularly
useful for areas involved in praxis, for example, when learning new skills through 
observation, as is often the case with human tool use learning.   
 We were interested in whether or not parietal responses to observing others’ 
actions would depend on how well the observed actions matched those normally 
associated with tool use. To address this question, we scanned individuals while they 
viewed short movies of familiar tools being grasped in ways that were either consistent or 
inconsistent with how tools are typically grasped during use. By using tool grasping, as 
opposed to whole arm movements with a tool in hand, we were able to keep very tight 
control over our two critical stimulus conditions (see Figure 2.1). That is, our ‘typical 
grasping’ (TG) and ‘atypical grasping’ (AG) movies simply varied with respect to how a 
target tool was grasped in conjunction with how it was oriented. This design allowed us 
to manipulate the strength to which these actions were associated with typical tool use, 
while at the same time keeping other factors between conditions, like the constituent arm
and hand movements themselves, very similar. In previous work, Creem and Proffitt 
(2001) showed that when individuals were asked to grasp familiar tools they typically 
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rotated their wrist and hand in accordance with how the handle of the tool was oriented, 
as with our TG condition. This finding is one instance of a more general “end state 
comfort effect” whereby subjects will adopt an initially uncomfortable posture that 
enables a comfortable posture at the conclusion of an action (Rosenbaum & Jorgensen, 
ent, 
poro-
parietal junction, Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). Indeed, others have shown that unexpected 
oods, 
& 
1992; Rosenbaum et al., 1990; Rosenbaum, van Heugten, & Caldwell, 1996).  As already 
noted, previous imaging work involving action observations have shown that parietal 
areas respond more strongly to actions that closely match internal representations (e.g. 
Calvo-Merino et al., 2006). Thus, we predicted that parietal areas involved with tool use 
would respond more strongly to our TG actions, since these were the types of grasping 
actions normally associated with using tools (as opposed to AG actions). To help us 
identify parietal areas associated with tool use, independently from our main experim
we used a separate localizer paradigm based on previous imaging work (see Methods, 
“Localizer 1”). We also thought that many other areas could be differentially active for 
our movie conditions, including the possibility of detecting areas that prefer viewing AG 
as compared with TG. For example, in some ways our AG movies may seem more 
surprising or unusual to subjects, which might be expected to influence the activity of 
areas involved with understanding the intentional aspects of others actions (e.g. tem
or unusual events can lead to increased activity in many areas (Buccino et al., 2007; 
Liepelt, Von Cramon, & Brass, 2008; Murray, Kersten, Olshausen, Schrater, & W
2002; Murray, Schrater, & Kersten, 2004; Summerfield, Trittschuh, Monti, Mesulam, 
Egner, 2008). Thus, we also performed a whole-volume voxel-wise analyses, directly 
comparing activation between conditions.   
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Figure 2.1. Experimental paradigm. a) Examples of our typical grasping (TG) movies. Shown 
are three individual frames from two different movie clips. In each case, regardless of handle 
orientation, the grasp is consistent with how tools are typically grasped for the purpose of using. 
b) Examples of our atypical grasping (AG) movies. Regardless of handle orientation, the gr
inconsistent with how tools are typically grasped for the purpose of using. Both TG and AG
conditions comprised the same proportion of tool identities, tool orientations, and hand 
trajectories. 
  
asp is 
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Rather than finding a preference for viewing TG actions within parietal cortex, 
this pattern of activity was observed within several ventral stream areas. Our discussion 
focuses on interpreting the significance of these ventral stream activations, as well as 
addressing the findings within parietal cortex, in particular, within the context of action 
understanding and tool use. 
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1. MRI participants   
Nine neurologically intact individuals participated in the study (five female; age 
range of 22 – 41 years) and each provided informed consent in accordance with the 
guidelines approved by the University of Western Ontario Health Sciences Review Ethics 
Board. All individuals were right-handed, with normal or corrected-to-normal visual 
three 
types of movie clips, TG, AG, and Reach movies, which were organized into separate 16 
~ 333 ms. Regardless of the 
movie type, each epoch comprised three movie clips in which the handle of the tool faced 
away from the actor and three movie clips in which the handle of the tool faced toward 
the actor. In TG, when the handle faced away from the actor the hand was rotated about 
the wrist at the point of prehension such that the tool was grasped in a functionally 
appropriate manner, whereas when the handle faced toward the actor the tool was grasped 
without such a rotation (but still in a functionally appropriate manner; see Figure 2.1a). In 
AG the reverse was true, such that when the handle faced away there was no rotation of 
the hand but when the handle faced toward the actor there was. This combination brings 
about grasping actions that do not easily allow for the actor to use the tool without further 
postural adjustments (see Figure 2.1b). The Reach movies simply involved the touching 
of the target tool (at the handle) with the actor’s knuckles. Note also that, in the interest 
of keeping hand and arm trajectories similar across conditions, regardless of handle 
orientation, half of our Reach movies also involved a rotation of the hand at the point of 
acuity, and all were naïve to the purpose of the study.  
2.2.2. Experimental paradigm 
Movie clips were recorded and shown at 30 frames per second, were 2 s in 
duration, and each frame subtended 15° of the subject’s visual field. There were 
s epochs, with 6 clips per epoch and an inter-clip-interval of 
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contact
e 
hs comprised of scrambled-up 
ovies. In the scrambled epochs, like with the other movie conditions, six 
distinct movie clips of 2 s duration were shown with an inter-clip-interval of ~ 333 ms. 
re created by deconstructing each clip into its constituent 
frames  
d 40 s and comprised 25 separate epochs (6 fixation, 7 
scramb a 1-
o 
e 
. Also, we performed a left-right ‘horizontal flip’ on our movie clips, such that 
half of our blocks showed actions with the right hand approaching from the left side of 
space (Figure 2.1) while the other half showed actions with the left hand approaching 
from the right side of space, balanced across conditions. Our three movie conditions wer
interleaved with either 16 s fixation epochs or with epoc
versions of the m
Scrambled movie clips we
(using Adobe Premiere), dividing each frame into a grid of 48 x 48 cells and then
randomly reordering the cells of the grid (with subsequent frames of a given clip 
scrambled and reordered in the same manner, using a custom Matlab code), and then 
finally reconstructing the movie clip from the newly scrambled frames (again, using 
Adobe Premiere).  
 Each run lasted 6 min an
led, and 4 epochs per movie type). Throughout each run subjects performed 
back task whereby responses were made, via a right-handed button press, whenever tw
successive video clips were identical. Each epoch could contain either 0 or 1 repeated 
clip, balanced across conditions (2 repeats per movie type, 3 repeats for scrambled). 
Subjects were told that their main goal should be to perceive each of the movies intently, 
that the repeated clips would occur quite infrequently, and that the task of detecting thes
repeats would be used as an index of their attention to the movies. A solid red circle, 
superimposed on the centre of each frame, served as a fixation point throughout.  
 Altogether, our collection of tools included 33 different identities (see Appendix 
A) and 4 different exemplars for each identity (e.g. 4 distinct umbrellas) for a total of 132 
distinct objects, and for each object, any given hand posture might be associated with it. 
Each run was organized such that within the first half, all 33 distinct tool identities were 
shown (divided up among the first six intact movie epochs) and within the last half a 
different exemplar of the 33 identities were shown (divided up among the six remaining 
intact movie epochs). The following run showed the third and fourth exemplar versions, 
again distributed separately across the first and second halves of the run. The third run 
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used the same tools as in the first run and the fourth run used the same tools as in the 
second run, however, in each case, the hand actions associated with each of the tools 
differed from those shown previously. That is, careful organization of clips ensured tha
when tool identities, and identity exemplars, were repeated they were not coupled with 
the specific hand actions for which they were previously associated. Thus, the time 
between repetition of tool identities (and exemplars) was maximized and the type of hand 
actions associated with each repetition was varied and unpredictable. Both of these 
measures were taken so to minimize the potential for complicated repetition effects t
accrue upon the repetition of identities and/or exemplars. The order of runs was 
counterbalanced across individuals.  
 Note also, to gain some appreciation of how familiar our subjects were with the 
appropriate use of our different tools, we asked them to estimate levels of hands-on-
experience using the following five
t 
o 
-point scale: 1 = never used or seen in use, 2 = never 
sed m
ly 
 
 
 
ed 
u yself, but seen in use, 3 = used this tool maybe once or twice in my life, 4 = use 
this tool approximately once a year, 5 = weekly or daily use. This scale was taken direct
from a recent imaging study by Vingerhoets (2008) that was specifically designed to 
address issues of tool familiarity.  We received responses from 7/9 of our subjects, and
the mean ‘familiarity-of-use’ score across all of our tools was found to be 4.4, with a 
standard deviation of 0.5, indicating that our tools were highly familiar to our subjects. 
Most importantly, given that each particular tool was distributed evenly across our three 
movie types, any observed activation differences across movie types could not be 
attributed to differences in tool familiarity. 
2.2.3. Localizer 1: Bodies, objects, tools 
Each of these runs included colour photos of familiar tools (87 different 
identities), headless bodies (87 different identities; 44 were females), non-tool objects (87
different identities, including vehicles, furniture and appliances, food items, plants, 
clothing items, and other objects from miscellaneous categories), and scrambled-up 
versions of these stimuli. All stimuli were selected from the Hemera Photo-Objects image
database (Hemera Technologies Inc., Gatineau, QC). For the scrambled stimuli, we 
divided each of our photo images into a grid of 48 x 48 cells and then randomly reorder
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the cells of the grid. A small black circle was superimposed in the centre of each imag
serve as a fixation point. Each image subtended 15° of the subject’s visual field. Stimuli 
were organized into separate 16 s epochs, with 18 photos per epoch, presented at a rate of
400 ms per photo with a 400 ms inter-stimulus-interval. Each run lasted 6 min and 40 s 
and was comprised of six stimulus epochs per condition and seven (baseline) scramb
epochs. Stimulus epochs were organized into sets of three, separated by scrambled 
epochs, balanced for epoch history within a single run. All subjects received four of
localizer runs, photos were repeated across runs, and the stimulus and epoch orders we
pseudo-randomized and balanced across runs. Subjects performed a 1-back task 
throughout, whereby responses were 
e to 
 
led 
 these 
re 
made, via a right-handed button press, whenever 
 
l 
f 3 
t 
 
Robarts Research Institute (London, Ontario, 
Canada , 
te 
onal 
000 
two successive photos were identical. Each stimulus epoch included either three or four 
repeated photos, balanced across conditions (with a total of 21 repeats per condition per 
run). Scrambled-up photos were not repeated and subjects were simply asked to passively 
view the stimuli during scrambled epochs.  
2.2.4. Localizer 2: Motion sensitivity 
Each of these runs included alternating 12 s epochs of stationary (baseline) and
moving stimuli. Each subject (except one, due to time constraints) received two identica
runs, with 7 stationary and 6 moving epochs per run, resulting in a single run length o
min and 28s. The stimulus was an annulus checkerboard pattern, which moved in and ou
during motion epochs and remained static during stationary epochs. Throughout each run
subjects were simply asked to passively view the stimuli.  
2.2.5. Imaging parameters 
All imaging was performed at the 
) on a 4 Tesla, whole-body MRI system (Varian, Palo Alto, CA; Siemens
Erlangen, Germany) using a transmit-receive hybrid birdcage radiofrequency head coil. 
Each imaging session took approximately one hour and forty-five minutes to comple
and included ten functional runs and a single high-resolution anatomical scan. Functi
volumes were collected using a T2*-weighted, navigator echo corrected, segmented 
spiral acquisition (echo time, TE = 15 ms; flip angle, FA = 40°; time to repetition = 1
ms with two segments/plane for a volume acquisition time of 2 s) to image the blood-
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oxygenation-level dependent (BOLD) signal over time (Ogawa et al., 1992). Each 
volume comprised 17 contiguous, 6 mm, axial-oblique slices, spanning from the most 
superior point of the cortex down through the ventral fusiform cortex, including 
approximately ⅔ of the cerebellum. The field of view was 22.0 cm x 22.0 cm, with an in
plane resolution of 64 x 64 pixels, resulting in a voxel size of approximately 3.4 mm x 
3.4 mm x 6.0 mm. Anatomical volumes were collected in the same orientation and i
plane field-of-view as the functional scans using a T1-weighted 3D magnetization-
prepared spiral acquisition (inversion time, TI = 1300 ms; TE = 3.0 ms; time to repetition 
= 50 ms; FA = 20°, matrix size of 256 x 256 x 96). The resultant voxel size was 0
0.9 mm x 2.0 mm.  
2.2.6. Data preprocessing and analysis 
Imaging data were preprocessed and analyzed using Brain Voyager QX version 
1.7.9 (Brain Innovation, Maastricht, The Netherlands). Each functional run was assessed 
for subject head motion by viewing cineloop 
-
n-
.9 mm x 
animation and by examining Brain Voyager 
running 3D motion correction algorithms on the 
untrans
taxic space (Talairach & 
 
e 
motion detection parameter plots after 
formed two-dimensional data. No abrupt movements were detected in the 
animations and no deviations larger than 1 mm (translations) or 1 º  (rotations) were 
observed in the motion correction output. Functional data were then preprocessed with 
linear trend removal and underwent high-pass temporal frequency filtering to remove 
frequencies below three cycles per run. Functional volumes were aligned to anatomical 
volumes, which were then transformed into standard stereo
Tournoux, 1988).  
All imaging data were analyzed using contrasts within a general linear model 
(GLM) for each type of run (localizer and experimental runs). Each GLM included
predictor functions for each of the conditions (except the baseline), generated by 
rectangular wave functions (high during the condition and low during all other 
conditions) convolved with the default Brain Voyager QX “two-gamma” function 
designed to estimate hemodynamic response properties. For the experimental runs, th
baseline was defined as the scrambled movie epochs, and a predictor of no interest was 
included to account for the fixation epochs. Prior to GLM analysis, each run was z-
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transformed, effectively giving each run a mean signal of zero and converting beta 
weights into units of standard deviations.   
2.2.7. Region-of-interest (ROI) selections and analyses 
For each individual, data from the localizer scans were used to identify several 
distinct areas based on previous imaging work. A similar selection procedure was used to 
define all ROIs in all individuals, whereby the most significantly active voxel(s), or peak, 
was first identified based on a particular contrast (see Results), statistical thresholds were 
then set to a determined minimum, and a volume of interest up to (10 mm)3 = 1000 mm3 
around the peak was selected. The determined minimum threshold value varied 
depending on the nature of the contrast used to define the region and on the robustness of 
al. For example, for both tool-selective areas, 
which w
e response (i.e., volumes 5-7, corresponding to 10-14 s after 
the star
ce, 
r to test 
ere 
) was 
the resultant activity within each individu
ere identified using a more stringent conjunction analysis (see Results), the 
minimum determinant threshold was set to a p < .005 (uncorrected) for each individual. 
Note that we define a conjunction contrast as a Boolean AND, such that for any one 
voxel to be flagged as significant it must show a significant difference in each of the 
component contrasts. 
 For each subject’s ROI, we extracted the average time course activity, aligned to 
the onset of each epoch, from experimental runs. It is worth emphasizing that this activity 
is completely independent from the activity used to identify and select the regions based 
on either of the localizers. Within a given subject’s ROI, the mean percent BOLD signal 
change (mean %BSC) associated with each condition was computed as the average of the 
activation at the peak of th
t of each epoch). In order to compare activations across conditions, the mean 
%BSC values were then entered into a one-way repeated measures analysis of varian
with subject as a random factor. Where significant differences were found, in orde
for differences between pairs of conditions, all possible post-hoc comparisons w
performed by computing an F-statistic. Tukey’s wholly significant difference (WSD
then used to correct the critical significance value so to control for the problem of 
multiple comparisons.   
 
74 
 
2.2.8 Voxel-wise analyses 
A whole-brain voxel-wise analysis was performed for the entire group of subjects 
ate predictor 
or each subject. Three 
s. 
e differences reflect a greater failed-detection rate for the 
cramb
see Figure 2.2d). The locations of these foci are highly 
consistent with previous imaging studies involving tools, including tool viewing and 
using an averaged GLM fitted for random effects analyses, with separ
functions for each condition (except the scrambled baseline) f
contrasts of interest were performed (see Results). Activation maps were set to reliable 
statistical thresholds (p < .005, minimum cluster size of 163 mm3), using Monte Carlo 
simulations (performed with AlphaSim software, courtesy of Douglas Ward, Medical 
College of Wisconsin) to verify that the resultant clusters were unlikely to have arisen 
due to chance (corrected, p < .05), given the problem of multiple comparisons.   
2.3 Results 
2.3.1. Behavioural results  
Two subjects’ behavioural responses were not acquired due to technical problem
Repeated measures analysis of variance revealed no significant differences in response 
reaction times across conditions, F(3,18) = 1.47, p = .26, however, there were differences 
in the accuracy of correct responses, F(3,18) = 11.39, p < .001. Individual pair-wise 
comparisons revealed that thes
s led condition (missed repeats = 22.62%, SEM = 5.67), as compared with all other 
conditions (p < .001); TG missed repeats = 3.57%, SEM = 3.57, AG missed repeats = 
7.14%, SEM = 4.61, Reach missed repeats = 7.14%, SEM = 3.72. Differences between 
TG, AG, and Reach were not significant, F(3,18) = 1.0, p = .73. 
2.3.2. ROI results 
Our first localizer paradigm (see Methods for details) showed pictures of tools, 
other familiar objects, headless bodies, and scrambled stimuli. Tool-selective areas were 
identified by contrasting the viewing of tools versus objects, tools versus bodies, and 
tools versus scrambled images. In each individual, this conjunction contrast reliably 
revealed two areas of robust activity, one localized to the left posterior middle temporal 
gyrus (pMTG; see Figure 2.2a), and the other localized within the left anterior 
intraparietal sulcus, often on the medial bank of the sulcus, near the junction of the 
postcentral sulcus (aIPS; 
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naming (Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999; Chao & Martin, 2000; Martin, Wiggs, 
Ungerl
d 
 
d 
tion of 
ared with AG. Of these two areas, we predicted that the parietal tool area 
ost likely candidate to show such response selectivity. Note, however, 
tive pMTG should be considered part of the dorsal or the 
ventral
ow 
p 
 to our TG movies as 
p < .001), and the activity associated with 
viewing AG and Reach m
he 
 the 
 
ithin this 
ces 
eider, & Haxby, 1996; Valyear, Cavina-Pratesi, Stiglick, & Culham, 2007), 
pantomime tool use (e.g. Fridman et al., 2006; Johnson-Frey, Newman-Norlund, & 
Grafton, 2005), imagined tool use (Creem-Regehr & Lee, 2005; Moll et al., 2000), an
various other tool-related paradigms (for reviews, see Frey, 2007; Johnson-Frey, 2004; 
Lewis, 2006). Our primary interest was in evaluating how these tool-selective areas 
would respond during the observation of our different types of tool-directed actions. In
particular, we predicted that if these areas were tuned to the functional aspects of learne
object-specific actions then they would respond more robustly during the observa
TG as comp
would be the m
whether or not the tool-selec
 stream, or neither, remains uncertain. Indeed, as we will later discuss, the left 
pMTG is active in many different types of tool-related paradigms, and may have a 
particularly special role in processing the motion aspects of tool use. Thus, although we 
had clear predictions with regards to the parietal tool area, we were uncertain about h
the pMTG would respond. Our findings are shown in Figure 2.2c and f. Contrary to our 
predictions, although the tool-selective aIPS showed higher responses to both types of 
grasping movies relative to the reaching movies (TG > Reach, p < .01; AG > Reach, p < 
.001), this area did not distinguish between our two different types of grasping actions (
= .55). In contrast, the tool-selective pMTG was more responsive
compared with our AG movies (TG > AG, 
ovies did not differ (p = .71).  
 It should also be noted that in the majority of subjects (8/9) an additional focus of 
activity within the intraparietal sulcus, posterior to our aIPS area, was detected using t
conjunction contrast (which can be seen in Figure 2.2d and e). Tool selectivity within
more posterior regions of the intraparietal sulcus is also consistent with previous imaging
work (e.g. Valyear et al., 2007). However, analysis of the time course activity w
area during the viewing of our experimental movies revealed no significant differen
(F(2, 14) = 0.01, p = .91).  
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Figure 2.2. ROI results for tool-selective areas. a) Tool-selective activity within the posterior 
middle temporal gyrus (pMTG) is shown for each individual subject (S1-S9). b) Group averaged 
activity, based on random effects analysis, corrected for multiple comparisons, is shown on the 
partially inflated cortical surface of a single individual (S1), with the pMTG activity outlined in 
green. c) Mean percent BOLD signal change (%-BSC) values for the three experimental 
conditions are shown for each individual’s pMTG. The group mean %-BSC is also plotted, with 
any significant differences between conditions denoted (see legend). d) Tool-selective activity 
within the anterior intraparietal sulcus (aIPS) is shown for each individual subject (S1-S9). e) 
Group averaged activity for aIPS is depicted, as in b). f) Mean %-BSC in aIPS is shown for each
subject and the group, as in c)
 
. TG = typical grasping movies; AG = atypical grasping movies; 
Reach = reaching movies. 
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This localizer paradigm also allowed us to identify several other previously 
characterized visual areas, including body-selective areas, the extrastriate and fusiform 
body areas (EBA and FBA)(Downing, Chan, Peelen, Dodds, & Kanwisher, 2006; 
Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & Kanwisher, 2001; Peelen & Downing, 2005), and other 
higher-level object-related areas, the lateral occipital object areas (LO) and ventral 
temporo-occipital object areas (vTO) (e.g. Grill-Spector, Kushnir, Edelman, Itzchak, & 
Malach, 1998). Body-selective areas were identified using a conjunction contrast (bodies 
> tools, bodies > objects, and bodies > scrambled) and object-sensitive areas were 
identified using a simple contrast of objects versus scrambled. These results are 
summarized in Figure 2.3a and b. Most interestingly, the left vTO and area LO bilaterally 
showed a significant degree of selectivity for the TG movies as compared with both the 
AG and Reach movies (left LO: TG > AG, p < .01; TG > Reach, p < .01; right LO: TG > 
AG, p < .0001; TG > Reach, p < .0001; left vTO: TG > AG, p < .001; TG > Reach, p < 
.01) which did not differ from one another (left LO: p = .95; right LO: p = .99 ; left vTO: 
p = .65). 
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Figure 2.3. ROI results for body-, object- and motion-selective areas. a) Body-selective areas, 
the bilateral extrastriate body area (EBA) and the right fusiform body area (FBA). b) Object 
sensitive areas, the bilateral lateral occipital object area (LO) and ventral temporo-occipital object 
area (vTO). c) Motion sensitive areas, the bilateral motion complex MT+. For each of these areas, 
the group mean %-BSC values for each experimental condition are plotted, with any significant 
differences between conditions denoted (see legend). TG = typical grasping movies; AG = 
atypical grasping movies; Reach = reaching movies. 
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In addition to these localizer runs, all subjects except for one (due to time 
constraints) received two very short runs involving alternating blocks of moving and 
stationary patterns. This second localizer paradigm was used to identify the well studied 
human motion complex MT+ (Tootell et al., 1995). In all eight subjects area MT+ was 
identified bilaterally (Figure 2.3c), and the location of these foci were highly consistent 
with previous imaging studies (Dumoulin et al., 2000; Watson et al., 1993). Both the left 
and right MT+ showed a continuum of preferential activity in response to our action 
movies, showing the greatest amount of activity for TG actions, an intermediate level of 
activity for AG actions, and the least amount of activity for the Reach actions (left MT+: 
TG > AG, p < .05;  TG > Reach, p < .0001; AG > Reach, p < .01; right MT+: TG > AG, 
p < .001; TG > Reach, p < .000001; AG > Reach, p < .0001). 
 Worth noting, a very consistent spatial relationship between nearby areas LO, 
EBA, MT+, and the tool-related pMTG was observed within and across individuals. This 
configuration is shown in Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4. Spatial configuration of lateral occipito-temporal ROIs. a) The left hemisphere 
tool-selective pMTG (green), motion sensitive complex MT+ (pink), body-selective EBA (blue), 
and object area LO (purple) of subjects S1 and S2 are shown as 3D volumes superimposed on 
each individuals’ partially inflated cortical hemisphere (sulci = dark gray, gyri = light gray). b) 
Statistical maps representing the number of subjects (>2) with overlapping ROIs. That is, the 
colour coding for a given voxel reflects the number of subjects for which that voxel was included 
as part of their selected ROI. For additional clarity, we have traced the boundaries of each area, 
and, in particular, to help disambiguate area LO from MT+, we have coloured the boundary of 
LO yellow. Most important to note, in both the group and individual the spatial relationships 
between and amongst the ROIs are highly consistent.  
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2.3.3. Voxel-wise results 
Based on all experimental data collapsed across all individuals, fitted for random 
effects analyses, a direct contrast between TG and AG conditions revealed several, often 
contiguous, activation foci (Figure 2.5). These activations were localized to the posterior 
occipital and lateral temporo-occipital cortices; no significant clusters were observed 
within the parietal or frontal cortex, even at more liberal thresholds. This pattern of 
activity is highly consistent with our ROI findings. Indeed, many of the foci appear to 
correspond well with areas LO and MT+ (bilaterally) and the tool-selective pMTG (see 
Figure 5), all of which also showed a preferential response for the TG actions as revealed 
via our ROI analysis. However, increasing the thresholds so to isolate the individual hot 
spots also revealed a few areas that did not correspond as readily with our ROI results. In 
particular, three separable foci were noted in the posterior occipital cortex, one near the 
right calcarine sulcus and the other two appeared symmetrical, situated much more 
ventrally. In addition, one small area within the left putamen was found to be 
significantly more active for viewing our AG as compared with our TG movies (Table 
2.1).  
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Figure 2.5. Group voxel-wise results showing areas preferentially active for TG (> AG). 
Activation is based on a random effects analysis, corrected for multiple comparisons, and shown 
on the cortical representation of a single individual (S1). Slices A and B show the same group 
s localized to the ventral 
stream, with no significant activations observed within parietal-frontal dorsal stream areas, even 
at more liberal thresholds. In order to facilitate comparisons with the ROI-based results, the group 
ROI overlap map boundaries (see Figure 2.4b) of areas pMTG, MT+, EBA, and LO are traced 
over the activity.   
activity superimposed on the anatomical image of S1. Activity wa
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Table 2.1. Voxel-wise Group Results  
TG > AG Talairach Coordinates Volume mm3
Regions: x y z  
left anterior lateral occipito-temporal cortex -52 -64 -3 418 
left posterior occipito-temporal cortex -30 -82 -6 3864 
right anterior lateral occipito-temporal cortex 41 -70 -4 376 
right posterior occipito-temporal cortex 26 -87 -6 1486 
right posterior medial occipital cortex 11 -87 -10 1021 
AG > TG     
Regions:     
rea are indicated.  
  
left putamen -23 6 -7 166 
Areas are based on the group averaged activity within experimental runs, using random effects 
GLM, with activation maps cluster size corrected for the problem of multiple comparisons (p < 
.05). Contrasts used to define each area, mean centre of mass Talairach coordinates, and the 
volumes for each a
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 Most importantly, with respect to our a-priori objectives, the results from both our 
ROI and voxel-wise approaches failed to detect any differential activity within parietal or 
frontal areas in response to our different types of grasping movies. 
2.4. Behavioural follow-up study 
Since much of our imaging findings were unexpected, we decided to run the 
f er to help e ou erpre ons of t . In 
particular, th  he
observed within several ventral stream areas previously implicated as crucial for object 
r b and 2.5). We reasoned that since our TG and 
A within these areas, object recognition processing 
within the context of either TG or AG actions may reflect these differences. Specifically, 
since our TG actions evoked stronger responses within these reas, w  predicted that 
object recognition would be facilitated in this condition relative to AG. 
2  
We used an object naming paradigm and examined accuracy scores and voice-
onset reaction times as measures of object recognition processing. Thirty-one subjects (17 
, 
 screen. Each picture was shown for 2s and subjects 
ess. Critically, in some of 
the pictures the tool was being grasped with a TG posture while in others the tool was 
grasped with an AG posture. As a control condition, which we referred to as Neutral, we 
had tools presented in isolation, with no hand involved. Most of the pictures (86%) were 
taken as single frames from our AG and TG movies used in the imaging experiment. That 
is, due to confounds such as differences in the amount of object being occluded at the 
point of grasping across some of the TG and AG movies, not all of the tool movies used 
in the imaging experiment could be used as stimuli for this naming experiment. The 
remaining tool pictures were taken from movies we had collected previously but had not 
used in the imaging experiment. For the TG and AG pictures, we used only the situation 
where the handle of the tool faced the actor, not unlike the last frames shown with the 
ollowing behavioural experiment in ord  guid r int tati he data
is follow-up study was designed to lp account for the pattern of activity 
ecognition (e.g. area LO; see Figures 2.3
G movies evoked differential activity 
 a e
.4.1. Methods
female; age range of 19-43 years), different from those who participated in the imaging 
study, took part in this experiment. The task simply involved naming pictures of tools
presented singularly on a computer
advanced each subsequent trial themselves, using a button pr
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garden trowel in Figure 2.1a and b (see Figure 2.6). For the Neutral condition we simply 
took the first frame from either of our TG or AG movies, where no hand was yet present. 
Each subject received 6 different orders, and order by trial type was balanced across 
on per order, leading to a total of 132 trials 
per condition per subject. Mean voice-onset reaction times and accuracy scores per 
conditi  
eaction times 
n were as follows: TG = 838.7 ms, AG = 847.0 ms, Neutral = 839.3 ms. 
Individ k 
s 
subjects. There were 22 trials for each conditi
on per subject were then entered into a one-way repeated measures analysis of
variance, with subject as a random factor. Where significant differences were found, in 
order to test for differences between pairs of conditions, all possible post-hoc 
comparisons were performed by computing an F-statistic. Tukey’s wholly significant 
difference (WSD) was then used to correct the critical significance value so to control for 
the problem of multiple comparisons.   
2.4.2. Results 
Repeated measures analysis of variance revealed significant differences in voice-
onset reaction times across conditions, F(2,60) = 4.47, p < .05. The mean r
for each conditio
ual pair-wise comparisons showed that naming pictures with an AG posture too
significantly longer than naming both TG, F(1,60) = 7.25, p < .05, and our Neutral 
pictures, F(1,60) = 6.09, p < .05. In contrast, naming latencies for TG and Neutral 
conditions did not differ, F(1,60) = 0.05, p = .99. Plotted in Figure 2.6 are the difference
in naming latencies between TG and AG versus Neutral, with error bars indicating the 
95% confidence intervals, which reflect the variance in these difference scores across 
individuals. Clearly there is a small but reliable cost to naming AG pictures relative to 
Neutral, but no statistical difference between naming TG and Neutral pictures. There 
were no significant differences in naming accuracy across any of the three conditions; all 
conditions scored at ceiling, 99% correct, F(2,60) = 2.38, p = .10. 
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Figure 2.6. Naming latencies for behavioural follow-up study. Shown are example pictures 
from each condition (top) and the corresponding mean voice-onset reaction times for naming TG 
and AG relative to Neutral (below). For AG there is a significant increase in naming latencies 
compared with Neutral, whereas for TG there is a slight but unreliable decrease in naming 
latencies compared with Neutral. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, which reflect th
variability of the differences between TG and AG relative to Neutral across individuals. TG = 
typical grasping pictures; AG = atypical grasping pictures; Neutral = pictures with no hand 
grasping. 
  
e 
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2.5. Discussion 
We predicted that parietal areas involved in tool use and praxis would respond 
preferentially to our TG movies. Inconsistent with these predictions, both typical and 
atypical types of tool grasping actions were found to activate parietal areas in much the 
same way. Most intriguing, however, several areas more closely associated with the 
ventral stream were activated more strongly while observing TG as compared with AG. 
We view these findings as evidence for sensitivity within the ventral stream to learned 
semantic and/or contextual associations; in particular, those associations tied to stored 
knowledge of object-specific actions. In this way, our findings have important 
implications for understanding the cortical mechanisms underlying human tool use, and, 
more specifically, how semantic knowledge of tools and tool-related actions is likely to 
be represented in the brain. 
Both of our approaches, ROI and voxel-wise strategies, converged upon much the 
same findings: viewing TG as compared with AG led to greater activation in the posterior 
and ventral temporo-occipital cortex (Figure 2.5). As our ROI findings indicate, these 
areas include the left hemisphere tool-selective pMTG, left vTO area, bilateral area LO, 
and bilateral MT+ (Figures 2.2a, 2.3b, and c). Areas LO and vTO are shape selective 
 
 
tools (Beauchamp, Lee, Haxby, & Martin, 2002, 2003; Chao et al., 1999; Chao, 
particular, the left MFG is supposed to be important for 
processing the form and structure of tools (for review, see Beauchamp & Martin, 2007). 
Together with the activity seen in other parts of the LOC, as well as the left tool-selective 
pMTG (discussed in more detail below), we view these findings as evidence for 
sensitivity to the contextual aspects of our movies. Indeed, a ramping up of activity might 
arise within this network whenever object-directed actions are perceived within a familiar 
visual areas of the ventral stream, considered part of the lateral occipital complex (LOC), 
thought to be critical for perceiving and recognizing objects (e.g. Bar et al., 2001; e.g. 
Grill-Spector, Kushnir, Hendler, & Malach, 2000; for review, see Grill-Spector & 
Malach, 2004; e.g. James, Culham, Humphrey, Milner, & Goodale, 2003; e.g. James, 
Humphrey, Gati, Menon, & Goodale, 2000). Previous work has suggested a special role
for the left mid-fusiform gyrus (MFG), near our left vTO area, in processing familiar
Weisberg, & Martin, 2002). In 
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or stereotypical context; in our case the viewing of tools grasped in familiar ways 
resonates with these areas m
ds 
ng 
at 
ledge 
 
 
creased activity may then be expected to facilitate object 
identification and nam
pointed out, our nam
e, 
lso 
ore strongly than the viewing of tools grasped in not so 
familiar ways. For example, perhaps seeing a garden shovel being grasped properly ten
to more robustly activate other semantic associates, like plants and dirt, and this may 
have led to stronger and more extensive activations within the posterior and ventral 
temporo-occipital cortex, as we have observed.  
The results from our follow-up behavioural naming study corroborate our imagi
findings. We found significantly shorter naming latencies when subjects named tools th
were being grasped with a TG posture as compared with an AG posture. If know
about the functional properties of tools were accessible to ventral stream areas critical for
object recognition, then TG might lead to increased activations within these areas, as our
imaging data support. This in
ing, as our behavioural data support. As one anonymous reviewer 
ing results are strikingly similar to the scene superiority effects 
described by Biederman and colleagues (Biederman, 1981; Biederman, Mezzanotte, & 
Rabinowitz, 1982), in which objects are more easily identified when presented in the 
context of a typical setting. For example, Biederman et al. (1982) found that detecting the 
presence of an object was more difficult if presented in an unusual scene (e.g. a fire 
hydrant in a kitchen) or in an unusual position (e.g. a fire hydrant on top of a car). It is 
easy to see how our findings can be considered consistent with these results; in our cas
hand postures were either unusual, as with AG, which was found to be costly for object 
recognition, or usual, as with TG, which had no effect on object recognition (see Figure 
2.6). In other words, depending on the posture of the hand, our objects were either 
presented in a typical or atypical context, and, like with the findings of Biederman et al., 
context influenced object identification (and, in the case of our movies, the patterns of 
activity within ventral stream areas known to mediate higher-level object processing).  
Before proceeding, however, we would like to address the fact that our findings 
were not limited to the higher-level object areas of the ventral stream, but rather a
included motion specialized area MT+, tool-selective pMTG, and, rather surprisingly, 
more posterior occipital areas. With respect to the activation observed in more posterior 
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occipital cortex, in particular, we should consider the possibility that instead of hig
level semantic or contextual influences, our findings might simply reflect low-level 
differences between our TG and AG movies. Two such accounts seem possible. First, 
compared with TG, AG may have led to more occlusion of the functional aspects of o
tools (see Figure 2.1). However, AG was also likely to involve more tool occlusion t
with our Reach condition, such that if our effects
her-
ur 
han 
 were simply driven by differences in 
occlusion levels, differences between AG a
n 
widespread, albeit primarily ventral stream, network of the visual system. Notice that 
nd Reach would have also been expected. 
Moreover, given that for all clips there was plenty of time for tools to be recognized 
before any occlusion took place (approximately 1000 ms), we do not feel that differences 
in occlusion levels would have had any substantial impact on our findings. Second, 
although the hand actions within our TG and AG movies were similar, upon close 
inspection TG appears to involve more fine-tuned postural adjustments of the wrist, 
fingers, and thumb, in particular at the point of grasp and as the object is being lifted. 
Again, however, any area sensitive to such differences would also be expected to show 
higher activity for AG versus Reach, since the grasping actions clearly have more 
postural movements and/or motion transients. Also, both TG and AG involve lifting and 
thus motion of the tool, whereas Reach movies do not. In fact, it is difficult to imagine 
any argument for low-level differences between TG and AG that would not also predict 
differences between AG and Reach. In other words, any low-level account of differential 
activations between TG and AG would also predict differences between AG and Reach. 
Of the areas we identified, only the pattern in area MT+ was consistent with such 
predictions (Figure 2.3c). Thus, it is possible that the activation pattern observed in MT+ 
simply reflects sensitivity to lower-level stimulus differences across movie types. 
However, as we will return to below, there is another possible account of the activatio
we observed in MT+ worth considering. For now, we would like to emphasize that the 
patterns of activity we have observed elsewhere, including early ventral occipital cortex, 
are inconsistent with any plausible low-level explanations. 
Instead, we view the activity seen in more posterior areas of occipital cortex as 
coupled with that seen in higher-level visual areas, like LO and vTO. That is, we believe 
our findings reflect sensitivity to learned contextual and/or semantic associations within a 
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feedback projections are an integral part of the primate visual system (Felleman & Van
Essen, 1991), and mounting evidence suggests that feedback from higher to lower le
visual areas plays an important if not essential role in perceptual processing (for review
see Blake & Logothetis, 2002; Bullier, 2001; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Murray, 
Boyaci, & Kersten, 2006; Murray et al., 2004; Pascual-Leone & Walsh, 2001). Perhaps 
the activity we observed in higher-order visual areas, like LO and left vTO (and/or the 
tool-selective pMTG), is driving the effects observed in more posterior areas, via 
recurrent connections. Moreover, Biederman and colleagues were explicit to emphasi
that their findings, discussed above, did not fit well with a strictly bottom-up view of 
perceptual processing. Instead, their results indicate that object semantics are accessi
very early on, and can influence perception and object recognition rather immediate
Similar findings have been described with letters and words, in which letters are mor
accurately identified within the context of real words versus non-words, or in isolation
(e.g. Reicher, 1969). To account for such findings, McClelland and Rumelhart 
(McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1982) put forth a 
computational model describing parallel excitatory and inhibitory interactions between 
multiple levels of processing. When letters are shown within the context of a word, low
(e.g. visual feature) and high-level (e.g. word knowledge) representations interact with 
one another to strengthen the overall excitatory activity of the network, leading to a 
perceptual advantage. It is exciting to consider that just such a mechanism may relate to 
our imaging findings, and, more directly, may in fact underlie the naming effects w
observed. Along a similar vein, one of the core principles of many prominent theories on 
the organization of semantic knowledge is the importance of multidirectional inter
between higher-level representations and more bottom-up, modality-specific, systems 
(for reviews, see Barsalou, 2007; Humphreys & Forde, 2001; Simmons & Barsalou, 
2003). Indeed, we believe our imaging results reflect this kind of organization, whereby 
conceptual knowledge about the functional properties of obj
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actions 
ects is anchored within areas 
of the ventral stream
 
 specialized for object recognition. 
 Importantly, differences in general attentional mechanisms, like sensitivity to 
task demands, cannot adequately account for our findings. First, there is no evidence to 
suggest that subjects would have paid more attention, or that the 1-back task was more
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demanding for TG; in fact, if anything, AG would seem more likely to capture the greate
interest, since these actions are less familiar, and less predictable. Second, if attentional 
processes were driving our effects, then one would predict highest activation for our 
scrambled movies, for which our 1-back task was appreciably more difficult. Lastly
areas previously implicated as sensitive to attention and task demands (e.g. superior 
parietal areas) (for review, see Kanwisher & Wojciulik, 2000), were not preferentially 
active for TG, as would be expected if differential allocation of general attentional
resources were driving our effects. There are a few other possibilities, however, that may
or may not involve differential attentional mechanisms. For example, TG movies may
hold more implied motion than our AG movies, by virtue of the fact that these movies 
may more readily predict future movements. Such an account may be particularly 
attractive for area MT+, considering that many previous studies have shown this area to
be sensitive to implied motion (Fawcett, Hillebrand, & Singh, 2007; Kourtzi & 
Kanwisher, 2000; Lorteije et al., 2006; Peuskens, Vanrie, Verfaillie, & Orban, 2
Senior et al., 2000). We should emphasize, however, that this interpretation ma
account for the activity seen in other areas, besides MT+. Most importantly, such 
sensitivity to anticipated motion patterns must be based on stored knowledge about 
object-specific actions. Finally, we wish to acknowledge that preferential responses to 
TG need not reflect the activation of explicit semantic representations, but instead m
relate to implicit experiential or procedural knowledge of tool use actions. That is, we 
cannot rule out the potential role of pragmatic processing related to tools and/or the 
actions for which they typically afford. We do, however, find it difficult to accept a 
purely pragmatic-based account of our findings, mainly because many previous data 
indicate a strong parietal/frontal involvement when it comes to the pragmatic aspects o
actions (e.g. Boronat et al., 2005; Kellenbach, Brett, & Patterson, 2003).  
Why do we not find preferential activity for our TG movies within parietal/frontal 
areas? There is certainly plenty of evidence showing that these areas p
underlying praxis and object-specific action knowledge (Haa
r 
, 
 
 
 
 
005; 
y also 
ay 
f 
lay a crucial role in 
land et al., 2000; Johnson-
Frey, 2
r 
004; Rothi & Heilman, 1997). There is also plenty of neuroimaging evidence 
showing that these areas can become active in the absence of any overt movement (e.g. 
with imagined tool use). Are parietal/frontal areas simply insensitive to the familiarity, o
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typicality, of observed tool use actions? Consistent with our findings, Frey and colleagues 
(2003), using a very similar imaging paradigm to ours but with static pictures, also found
that frontal areas were insensitive to the functionality of observed grasps (note, howev
that these authors constrained their analyses to only frontal areas). However, this 
conclusion seems particularly surprising for inferior parietal areas, given that others (
Buxbaum et al., 2005; Heilman et al., 1982) have argued that the recognition of tool use
actions critically depends on the integrity of such areas. Instead, we believe the patt
activation we observed in parietal cortex was strongly influenced by the particular types 
of actions we chose to use. Specifically, if we had shown movies of tools being used, 
rather than simply being grasped, differential modulation within parietal and/or frontal 
cortex may have been observed. In other words, perhaps parietal tool areas specific
encode actions with tools, and not simply toward them. Indeed, most studies interested in
the parieto-frontal representations critical for knowing how to use tools, not surp
have looked only at those actions associated with having the tool in hand. For exampl
test for damage to these representations patients are often asked to pantomime how the
would use objects, not how they would grasp-to-use them. Worth mention, howeve
when tested, deficits specific for grasping-to-use objects have been noted in some ap
patients with parietal damage, suggesting that there are parietal areas specialized for 
mediating object-specific functional grasps (for review, see Daprati & Sirigu, 2006; 
Sirigu et al., 1995). Still, these areas may be important for functional grasping in the 
sense that they provide a special interface, critical for receiving and integrating input
from other areas. In this way, our results suggest that prior to the actual use of object
ventral stream provides important information to specific parietal areas about how to 
most efficiently engage an object based on semantic knowledge about its identity, 
function, and how it is to be moved and used (Creem & Proffitt, 2001; Mil
 
er, 
e.g. 
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ner & 
Goodale, 1995).  
 
There is certainly growing consensus about the left pMTG and its importance in 
knowing about object-specific actions and familiar tools. This area is active during the 
generation of words associated with object-specific actions (Martin, Haxby, Lalonde,
Wiggs, & Ungerleider, 1995), when viewing and naming tools relative to other objects 
(e.g. Martin et al., 1996; Valyear et al., 2007), during the retrieval of semantic 
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information about object function and manipulability (Boronat et al., 2005; Kellenbach et 
al., 2003), during pantomime object use (e.g. Fridman et al., 2006; e.g. Johnson-Frey et 
al., 2005), and is even preferentially responsive to the sounds of familiar tools in action 
(Beauchamp, Argall, Bodurka, Duyn, & Martin, 2004; Beauchamp, Lee, Argall, &
Martin, 2004; Lewis, Brefczynski, Phinney, Janik, & DeYoe, 2005). Also, exciting new 
findings indicate that tool-selectivity in this area comes about as individuals learn about 
the function and manipulability of novel objects (Weisberg, van Turennout, & Martin, 
2007). Human pMTG has not yet been classified as either a dorsal or ventral stream area;
like MT+, it may have crosstalk with both of the classic visual streams. Notably, pMT
is in a good position to receive various types of input (e.g. visual and auditory, 
Beauchamp, Argall et al., 2004; Beauchamp, Lee et al., 2004) and to mediate interaction
between dorsal and ventral pathways. As shown in Figure 2.4, the tool-selective pMTG 
sits just anterior, lateral, and slightly ventral to the well studied human motion complex 
MT+. This relationship is consistent with previous descriptions by Beauchamp and 
colleagues (Beauchamp et al., 2002, 2003), who also showed that the pMTG is more 
active for tools in motion than for bodies in motion, whereas MT+ shows comparable 
activity for both. If, as Beauchamp and colleagues suggested, this area is particularly 
important for processing tool motion (for review, see Beauchamp & Martin, 2007), o
results would indicate that this processing includes knowledge about how tools and 
specific body parts (e.g. the arm and hand) typically move and interact together durin
use. That is, we believe our results suggest an important role for the pMTG in predicti
object-mediated action outcomes, including how tools and body effectors are likely to 
move in both time and space, based on prior experience actually using, or, to some 
extent, seeing others use tools. 
 To summarize, our findings suggest that during the perception of object-directed 
actions the ventra
 
 
G 
s 
ur 
g 
ng 
l stream is likely to play a prominent role in processing the meaning and 
interpr
e 
 
l 
ecting a 
etation of the action, presumably by integrating information about the motoric 
details of the action with stored knowledge about the object. Several areas, including th
tool selective left pMTG and higher level object processing areas LO and the left vTO,
were preferentially active for grasping actions that were consistent with the conventiona
use of tools. While other accounts remain possible, we view our findings as refl
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special role for the ventral stream, as well as the tool-selective pMTG, in coupling stored 
perceptual and semantic knowledge about objects with procedural knowledge supporting
their skilled use. These findings may extend to suggest that during actual tool use a 
complex interplay between ventral and dorsal streams must take place, with ventral 
stream areas providing critical input as to how an object should be engaged in accordance
with stored semantic knowledge. Future research in our lab will look to provide new 
insights into how these interactions are mediated during actual tool use. 
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Chapter 3 
3. To use or to move: Goal-set modulates priming when grasping real tools. 
3.1. Introduction  
According to Gibson (1979), the content of visual perception includes a 
tion of how the environment and objects within it can potentially impact our descrip
 
program d participants to decide whether or 
with ei
were facilitated, and when objects were facing left, left hand responses were facilitated. 
authors have since shown 
that such compatibility effects also work for the sizes of objects. Using a novel apparatus 
to simulate precision and power type grasping (Ellis & Tucker, 2000), they showed that 
small objects facilitate precision-type responses while large objects facilitate power-type 
responses (Tucker & Ellis, 2004). Again, the task, to decide if objects were man-made or 
natural, did not require explicit attention to the particular object features driving the 
effects, nor did it have anything to do with grasping. It appears as though the visual 
properties of objects important for grasping (e.g. size, orientation) automatically trigger 
the activation of corresponding motor representations. 
The idea of motor affordances as integral to the visual perception of objects has 
also received some support at the neural level. Electrophysiological recordings in 
monkeys have shown that grasp-related neurons often respond to the visual presentation 
of objects, even in the absence of any movements (Murata et al., 1997; Murata, Gallese, 
Luppino, Kaseda, & Sakata, 2000; Rizzolatti et al., 1988; Taira, Mine, Georgopoulos, 
Murata, & Sakata, 1990). Moreover, for some of these cells, the motor and visual 
response properties closely match (e.g. cells that respond maximally to precision-type 
grasping, also respond maximally to the sight of small objects, which afford precision 
actions. The mere sight of a graspable object, for example, will partially activate motor
s for grasping. Tucker and Ellis (1998) aske
not pictures of familiar graspable objects with handles were inverted or upright. Object 
handles were either facing left or right, and simple button-press responses were made 
ther the left or right hand. When objects were facing right, right hand responses 
These results were taken to indicate that handle orientation automatically gives rise to the 
activation of corresponding motor plans for grasping. These 
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grasping). In human neuroimaging stud otor areas show preferential 
2000; Valyear, Cavina-Pratesi, Stiglick, & Culham, 2007), and real objects within 
chable) space (Gallivan, Cavina-Pratesi, & Culham, 2009). Also, in a 
recent study using a com
 
es, 
n, 
 
 
ng is sensitive to priming, but 
clearly m
f 
 
 
d, 
 it 
ies, sensorim
activation for pictures of graspable (vs. non-graspable) objects (e.g. Chao & Martin, 
reachable (vs. unrea
bined TMS and EMG approach, Buccino et al. (2009) showed 
that motor-evoked potentials recorded from hand muscles are modulated by the handle 
orientation of passively viewed objects; activity in the right hand was elevated when 
handles were oriented to the right, in accordance with a right-handed grasp.  
 The work we have discussed thus far indicate that object affordances relevant for
grasping give rise to motor-related activity, and can influence unrelated motor respons
but what about the planning of real grasping actions? If object properties, like orientatio
automatically activate corresponding motor plans, then grasping might be facilitated 
(primed) if preceded by an object that evokes consistent affordances. Indeed, Craighero 
and colleagues (1996) showed that grasping a simple bar is primed if preceded by a 
picture of a bar in the same orientation. However, Cant et al. (2005) failed to replicate 
such orientation priming effects, and argued that participants in the Craighero study were
making memory-guided (not visually-guided) grasping, and this could account for the 
priming they observed. Still, other studies indicate significant priming effects with real 
visually-guided grasping using words as primes (e.g. Glover, Rosenbaum, Graham, &
Dixon, 2004), and have shown priming in the context of action observations (e.g. 
Edwards, Humphreys, & Castiello, 2003; Gianelli, Dalla Volta, Barbieri, & Gentilucci, 
2008). In short, available evidence indicates that graspi
ore work is needed to better understand the particular experimental factors that 
are important (e.g. the nature of the task; the modality of primes). 
 Perhaps the strongest evidence that object affordances can lead to the activation o
motor representations relevant for the planning of real grasping actions comes from those
patients who demonstrate so-called ‘utilization behaviour’. Such patients are compelled
to grasp and use familiar objects, even though they are not told to do so, and, indee
even after they are instructed otherwise (Lhermitte, 1983; Shallice, Burgess, Schon, & 
Baxter, 1989). The disorder follows damage to frontal areas, and Lhermitte argued that
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may reflect a release of control over parietal functions. Further, Riddoch and colle
have shown that object affordances play an important role in triggering such impulsiv
grasping behaviours (Humphreys & Riddoch, 2000; Riddoch, Humphreys, & Edwa
2000). In their task, a familiar cup with a handle is presented to the left or right of the 
patients’ midline, and the instructions are as follows: if the cup is on the left, use the left
hand to grasp it by the handle, if it is on the right, use the right hand. The patient, who h
bilateral damage to medial frontal and anterior temporal areas and exhibits utilization 
behaviour, made frequent errors when the cup was on the left but the handle f
agues 
e 
rds, 
 
as 
aced to the 
 
 
ke 
, Doherty, Pellegrino, 
ith, 1987). For example, the structure of 
right. In this case the patient often incorrectly grasped with his right hand, as if handle 
orientation automatically evoked a grasp response which then served to override task 
instructions. Interestingly, such errors were only evoked when the task was grasping; 
when asked to point to handles instead, the patient performed without error. The findings 
show that object affordances can elicit grasping, and also suggest that task goals play a 
determining role (see also, Riddoch, Edwards, Humphreys, West, & Heafield, 1998). 
 Most studies of affordances have used familiar everyday graspable objects 
(although see, Symes, Ellis, & Tucker, 2006; Vingerhoets, Vandamme, & Vercammen, 
2009), which may, in fact, strongly associate with multiple action plans. For example, a
piece of fruit may afford a certain grasp style based on its size and shape, but it may also
afford a different grasp style based on the way in which it is typically eaten (Gentilucci, 
2002). Likewise, for familiar tools, grasping based on physical object properties, li
handle size, shape, and orientation, may differ from grasping based on knowledge and 
intention of use (Daprati & Sirigu, 2006; Frey, 2007). Indeed, for some objects, hand 
configurations predicted from structure are at odds with those required for use (e.g. 
Buxbaum, Sirigu, Schwartz, & Klatzky, 2003; Klatzky, McCloskey
& Sm a piano or keyboard key affords a “pinch” 
interaction style for grasping, but the learned interaction style for use is in fact a “poke”. 
Further, some patients show appropriate grasp scaling in accordance with object 
structure, but lack the kinematic features relevant for use (Carey, Harvey, & Milner, 
1996; Randerath, Li, Goldenberg, & Hermsdorfer, 2009; Sirigu et al., 1995), while others 
show marked improvements when grasping familiar versus semantically-neutral objects 
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(Jeannerod, Decety, & Michel, 1994). Thus, for familiar tools, affordances may be based
on structural properties, learned functional properties, or both (Valyear et al., 2007). 
In fact, Bub and colleagues (Bub, Masson, & Cree, 2008), using a very clever 
approach, provide direct evidence for both kinds of affordances. They devised an 
apparatus, fitted with abstract object shapes used to simulate distinct hand-object 
interactions. Subjects were required to actually reach out and interact with the different 
elements of the apparatus, and each element required a distinct hand configuration to do 
so. In a training session, participants learned to associate different colours with the 
different response elements of the apparatus. For example, the colour red might instruct 
subjects to interact with the response element requiring a “poke” hand posture. Once 
trained, participants were presented with pictures of coloured familiar graspable objects, 
or object words, and were told to ignore the object and respond to colour. Critically, 
objects were chosen such that the actions they afforded were either consistent or 
inconsistent with those of the colour-cued hand configurations (see also, Bub, Masson, & 
 
object 
n 
 
 
(Experiment 1) or were randomly intermixed within the same block of trials (Experiment 
Bukach, 2003). Moreover, the authors distinguished between affordances based on 
structure, termed volumetric, and those based on learned use, termed functional. Thus, o
any given trial, the colour-cued hand response could either match-up with the objects’ 
volumetric affordance, its functional affordance, or neither. If such affordances 
automatically lead to activations of corresponding motor plans, then such activity should 
speed up responses on matched trials and slow down responses on non-matched trials.
The authors showed exactly this, for both volumetric and functional matches, indicating
that familiar objects can evoke both types of affordance effects.   
 In the current study, we focused on ‘use-based’ rather than ‘structure-based’ 
affordances and our main objective was to investigate how task goals and task setting 
modulate these effects. We used priming as a measure of affordances, and looked at real 
grasping actions, using familiar kitchen tools as our stimuli (Table 3.1). We had two 
tasks: (1) grasp-to-move (GTM), whereby subjects grasped a tool to move it from one 
location to another; and (2) grasp-to-use (GTU), whereby subjects grasped a tool to 
demonstrate its typical use. Tasks were either presented in separate blocks of trials 
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2). Grasping was always preceded by a pre-view (prime) event, involving the simple 
visual presentation of a tool. Either the prime was the same tool as that which was then 
grasped (congruent trials), or
mere visual presentation of a tool activat
ed, 
, 
we 
t grasp 
 
 the 
ming is expected. 
l 
 the prime was a different tool (incongruent trials). If the 
es associated motor programs, then such 
activation may carry over to influence planning of subsequent grasping, and priming is 
expected for congruent trials.  
Our interests were focused on whether or not such priming effects would depend 
on which task was being performed, and whether or not task setting, blocked or mix
would also be important. For the GTU task, tool identity is important for action planning
and thus we predicted that priming would be observed. In contrast, for the GTM task, 
predicted that grasping might be planned without processing tool identity, and priming 
was thus not expected. Notably, we took steps to minimize the metrical differences 
important for grasping across tools. We used tools with the same handle, such tha
posture and grip scaling in the GTM task would in principle be comparable for all tools. 
As a secondary interest, this also gave us a chance to characterize the kinematics of 
grasping-to-use different tools without the confounding effects of using different handled 
tools. Of course, our tools differed in other physical aspects important for grasping, like
overall size and weight distribution, factors that could also drive priming even in
GTM task. In addition, it is possible that grasping actions of any kind always involve 
some processing of identity, even in a strictly semantic sense (Gentilucci, 2002, 2003), 
regardless of specific goals and motor requirements. If this were the case, repeating tool 
identity would facilitate processing even in the GTM task, and pri
Instead, we predicted that task goals would play a determining role, and priming was not 
expected for the GTM task. In contrast, the goals of the GTU task rely on access to too
identity, and thus priming was expected. Differences in priming for either task according 
to presentation setting, blocked (Experiment 1) versus mixed (Experiment 2), would be 
taken to reflect the influence of task set.  
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3.2. Experiment 1 
3.2.1. Method 
Participants  
Twenty-three right-handed students from the University of Western Ontario 
participated in this experiment. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision and gave informed consent. The experiment took approximately 45 min and 
utton 
 
nd 
e 
participants were either compensated financially or were given course credit.  
Experimental Setup and Materials 
Two OPTOTRAK 3020 cameras (NDI, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada), monitored 
the position (at 100 Hz) of three infrared markers (IREDs) attached to the tip of the 
index-finger, the inside tip of the thumb, and the base of the index-knuckle 
(metacarpalphalangeal joint) of participants’ right hands.  
Participants were seated at a 1 m x 1 m table with a horizontally centred start 
button positioned 15 cm from the front edge of the table. Participants held the start b
down with their right index finger and thumb lightly pinched together. A circular 
platform used to position tools was placed in front and to the right of participants. Vision
was controlled using PLATO goggles (Translucent Technologies, Toronto, Canada), a
hearing was controlled using headphones.  
Table 3.1 lists the five different tools that were used. Importantly, all tools had th
exact same handle. 
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Table 3.1. Tools 
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Procedure 
 The sequence and timing of events within a given trial, and the two trial types are 
shown in Figure 3.1. Each trial comprised two successive events, a prime event followed 
by a probe event. Participants started each trial in the start position with no vision 
available. The goggles then opened for one second to reveal the prime object, (one of the 
five tools, Table 3.1), positioned in one of three positions on the presentation platform. 
Participants were instructed to simply view the (prime) tool. Next, the goggles closed for 
3-4 seconds, accompanied by a continuous burst of white noise in the headphones. After 
is delay, the goggles again o ened and participants’ reached-to-grasp whichever 
(probe) tool was now on the platform, at a quick but comfortable pace. Critically, there 
were two types of trials. In a congruent trial, the same tool was repeated from prime-to-
probe. In an incongruent trial, the tool was changed from prime-to-probe. The majority (~ 
67%) of trials were congruent, so that the prime had some predictive value. To 
discourage subjects from simply ‘darting out’ to the same location on each trial, tool 
position was always varied from prime-to-probe events. The burst of white noise during 
the delay between prime and probe events served to mask any auditory cues that might 
have otherwise provided information about the type of upcoming trial and/or the 
particular tool to-be-grasped. 
 
  
th p
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Figure 3.1. Trial types and timing. The top line represents the state of the LCD goggles and 
whether or not vision was available to participants. Prime events involved simply viewing tools 
while probe events required grasping. Tools were placed in three possible positions (29, 35, 39 
cm from start), and position always varied from prime-to-probe events. Trials were eith
congruent or incongruent with respect to tool identity, and subjects were either grasping-to-m
or grasping-to-use. 
  
er 
ove 
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GTM and GTU were performed in two separate blocks of 90 trials (60 congruent, 
30 incongruent). In GTM, probe events involved grasping tools, moving and placing 
them on a standard mouse pad, positioned 10 cm in front of the start button. In GTU, 
participants would grasp tools and then demonstrate two cycles of appropriate use (while 
over the mouse pad) before placing them down. Prior to testing, participants were shown 
each of the five different tools (Table 3.1) and the experimenter would demonstrate each 
of the expected actions. Note, however, that participants were told to carry out tool use 
actions in a way that was comfortable for them, not necessarily in the way that the 
experimenter had shown. All tools were shown, used, and paired with all other tools an 
equal number of times. Trials were presented in a randomized order, and balanced across 
the start button was used to calculate reaction times (i.e. time-to-
a from IREDs (see Table 
3.2). Raw three-dimensional data for each IRED for each trial was filtered using a low-
pass Butterworth filter (12 Hz-cutoff, 2nd order). Instantaneous velocities in each cardinal 
dimension (x,y,z) were calculated for each marker for each time point and the resulting 
velocity profiles were filtered (low-pass Butterworth filter, dual pass, 8 Hz-cutoff, 2nd 
order) and combined to create a vector velocity (i.e. three-dimensional) profile for each 
trial. Reaches were defined using the thumb marker, and were said to begin with the first 
of four consecutive vector velocity readings of greater than 20 mm/s where there was a 
total acceleration of 20 mm/s across the four points. Reaches were said to terminate with 
whichever of two conditions was first met: the first time the velocity dropped below 20 
mm/s or the time at which the maximum x-position (lateral) value of the thumb marker 
was reached (within 1500 ms of movement onset). 
When one of the markers was missing from view of OPTOTRAK cameras, we 
used translated data from other markers to fill in the missing time points. Specifically, for 
both the thumb and index-finger markers, missed data were filled with position translated 
data from the index-knuckle marker, and for the index-knuckle marker, data from the 
all possible orientations for both prime and probe. Task order (GTM or GTU) was 
counterbalanced across individuals. 
Data Processing  
Release of 
movement onset). All other measures were derived using dat
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index-f
ed 
is of peak grip apertures and movement 
then ensured that each participant had at least three repetitions of the 
actions  not 
inger marker was used. When this could not be done, due to multiple missing 
markers at the same time, missing data were linearly interpolated. 
Dependent Measures and Analysis 
Trials were rejected for the following reasons: the start position of the index-
finger marker was > 5 cm from the start button, the reach was too short in either duration 
(< 100 ms) or distance (< 10 cm in the x-dimension), a marker went missing for more 
than 100 ms, or the initial grip aperture (which was supposed to be pinched closed) was > 
4 cm. This procedure resulted in 3% of trials being removed. In addition, we perform
an outlier analysis on reaction times (for each individual and task) and movement 
durations (for each individual, task, and probe tool position) removing trials that were 
more than two standard deviations away from the mean. This procedure resulted in 9% of 
trials being removed. Finally, for the analys
durations only, we 
 performed in each task with each tool. In Experiment 1, two participants did
meet this criteria (in each case, too many trials were excluded due to the grip aperture 
being > 4 cm at start position). 
  
 
112 
 
Table 3.2. Dependent Measures 
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All dependent measures were entered into a three-factor task x trial type x probe 
tool identity (2 x 2 x 5) repeated measures analysis of variance (RM-ANOVA). Where 
significant, interactions were followed up with simple main effects single-factor RM-
ANOVAs. Post hoc follow-ups to significant main effects and simple main effects 
compared all possible pairwise comparisons of the most relevant factor. All RM-
ANOVAs were analyzed using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction for sphericity and 
taken to be significant at P < 0.05. Post hoc pairwise contrasts used the Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons with a corrected P < 0.05 taken as significant.  
3.2.2 Results and discussion 
ing or repeating tools 
from prime-to-probe events had no impact on reaction times when the task was GTM 
(Figure 3.2; Table 3.3). Participants were also faster to initiate grasping for the GTM 
task.  
  
Reaction Times 
 As predicted, priming was specific to the GTU task; switch
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Figure 3.2. Task-specific priming (Experiment 1). Mean reaction times as a function of task 
and congruency (left panel). Congruent trials were initiated faster than incongruent trials, but only
for GTU not for GTM, indicating that priming effects were specific to GTU. Priming is shown
the difference between reaction times for congruent versus incongruent trials according to task
(right panel). Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals based on the standard errors of the m
differen
 
 as 
 
ean 
ce scores (incongruent-congruent) across individuals. 
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Table 3.3. Experiment 1 significant results (* indicates p < .05, ** indicates p < .001) 
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Kinematics 
 No effects of priming were evident in grasping kinematics. Analysis of variance 
revealed a main effect of task; wider peak grip apertures and shorter movement durations 
were associated with the GTU task (Figure 3.3; Table 3.3). In addition, there was a 
significant task by probe identity interaction for both peak grip apertures and movement 
durations (Table 3/3). For the GTU task, grasping patterns clearly differed as a function 
of tool identity, whereas for the GTM task, grasping was similar for all tools (Figure 3.3). 
To help visualize these differences further, we plotted the relative positions of the index 
finger, thumb, and knuckle markers in 3-D space at 10% increments of total movement 
durations for each tool for each task (Figure 3.4). These plots give us an idea of how the 
posture of the hand was oriented throughout the grasp trajectory as a function of task and 
tool identity.  
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Figure 3.3. Grip aperture (Experiment 1). Grip aperture measures as a function of percent 
movement time, for each of the five tools for GTM (A) and GTU (B). Profiles for each individual
tool are coloured as indicated in the legend. The hand opens and closes in much the same way for 
all five tools wh
 
en grasping-to-move, but differently for different tools when grasping-to-use. 
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Figure 3.4 Grasp posture (Experiment 1). Plotted are the relative positions of the index finger, 
thumb, and knuckle markers in space, at 10% movement intervals, for each of the five tools, for 
The 
 clearly differed for different 
ioning of the markers was much 
the same for all tools. 
  
GTM (A) and GTU (B). Plots for each individual tool are coloured as indicated in the legend. 
x-dimension, or left-right direction, is plotted on the x-axis and the z-dimension, or up-down 
direction, is plotted on the y-axis. For each task, the final intervals of each grasp per tool are 
blown-up to facilitate comparisons. For GTU, the relative positioning of the finger and thumb 
markers, and hence the posture and orientation of the grasping hand,
tools at these later intervals. For GTM, however, the relative posit
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 To summarize, our predictions for Experiment 1 were verified. Priming was 
specific to the GTU task, and grasping kinematics differed between tasks. Participants 
took on a somewhat specific approach to grasping different tools for GTU, while all tools 
were grasped similarly for GTM.  
3.3 Experiment 2 
3.3.1. Method 
ized order. Participants 
were cued auditorily, “move” of “use”, at the beginning of each trial (one second before 
the onset of the prime event) as to which task they had to perform. All other methods 
were identical to Experiment 1. Trial removal procedures resulted in 3% of data removed 
and outlier analysis resulted in 7% of data removed. Two participants were then excluded 
from further analysis for not having sufficient repetitions (three) of trials for each task for 
each tool.    
3.3.2 Results and discussion 
Reaction Times 
GTM trials now showed sensitivity to priming; congruent trials reliably led to 
faster responses compared with incongruent trials for both tasks (Figure 3.5; Table 3.4). 
Main effects of task remained significant, although the differences were more 
pronounced when tasks were blocked separately. Participants appeared to have changed 
their motor strategies from blocked to mixed settings, and these changes gave rise to 
reliable priming effects in the GTM task. Priming was nontheless found to be 
significantly greater for GTU versus GTM trials (Table 3.4). 
Participants 
Twenty-two right-handed students from the University of Western Ontario 
participated in this experiment. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision and gave informed consent. The experiment took approximately 45 min and 
participants were either compensated financially or were given course credit.  
Procedure 
GTM and GTU trials were presented together in a random
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Figure 3.5. Priming (Experiment 2). Mean reaction times as a function of task and c
(left panel). Congruent trials were initiated faster than incongruent trials, indicating sig
ongruency 
nificant 
 GTM and GTU. The mean difference between congruent and 
rials, as a measure of priming, is also plotted for each task (right panel). Error bars 
reflect 9
priming effects for both
incongruent t
5% confidence intervals based on the standard errors of these mean difference scores 
(incongruent-congruent) across individuals. Priming effects were significantly greater for GTU. 
  
 
121 
 
Also different from the blocked setting, we now found a significant task by probe 
identity interaction in reaction times (Table 3.4). When subjects had to perform the GTU 
task, the particular tool to be grasped had an impact on their reaction times. These 
findings provide further evidence that strategies changed across experiments; in this case, 
the effects may relate to trade-offs between the relative costs of programming specific 
kinematics and the time taken to initiate grasping. 
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Table 3.4. Experiment 2 significant results (* indicates p < .05, ** indicates p < .001)
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Kinematics 
Similar to Experiment 1, participants reliably moved more quickly and opened 
their grasp wider for tools in GTU versus GTM trials (Figure 3.6; Table 3.4). However, 
interactions between task and tool identity, evident when the tasks were blocked, no 
longer reached significance in the mixed design (Table 3.4). The patterns remained the 
same, especially for different tools in the GTU task (Figures 3.6 and 3.7), but were less 
pronounced and/or more variable than observed when the tasks were blocked.  
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Figure 3.6. Grip aperture (Experiment 2). Grip aperture measures as a function of percent 
movement time, for each of the five tools for GTM (A) and GTU (B). Profiles for each individual 
tool are coloured as indicated in the legend 
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Figure 3.7. Grasp posture (Experiment 2). Plotted are the relative positions of the index finger, 
thumb, and knuckle markers in space, at 10% movement intervals, for each of the five tools, for 
The 
ask, the final intervals of each grasp per tool are 
blown-up to facilitate comparisons.  
  
GTM (A) and GTU (B). Plots for each individual tool are coloured as indicated in the legend. 
x-dimension, or left-right direction, is plotted on the x-axis and the z-dimension, or up-down 
direction, is plotted on the y-axis. For each t
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3.4. Discussion 
3.4.1 Priming and goal-set 
When Gibson first described affordances (1979), he stressed that the kinds of 
actions an object would elicit would greatly depend on the goal state of the individual; for 
example, a fallen tree may afford sitting if one is tired, but may also afford standing if 
one is looking for a better view (Humphreys et al., 2009). In Experiment 1 we show that 
real grasping is differentially sensitive to priming depending on task goals; when the task 
ess 
simply move an object aside. At a glance, such 
terpretations appear at odds ith other studies that have shown effects of object 
semantics on grasping kinematics (Gentilucci, 2002, 2003; Gentilucci, Benuzzi, 
Bertolani, Daprati, & Gangitano, 2000; Glover & Dixon, 2002; Glover et al., 2004). 
However, in most of these studies the effects of semantics were mediated by words, 
which is different than testing for semantic effects mediated by the sight of objects. Also, 
in these previous studies semantic effects on grasping were driven by features such as 
object size or location, not learned function or use. We view our findings as convergent 
evidence that the functional and metrical aspects of grasping can be dissociated; both 
priming and the kinematics of grasping were dependent on the task. Previously, Riddoch 
et al. (Humphreys & Riddoch, 2000; Riddoch et al., 2000) showed that affordance effects 
in an individual with utilization behaviour depend on task; for the handle of a cup to 
evoke incorrect responses, the task had to be grasping (see also, Riddoch et al., 1998). 
These findings coincide nicely with ours, and suggest that task goals shape and determine 
affordances.  
However, immediate task goals were not the only determining factor; when GTM 
and GTU trials were intermixed (Experiment 3.2), priming emerged for GTM trials as 
well (Figure 3.5). These findings, although at first surprising to us, are in fact quite 
consistent with the results of a previous study by Bub et al. (2003). In this work, 
was GTU, priming was evident, but when the task was GTM, priming was not (Figure 
3.2). In line with our a priori predictions, priming effects appeared to follow the relative 
importance of tool identity to the particular goals and requirements of the task. We 
interpret these findings as evidence that grasping can proceed without the need to proc
object identity when the goal is to 
in  w
 
127 
 
participants were trained to respond to different colours by demonstrating different hand 
 learned object-use interaction style (e.g. a 
“poke” hand gesture). When participants were 
and on others respond to colour
t 
 
ls, 
 
d colleagues (2009), to suggest that the goal-set, or action-state, of an 
individual indeed helps to 
made to distracters which shared the same orientation as the target much more often if 
gestures, each of which fit with a specific
later cued to name objects on some trials 
, there were effects in the gesturing-to-colour responses 
based on whether or not the object in question shared the same hand configuration when 
used. However, in a separate experiment, when naming trials were not included no such 
effects were observed. Although not the focus of the paper, this finding was taken to 
indicate that affordances associated with the use of objects are not automatically evoked, 
but are instead only evoked when a certain extent of processing is, (or has been), directed 
to the object itself; in this case, recognition and retrieval of object names on separate 
trials did the trick. It seems that drawing attention to object identity on naming trials led 
to a ‘spill over’ of attention to these features on gesture trials. With attention to objec
identity in place, use-related affordances were evoked on gesture trials, and influenced
response times accordingly. Our priming results for GTM, absent when tasks were 
blocked but evident when our tasks were put together, are in line with these findings. 
Attention to tool identity in GTU trials turned attention to these features in GTM tria
and, with attention to identity in place, priming effects emerged for GTM trials.  
In this view, task goals modulate attention to particular object features, which in
turn modulate corresponding affordances (and priming). Thus, affordance effects are 
determined by task goals insofar as task goals determine the allocation of attentional 
resources. If we expand this idea, and define the goal-set of an individual as that which is 
also determined by overall task setting and context, as well as immediate goals and 
intentions, then we can see how changes in setting can lead to changes in affordance 
effects, and this can explain why we observed priming for GTM trials in the mixed but 
not blocked experiments. In fact, there is a host of other evidence, nicely reviewed by 
Humphreys an
shape processes of attention and selection. For example, 
Bekkering and Neggers (2002) asked participants to search for a target defined by its 
colour and orientation (e.g., find the red horizontal bar). Participants had to indicate the 
target by either pointing to it, or by grasping it. Eye movements during the search were 
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participants were required to grasp versus point. It was as if the action-state of the 
individual influenced the ‘weighting’ of visual features in the display; in the case of 
grasping, orientation was weighted more strongly, presumably because orientation is 
more important for grasping than is object colour.  
With these views in mind, our findings can be explained by differences in the way 
attention operates on (e.g. activates) affordances in accordance with the particular goal-
set of the individual. Notably, however, our priming method may be limited in its 
capacity to detect affordances. For example, perhaps the presentation of a given tool as a 
prime leads to the activation of associated motor plans in both tasks, regardless of setting 
(blocked or mixed), but such activations then decay at different rates, or are differentially 
inhibited. Such differences could then impact priming and account for our results. In 
patients demonstrating utilization behaviour, the tendency to compulsively grasp and 
interact with objects is believed to reflect a failure to properly monitor and inhibit 
environmentally-driven processes (Lhermitte, 1983; Shallice et al., 1989). Lhermitte 
proposed that visual inputs activate parietal representations for actions, and that normally 
such activations are held in check by frontal control mechanisms. Damage to key frontal 
areas “releases the activity of the parietal lobe”, which then “tends to subject the patient 
to all e
l 
y, 
 
as to 
xternal stimuli”, and utilization behaviour results. Our findings may reflect 
differences in the extent of such inhibitory control depending on task goals and overal
task setting. When GTM trials were blocked, suppression of affordance-driven activit
specific to specific tools, may have allowed for more efficient responses. In contrast, in 
the context of the mixed design it may have been best to ‘allow’ such activations to 
unfold for both tasks. Switching inhibition of affordances on and off may have been 
inefficient in this context. Alternatively, perhaps affordance-driven motor plans need to 
be maintained in order to prime subsequent actions, and such maintenance in turn 
depends on the goal-set of the individual. In either case, corresponding differences in
attentional mechanisms may be critical. Future studies may provide further insights 
which of these models is most likely. 
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3.4.2 Motor strategies and kinematics 
In parallel with changes in priming from blocked to mixed designs, our findin
also show evidence of other changes in general motor strategies across experiments. 
Some of these changes appear in line with previous 
gs 
work describing a homogenization 
effect, whereby responses to different tria
ing 
and 
pare 
s for 
ent 2, 
That is, if we assume that the blocked 
setting (Experiment 1) gives rise to the most optimal strategies for a given trial type, then 
the strategies employed in the mixed setting (Experiment 2) can be considered less 
optimal. 
l types look more similar when presented 
together versus separately (e.g. Rastle, Kinoshita, Lupker, & Coltheart, 2003; Song & 
Nakayama, 2007). For example, in a study by Song and Nakayama (2007), two reach
tasks, one ‘easy’ and one ‘hard’, were compared across different methods of presentation. 
When the tasks were presented separately (blocked), easy trials led to faster reaction 
times than hard trials, as might be expected. However, when the tasks were presented 
together (mixed), as either alternating or random sequences, the differences between easy 
and hard trials disappeared. In particular, reaction times were extended for easy trials 
shortened for hard trials, reflecting the so-called homogenization effect. If we com
our results from Experiment 1 (blocked) with Experiment 2 (mixed), reaction time
GTM appear to be lengthened in the mixed design, while reaction times for GTU appear 
to be shortened, in line with this homogenization pattern. Song and Nakayama (2007) 
concluded that participants implicitly took on different states of motor readiness when 
tasks were presented as mixed versus blocked. They also showed that explicit knowledge 
of upcoming trial types could not be used to reset the system to its optimal strategy. That 
is, in both their blocked and alternating conditions participants had full knowledge of 
upcoming trial types, and yet the alternating condition looked much like the randomized 
condition. They concluded that differences in strategy between blocked and mixed 
conditions appeared to be governed by a passive cumulative learning process tuned to 
recent trial history, not to do with the explicit predictability of future events (see also, 
Whitwell & Goodale, 2009; Whitwell, Lambert, & Goodale, 2008). In our Experim
due to the task cuing before each trial begins, our participants also have explicit 
knowledge of upcoming trial types, and yet they also fail to make full use of such 
knowledge to prepare their actions accordingly. 
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Further evidence that strategies changed across our experiments is indicated by 
the sign
me 
cits 
 
, 
If, 
 and colleagues (Cohen & Rosenbaum, 2004; Rosenbaum et al., 1996) have 
asp objects depends on the next steps of 
ificant task by tool identity interaction in reaction times, specific to the mixed 
setting (Table 3.5). Only in Experiment 2 did participants take different amounts of ti
planning grasping-to-use actions according to the particular tool being grasped. And, 
most intriguing, the tool that stands out here, the vegetable peeler, is the tool that eli
the most distinct pattern of grasping kinematics. We believe these findings indicate a 
change in the way subjects carried out the GTU task in the mixed setting. First, we should
clarify our stance that reaction times do indeed reflect the planning of actions, including 
(at least in part) the programming of specific kinematic details. Indeed, Klatzky and 
colleagues (Klatzky, Fikes, & Pellegrino, 1995; Pellegrino, Klatzky, & McCloskey, 
1989) provide evidence that when functionally interacting with objects, participants plan 
appropriate hand configurations prior to initiating movements. Similarly, previous work 
with both grasping and tool use indicate that goal postures are predicted in advance of 
preceding movements (Bongers, Michaels, & Smitsman, 2004; Cohen & Rosenbaum, 
2004; Rosenbaum, van Heugten, & Caldwell, 1996). With this in mind, if we compare 
reaction times for the GTU task from Experiment 1 (blocked) to Experiment 2 (mixed)
participants seemed to have spent less time planning these actions in the mixed setting. 
as we suspect, this effect reflects a change in strategy, perhaps the peeler action, by virtue 
of its relatively distinct kinematics, was more difficult to adjust to this new strategy.  
Why did the peeler action result in such distinct kinematics? Our account is that 
for all tools, the particular pattern of grasping reflects anticipation of upcoming features 
of the movements to be performed. In the case of the peeler, what appears to stand out 
most from the other tool actions with respect to post-grasp kinematics is the act of turning 
the handle over. That is, the peeler was always placed with its blade facing up, so that to 
properly perform the action participants should turn the tool over so that the blade faces 
downward. Participants usually did this in time with the final stages of grasping; the 3D 
plots of the thumb and finger positions in space appear to reflect this pattern (Figures 3.4 
and 3.7). The thumb most often contacts the top surface of the handle while the index 
finger hooks to the far side and under, in line with the mechanics of the turning action. 
Rosenbaum
shown that where and how participants gr
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actions
s 
r 
 
ue 
are 
) 
indicat n 
 
), 
, and in particular anticipated end-states. Similarly, when participants grasp the 
same objects for different purposes, grasping kinematics differ and early steps of action
reflect the particular mechanics and demands of later steps (Ansuini, Giosa, Turella, 
Altoe, & Castiello, 2008; Ansuini, Santello, Massaccesi, & Castiello, 2006; Armbruste
& Spijkers, 2006; Marteniuk, MacKenzie, Jeannerod, Athenes, & Dugas, 1987). Ansuini
and colleagues (2008) show, for example, that changes in finger joint angles were uniq
for grasping a water bottle in order to pour from it, and appeared to reflect anticipation of 
the particular dynamics needed to carry out the pouring action. Likewise, Friedman and 
Flash (2007) demonstrate that force transmission patterns during functional grasping 
compatible with the specific requirements of the task. Finally, Randerath et al. (2009
provide evidence that performance in functional grasping predicts performance in actual 
tool use. Thus, the differences we observed in grasping when moving versus using, and 
between different tools during our GTU task, most likely reflects differences in the 
kinetics of the movements to follow, as consistent with predictive models of motor 
control (e.g. Flanagan, Bowman, & Johansson, 2006; Rosenbaum et al., 2009).  
3.4.3 Concluding remarks 
 Relatively few studies have looked at the priming of actual grasping actions using 
familiar objects, and, to our knowledge, we are the first to explore how object identity 
can differentially prime grasping depending on the greater goals of the task. Our findings 
e that task specific goals as well as overall task setting determine the goal-set of a
individual, which in turn determines object affordances and priming, most likely by 
modulating processes of attention and selection. Beyond the physical properties of 
objects, knowledge and intention of use provide a mechanism for which affordances and 
the priming of actions may operate. One of the more exciting directions for future 
research is a continuing interest in the potential interactions between detailed kinematics 
of actions and priming. While our findings showed no evidence of priming effects on in-
flight kinematic measures of grasping for either task, other studies have shown that the 
features of prime events can impact such details (e.g. Glover et al., 2004). Further, it is
sensible to expect that such effects would be short lived (Jax & Rosenbaum, 2007, 2009
so that future studies with shorter delays between prime and probe events may indeed 
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show learned object-specific priming effects in the kinematics of grasping. The present
findings suggest that such effects would track with task goals and task setting. 
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Chapter 4 
ral priming of tool use 4. Neu
4.1. In
common to hunter-gatherer and modern advanced societies alike. In a single day, we 
deliber vidence in the fields of psychology 
 between highly specialized 
and functionally dissociable brain areas, organized within a widely distributed network of 
cortical and subcortical regions (Johnson-Frey, 2004; Rothi, Ochipa, & Heilman, 1997). 
Clearly, understanding the neural mechanisms underlying this network is a great 
challenge for neuroscientists, but continuing efforts in this area promise to reveal 
fundamental elements of human brain function and cognition (Iriki & Sakura, 2008; 
Johnson-Frey, 2003b; Washburn, 1960). At the core of common tool use is memory and 
mechanical understanding. Memory for objects, memory for actions, and an 
understanding of the mechanical properties of objects, and how these properties can aid 
in achieving specific goals. Despite over 100 years of prolific neuropsychological work 
in this area, and more recently the application of advanced neuroimaging methods, a clear 
picture of the brain mechanisms underlying tool use has yet been established. Indeed, 
current cortical theories of tool use highlight important gaps in understanding (e.g. 
Buxbaum & Kalenine, 2010; Frey, 2007). For example, it remains unclear how the brain 
transforms information supporting object recognition to recruit and implement 
appropriate action plans.  
 Challenges inherent in the study of real actions with neuroimaging methods such 
as fMRI have undoubtedly held back progress in this area. This is not to say that previous 
neuroimaging studies related to tool use have not significantly furthered our 
understanding; indeed, many valuable studies have been carried out, and convergence of 
activity patterns across a wide range of disparate paradigms implicate a core network of 
areas spanning temporal, parietal, and frontal cortices as important for tool use 
troduction 
 Tool use is ubiquitous and essential to human life, culturally universal, and 
perform countless interactions with objects, typically without much thought or conscious 
ation. And yet, according to multiple lines of e
and neuroscience, tool use must rely on complex interactions
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knowledge (Johnson-Frey, 2004; Lewis ever, given that actual tool 
d, exactly how well activations reported 
correspond with those areas needed for real tool use planning and execution is not yet 
udies that have used real tools, comparisons were made against 
timately 
ed real 
 
portantly, 
 of 
were 
irectly related to the planning and execution of stored tool use. 
, 2006). How
manipulation has been scarcely explore
clear. Of the few st
conditions that either involved no object manipulation (Hermsdorfer et al., 2007; Imazu 
et al., 2007), no overt action (Higuchi et al., 2007), or, quite specifically, the use of 
chopsticks to pick up objects versus grasping with the hand (Inoue et al., 2001). With this 
approach, it is difficult to determine if resultant activity reflects processes specific to tool 
use per se, or differences in motor complexity, duration, spatial extent, somatosensory 
feedback, or a combination of such factors.  
 The current design manages to solve these difficult challenges. We use a novel 
variant of repetition suppression (RS) that we refer to as neural priming, which ul
compares trial types involving the same motor outputs. Participants grasped and us
mini-sized familiar kitchen tools in accordance with the basic kinematic features of 
corresponding tool-specific actions. Actions matched the basic movement patterns tied to
real tool use according to known identity and function (Figure 4.1C). Most im
action (probe) events were immediately preceded by visual preview (prime) events 
showing either the same or different tool as that which was then used. Neural priming 
was predicted to correspond with less BOLD activity for trials involving repeated tools at 
prime-probe events (Tool Repeated, TR) compared with trials involving different pairs
tools (Tool Changed, TC). Thus, on either side of this comparison the same actions 
performed, the only difference being the relationship between prime (visual) and probe 
(action) events. In other words, with this method, neural priming effects are mediated 
purely visually, although d
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Figure 4.1. Methods. A. An overhead view of the grasping platform and turntable apparatus use
to present tools to participants in the scanner. Both presentation sides can be viewed, the pri
side showing a yellow spatula in position, and the probe side showing a blue spoon in position.
On the probe side, a small box was used for participants to drop tools in after they had completed 
their actions. B. Examples of tools (bottle opener, knife, spoon, and spatula) and handle colours 
(yellow, white, red, and blue). C. In the Experimental Task, participants grasped and used tools 
according to identity (i.e. the basic movement features of these actions were consistent with those 
of actual tool use).  Actions are shown with arrows drawn to indicate basic movement features. In
the Control Task, participants grasped and used tools according to arbitrarily learned association
matching handle colour to a specific set of movements. D. For each trial, prime and probe even
were modelled with a single predictor function aligned to the start of the prime event convolve
with Brain Voyager QX “two-gamma” hemodynamic response function designed to estimate 
d 
me 
 
 
s 
ts 
d 
BOLD response characteristics. E. Shown are examples of the four possible combinations of 
s, the critical trial types were 
Tool Changed (TC) and Tool Repeated (TR), and priming was expected to correspond with TC > 
TR. For Control runs, the critical trial types were Colour Changed (CC) and Colour Repeated 
(CR), and priming was expected to correspond with CC > CR.  
  
prime-probe tool identity and handle colour. For Experimental run
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 Less BOLD activity in this context, as with other RS designs, is thought to reflect 
better metabolic efficiency when successive events activate closely overlapping neural 
processes (Grill-Spector, Henson, & Martin, 2006). In this case, tools presented as prime 
events are expected to partially activate corresponding motor plans related to learned use. 
Repetition of the same tools at action events, TR trials, will thus result in overlap of 
neural processing, and reduced BOLD activity is predicted. In contrast, by definition, 
prime-probe events for TC trials involve different tools, and will thus activate different 
motor plans. The theoretical basis for these predictions stems from the concept of motor 
affordances (Gibson, 1979): that the vision of objects alone naturally involves some 
activation of corresponding motor representations. This theory has received support from 
multiple disciplines, including monkey neurophysiology (Murata et al., 1997; Murata, 
Gallese, Luppino, Kaseda, & Sakata, 2000; Rizzolatti et al., 1988; Taira, Mine, 
Georgopoulos, Murata, & Sakata, 1990), human neuroimaging (e.g. Chao & Martin, 
2000; Grezes, Armony, Rowe, & Passingham, 2003), human neuropsychology 
(Lhermitte, 1983; Shallice, Burgess, Schon, & Baxter, 1989), and behavioural studies 
with neurologically healthy individuals (e.g. Tucker & Ellis, 1998). More recently, 
 
. 
ural mechanisms underlying 
hese activations will reveal 
those areas critical to learned tool use planning and execution.  
beyond the physical properties of objects, we and others have provided support for tool 
‘use-based affordances’ that correspond with motor plans related to learned function and
use (Bub, Masson, & Bukach, 2003; Bub, Masson, & Cree, 2008; Valyear, Cavina-
Pratesi, Stiglick, & Culham, 2007). 
 Previous neuroimaging studies using RS have typically involved events of the 
same stimulus-response modality, and few have looked at real object manipulation tasks 
(although see Chong, Cunnington, Williams, Kanwisher, & Mattingley, 2008; Dinstein, 
Thomas, Behrmann, & Heeger, 2008; Kroliczak, McAdam, Quinlan, & Culham, 2008)
Thus, the current study is unique in that it deals with real actions with real tools, and, 
critically, prime-probe events involve different response modalities: prime events involve 
viewing tools while probe events involve viewing and acting with tools. Detection of 
priming is predicted to reflect increased efficiency in the ne
retrieval and implementation of stored tool use plans. Thus, t
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 Importantly, to make such claims about the specialization of areas for learned tool 
use, it is necessary to demonstrate that neural priming is specific to tool-action 
associations. Less activity for TR versus TC trials could in principle reflect a general 
effect of prime stimuli correctly versus incorrectly cuing subsequent actions, independent 
of tool use specialization per se. If this were the case, then other types of congruent 
versus incongruent stimulus-action associations should lead to the same effects. To tes
this, we included a Control task whereby participants grasped the same tools used in the
Experimental task, but instead of performing actions according to tool identity and 
function, actions were performed according to arbitrary associations based on handle
colour of tools. These action associations, along with the Experimental task, were learned 
and practiced prior to scanning, and involved distinct hand and wrist movements along 
distinct spatial trajectories (Figure 4.1C). The Control task was performed on sep
runs, interleaved with Experimental runs. For Control runs, trials with repeated handle
colours, Colour Repeated (CR), would signal overlapping motor plans, while tri
different handle colours, Colour Changed (CC), would signal different motor plans, an
priming in this task was thus predicted to correspond with CC > CR activations.  
4.2. Results and discussion 
4.2.1. Neural priming of tool use 
 The comparison TC > TR for
t 
 
 
arate 
 
als with 
d 
 Experimental runs identified four distinct areas at 
reliable statistical thresholds (Figure 4.2 A-D): left anterior intraparietal/inferior parietal, 
left dorsal precentral, left ventral precentral, and right intraparietal/superior parietal.  
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Figure 4.2. Priming of tool use. Activation maps based on the contrast TC > TR for 
 
is 
een trial types; 
sociations and Experimental 
runs.  
  
Experimental runs, set to reliable statistical thresholds (t = 3.6, p < .005; cluster-sized corrected, 
min = 135 mm3, p < .05) based on group random effects general linear model. Four distinct areas
are identified (A-D). For visualization purposes, beta weights per individual per trial type are 
shown for each of the areas, and the group mean difference between TC-TR activation levels 
shown as a measure of priming with 95% confidence intervals indicated. Beta weights per 
individual per trial type for Control runs indicate no reliable differences betw
neural priming effects in these areas were specific to tool-action as
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 Priming effects in these areas did not generalize to colour-action associations for 
Control runs, but were specific to tool-action associations and Experimental runs (see 
Figure 4.2). The findings provide neural evidence for learned use-based affordance 
effects; experience using tools shapes robust associations between tool identity and action 
schema, such that vision of tools can activate corresponding motor plans. Re-activation of 
shared processes following repeated tools in TR trials results in less BOLD activity 
compared with TC trials. Localization of these effects to the areas identified indicates a 
relatively selective, mainly left-lateralized parietofrontal circuit. These areas play an 
important role in the retrieval and/or implementation of stored tool-specific action plans; 
neural priming effects specific to Experimental runs indicate functional specialization for 
learned tool use. 
 Activations showing tool specific priming effects correspond well with previous 
tool-related imaging studies, based on a wide range of disparate paradigms (Lewis, 
2006), but also appear to highlight a more selective network than that which is typically 
specified. First, while left superior parietal cortex is most commonly reported, we detect 
priming effects within lateral anterior intraparietal cortex, more closely aligned with 
inferior parietal cortex. Notably, in two previous studies, when planning aspects were 
separated from execution of tool use pantomimes, more inferior versus superior parietal 
stent 
 to and implementation of stored action plans. Note also that more inferior versus 
everal recently articulated 
theories of posterior parietal function which posit a separation of inferior from superior 
parietal cortex based on a number of factors, including tool use as specific to left inferior 
parietal lobule (Frey, 2007; Jeannerod & Jacob, 2005; Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003). 
Second, many previous tool-related imaging studies report activations more closely 
aligned with the ventral visual pathway (e.g. left posterior middle temporal and mid-
fusiform cortex), whereas we find no evidence of tool use priming in ventral stream 
areas were isolated (Fridman et al., 2006; Johnson-Frey, Newman-Norlund, & Grafton, 
2005). Also, tasks involving explicit retrieval of manipulation versus functional 
knowledge of tools selectively activate inferior parietal areas (Boronat et al., 2005; 
Canessa et al., 2008; Kellenbach, Brett, & Patterson, 2003). Such findings are consi
with our interpretations of the current results: that tool specific priming corresponds with 
access
superior parietal areas for learned actions is consistent with s
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areas. Compared with the current paradigm involving real actions with real 3D tools, 
previous studies have used tasks and/or stimuli that may have tapped into more 
perceptual/conceptual aspects of tool knowledge (for review, see Lewis, 2006), whic
could be particularly important in driving the activity in temporal areas (Martin & Chao, 
2001). Still, we and others have previously argued that tool use necessarily involves 
access to ventral stream resources (Creem & Proffitt, 2001; Milner & Goodale, 1995
202-204; Valyear & Culham, 2010), and the current findings, showing robust priming fo
tool use in parietofrontal areas in the absence of concurrent effects within temporal ar
appear to work against such a model. Indeed, although there is some support for a direct, 
non-semantic route to learned actions (Riddoch, Humphreys, Coltheart, & Funnell, 1988; 
Riddoch, Humphr
h 
, pp. 
r 
eas, 
eys, Heslop, & Castermans, 2002; for review and computational model, 
ely, 
rch on 
ith 
 
ate 
 
y 
s 
see Yoon, Heinke, & Humphreys, 2002), that the ventral stream is not at all important for 
planning tool use is difficult to reconcile with other findings (e.g. Carey, Harvey, & 
Milner, 1996; Hodges, Bozeat, Lambon Ralph, Patterson, & Spatt, 2000). Alternativ
our neural priming paradigm may bias detection of changes at the level of inputs (e.g. 
Tolias, Smirnakis, Augath, Trinath, & Logothetis, 2001), such that comparable changes 
in outputs may have been missed. Clearly, further investigations are needed to clarify the 
importance of ventral stream areas in planning learned tool use. 
 That priming effects in left inferior parietal and frontal areas reveal processes 
related to procedural memory stores for tool use is consistent with previous resea
ideomotor apraxia. These patients have lost the ability to carry out learned actions w
tools, hypothesized by many to reflect the loss of procedural representations which 
normally specify the particular details of tool use actions (Buxbaum, 2001; Heilman, 
Rothi, & Valenstein, 1982; Liepmann, 1980; Rothi et al., 1997). Lesion overlap studies 
point to both left inferior parietal and inferior frontal cortex as the most common sites of
damage (Buxbaum, Johnson-Frey, & Bartlett-Williams, 2005; Goldenberg & Spatt, 2009; 
Haaland, Harrington, & Knight, 2000). Priming effects specific to tool use in the current 
study were detected in both of these areas. Together the findings converge to implic
left inferior parietal and frontal cortices as specialized for the storage and retrieval of
learned tool use actions. Notably, the presence of concurrent effects in a more dorsall
located left frontal area, as well as right intraparietal/superior parietal cortex, suggest
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that these regions are additionally important. We can only speculate why lesion 
subtraction studies with apraxic patients do not tend to also highlight these areas
perhaps this discrepancy indicates a cooperative but non-critical role for these areas in t
healthy brain. In other words, unless damage here also coincides with damage to either 
inferior frontal or inferior parietal areas, compensation is possible and ideomotor apra
is not typically observed. Previous imaging studies involving tool use pantomimes have 
also noted dorsal frontal activations (for review, see Johnson-Frey, 2004; Lewis, 2006), 
and comparisons with more perceptually oriented tasks (e.g. tool picture viewing) suggest 
that right intraparietal activations may be specific to tool-related tasks involving actual 
motor outputs (see Lewis, 2006).     
4.2.2. Neural Priming of Control Actions 
 The comparison CC > CR for Control runs identified three distinct areas at 
reliable statistical thresholds (Figure 4.3 A-C): left ventral prefrontal, left posterior 
calcarine, and bilateral ventral medial occipital. 
  
, but 
he 
xia 
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Figure 4.3. Priming of control task. Activation maps based on the contrast CC > CR for Control 
runs, set to reliable statistical thresholds (t = 3.6, p < .005; cluster-sized corrected, min = 135 
mm3, p < .05) based on group random effects general linear model. Three distinct areas are 
identified (A-C). For visualization purposes, beta weights per individual per trial type are shown 
for each of the areas, and the group mean difference between CC-CR activation levels is shown 
as a measure of priming with 95% confidence intervals indicated. Beta weights per individual per 
trial type for Experimental runs indicate no reliable differences between trial types; neural 
priming effects in these areas were specific to colour-action associations and Control runs.  
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 Priming effects in these areas were specific to Control runs and colour-action 
associations; no indication of priming in these regions for Experimental runs was 
observed (Figure 4.3). This pattern of selectivity suggests a specific role for these areas in 
mediating the colour-defined Control actions. Mohr et al. (2006) report left inferior 
prefrontal cortex as selectively active in encoding and maintaining colour (versus spatial) 
information over a delay period. More recently, Yee et al. (2010) find greater delay 
activity for colour versus shape in what appears to be the same left inferior prefrontal 
region, and the strength of activity in this area was related to better performance on the 
colour task. Both studies provide support for a selective role for this region in encoding, 
storing, maintaining, and/or manipulating colour relevant task information. Notably, both 
studies also showed concurrent colour-specific activations within posterior medial 
occipital areas, and, as Mohr and colleagues (2006) proposed, left ventral prefrontal 
cortex “might control the rehearsal of colour information through a cross talk with more 
posterior visual areas”. Thus, our findings showing neural priming specific to colour-
action associations within left ventral prefrontal and posterior occipital areas fit well with 
this previous work. This circuit appears particularly well suited for mediating behaviours 
based on arbitrary mappings according to object colour; in our case, left ventral prefrontal 
cortex may hold colour-defined rules in mind and coordinate with early visual areas to 
ilt 
up over the life span, with relatively continuous reinforcement, not only through the 
tools, and through the gradual development of conceptual knowledge stores about tools 
and tool use actions. In other words, the specificity of neural priming within 
parietofrontal cortices corresponds with the overlearned nature of tool-action 
associations; only with sufficient experience and reinforcement do stimulus-action 
associations come to be represented within this circuitry to the extent that stimuli (tools) 
alone will trigger partial activation of motor plans. The second hypothesis highlights the 
plan and carryout actions accordingly.  
4.2.3. Tool-action Associations and Experience-dependent Plasticity 
 To account for tool use specific priming, we favour two interrelated hypotheses. 
The first puts an emphasis on the relative strength of tool-action associations. Pairings 
between tools and their associated actions tend to be particularly well established, bu
performance of actual actions with tools, but also through the observation of others using 
 
148 
 
role of ecologically valid outcomes. Tools are used to achieve specific goals, real wor
aims with meaningful outcomes, to the benefit of the user. In this way, tool-action 
pairings are themselves coupled with ecologically important behavioural outcomes, and 
this factor may be crucial in ‘gaining a position’ within parietofrontal neural machin
Recent evidence implicate inferior frontoparietal areas as coding the goals and outcomes 
of actions, rather than specific motor mechanisms, such as the particular effectors or
kinematics used to achieve those goals (Andersen & Buneo, 2002; Bonini et al., 2010; 
Fogassi et al., 2005; Hamilton & Grafton, 2008; Umilta et al., 2008). Of course, both 
accounts may be valid, and, in fact, interactions between these factors may be particularly
critical: sufficient experience and continuous reinforcement paired with true ecologically 
meaningful outcomes together may comprise the key features underlying the specif
of neural priming for tool use within the parietofrontal areas identified.  
 In contrast, the colour-action associations that make up our Control task are 
neither well established nor ecologically meaningful. It is true that following instructions 
accurately, like those required by our colour-action task, does have real ecological value 
in the sense that socially, it is often advantageous to adhere to the requests of others; and 
in the case of our experiment, participants were certainly encouraged to learn these 
associations and were ultimately given monetary compensation for their participation. 
But still, there is something clearly different 
ld 
ery. 
 
 
icity 
about the explicit, inherent rewards that are 
 performing the 
ern of 
rt 
to 
routinely paired with real familiar tool use, and those that go along with
colour-defined actions we introduced to participants in the current experiment. Thus, in 
our hands, it is fair to say that the arbitrarily assigned colour-action associations that 
comprise our Control task differed critically in how they are paired with real world 
meaningful outcomes, such as successfully feeding and clothing oneself. As for the 
strength of these associations, colour-action pairings were newly learned, with no 
correspondence to pairings that occur in real life. Thus, clearly the strength of these 
associations differed from those of our tool use task. Indeed, we view the patt
priming effects specific to Control runs and colour-action associations as in pa
reflecting the temporary nature of these associations; it made sense for participants 
hold in mind these pairings only temporarily, and evidently, they recruited a completely 
different set of areas to do so. Priming in left ventral prefrontal cortex may, in particular, 
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reflect the holding of rules in mind, while concurrent effects in early visual areas may 
relate more directly with bottom-up components of the task (i.e. in distinguishing 
between different handle colours). In other words, we interpret this collection of 
activations as reflecting the coordination of both top-down (left ventral prefrontal) and 
bottom-up (early visual) mechanisms. 
 To conclude, we identified a selective, mainly left-lateralized parietofrontal 
circuit showing neural priming specific to familiar tool-action associations. Specificity of
priming for tool use in these areas reflects a form of experience-dependent plasticity, 
whereby continuous pairings of tools with actions gives rise to use-based affordances: 
visually-driven activations of motor representations for learned use. That such effects 
instantiated within left inferior parietal and frontal cortex converges with previous 
neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence; these areas are particularly im
 
portant in 
e retr r 
 or 
thics 
th ieval and implementation of learned tool use. The current design controlled fo
various confounds that plagued previous imaging studies of tool use and the findings 
have provided a more selective account than was previously available. Tool-use priming 
within left inferior parietal cortex is consistent with recent arguments for its uniquely 
human specialization for tool use (Peeters et al., 2009), following disproportional 
expansion of inferior parietal cortex in human evolution (Bruner, Manzi, & Arsuaga, 
2003; Eidelberg & Galaburda, 1984, as cited in Johnson-Frey, 2003a, p.206). 
4.3. Experimental Procedure 
4.3.1. Subjects 
Eleven right-handed individuals with normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
participated in the study. None of the participants had any prior history of neurologic
psychiatric illness. All subjects provided informed consent in accordance with the 
guidelines approved by the University of Western Ontario Health Sciences Review E
Board. 
4.3.2. Stimuli and presentation setup 
Figure 4.1B shows the different tools and handle colours that were used. The 
complete set included repeats of each exemplar, for a total of 32 items. Tools were 
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presented using the platform and turntable apparatus shown in Figure 4.1A. Two Velcro-
covered sides were used to attach tools and allowed for the independent presentatio
prime and probe events within a trial. On the probe side only, a small cardboard b
attached to the lower part of the workspace, used to catch tools in after subjects had 
completed their actions. The platform w
n of 
ox was 
as specifically adjusted for each individual so 
d 
e 
nation of 
tion (probe) event, in which subjects reached, grasped, 
placed it in the ‘catch box’ before returning 
on to wait for the next trial to begin. From the onset of the probe event, 
there w
4 times per run, arranged so that actions 
events were equally represented within a run, evenly distributed across trial types. For 
rrelevant and participants performed actions 
accordi
sk, 
that tools and the workspace could be comfortably viewed without the use of a mirror and 
so that tools could be easily grasped and used with minimal movement of the arm. 
Specifically, the setup allowed participants to grasp and use tools without the need to lift 
their elbow from the bed or move their upper arm or shoulder. Tools were presented in 
the lower right quadrant of the workspace. Participants were instructed to fixate a small 
light-emitting diode (LED) that was attached to an adjustable plastic stalk positione
directly above where tools were presented. For both prime and probe events, tools were 
made visible by brief (300-ms) illumination of a superbright white LED attached to a 
second adjustable stalk. The experiment was otherwise carried out in complete darkness. 
4.3.3. Tasks 
 Experimental and Control tasks were performed in separate runs. Each run 
comprised 16 trials. A given trial was made up of the following events: a visual prim
event involving 300 ms illumination of a tool, followed by a 2700 ms delay with no 
vision, followed by a second tool illuminated for 300 ms (Figure 4.1D). Illumi
the second tool signalled the ac
and used whichever tool was shown and then 
to the rest positi
as a 16.5 s delay period before the next trial began. 
 On a given trial, prime-probe events either involved the same or different tools, 
with either the same or different coloured handles (Figure 4.1E). Each possible 
combination of these trial types was shown 
Experimental runs, handle colour was i
ng to tool identity; whereas for Control runs, tool identity was irrelevant and 
participants performed actions according to handle colour (Figure 4.1C). For each ta
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actions were minimal-amplitude motions, involving mostly the wrist, fingers and thumb, 
approximately 3-4s in duration. Participants performed a minimum of 3 Experimental 
(with an average of 4.2 runs per subject) and 3 Control runs (with an average of 4.1 runs 
per subject). Eight distinct run orders were created for each Experimental and Contro
runs, and all possible combinations of prime-probe pairings were equally represented 
across orders. Different run orders were evenly distributed across individuals, 
randomized for presentation order within individuals, always following an interleav
sequence (e.g. Control-Experimental-Control, or vice-versa). 
4.3.4. Pre-scan training  
 Prior to scanning (max 1 week, min 2 days), participants took part in a 
behavioural training session. The purpose of this session was to familiarize participants 
with tools, trial types, events and timing, and to learn the colour-action pairings for the 
Control task. Another important goal was to closely specify and practice the particular 
actions that were to be performed in the scanner, for both Control and Experimental 
l 
ed 
s associated with movements of the head while in the scanner were 
t 
l 
e 
k. Trial types and timing were 
e sam
eady. 
ls, 
r 
itude 
s 
tasks. The problem
thoroughly explained, and participants understood that their hand actions should no
involve movements of the upper arm or shoulder, and that their head should be kept stil
at all times. Minimal-amplitude actions were stressed, emphasizing the use of only th
wrist and fingers. And, actions were trained to be performed quickly but smoothly, 
finishing in approximately 3-4s.  
 After initial discussions about the task and stimuli had took place, participants 
performed 16 trials of each Experimental and Control actions, presented in separate 
blocks, balanced for trial type and action type within a bloc
th e as used in the actual fMRI experiment, except trials were not spaced so far 
apart; participants dimply signalled the experimenter to initiate new trials once r
The same turntable apparatus as used in the scanner was used to present tools (Figure 
4.1A), and LCD goggles were used to control participants’ vision. For these first 32 tria
actions were performed with visual feedback to allow participants and the experimente
to more easily comment on and adjust actions if needed (e.g. to suggest smaller ampl
movements; to suggest particular finger placements, etc.). After these two blocks of trial
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were performed, two additional blocks of 40 trials per task were performed, this time 
with no visual feedback of actions, as in the fMRI experiment (i.e. tools at both prime 
and probe events were only made visible for 300 ms). Actions and trial types were 
equally represented and evenly distributed within blocks, and block order was 
counterbalanced across individuals. For the Experimental task, no differences in reacti
times were evident when Tool Repeated (M = 412 ms, SEM = 19.9 ms) and To
Changed (M = 416 ms, SEM = 24.5 ms) trials were compared, t(10) = 0.20, p = 0.85. 
Likewise, for the Control task, no differences between Colour
on 
ol 
 Repeated (M = 416 ms, 
M = 411 ms, SEM = 30.1 ms) trials were 
 
 
1 
lel 
 2 with generalized auto-calibrating partially parallel 
ition
SEM = 34.7 ms) versus Colour Changed (
evident, t(10) = 0.13, p = 0.90. 
4.3.5. Imaging parameters 
 Imaging was performed on a 3 Tesla Siemens TIM MAGNETOM Trio MRI 
scanner. The T1-weighted anatomical image was collected using an ADNI MPRAGE 
sequence (time to repetition = 2300 ms, TE = 2.98 ms, field of view and matrix size =
192 x 240 x 256, flip angle = 9°, 1 mm isotropic voxels). Functional MRI volumes were
collected using a T2*-weighted single-shot gradient-echo echo-planar imaging (EPI) 
acquisition sequence (time to repetition = 1500 ms, slice thickness = 4 mm, in-plane 
resolution = 3.3 mm x 3.3 mm, time to echo (TE) = 30 ms, field of view = 211 mm x 21
mm, matrix size = 64 x 64, flip angle = 75°, and acceleration factor (integrated paral
acquisition technologies, iPAT) =
acquis s (GRAPPA) reconstruction). We used a combination of parallel imaging coils 
to achieve a good signal-to-noise ratio and to enable direct viewing without mirrors or 
occlusion. We tilted (~30° degrees) the posterior half of the 12-channel receive-only head 
coil (6-channels) and suspended a 4-channel receive-only flex coil over the anterior-
superior part of the head. Each volume comprised 28 contiguous (no gap) axial-oblique 
slices, spanning from the most superior point of cortex through ventral fusiform cortex to 
include approximately two-thirds of cerebellum, providing near whole brain coverage; 
volume acquisition space included anterior temporal poles but excluded parts of orbital 
prefrontal cortex. 
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4.3.6. Data preprocessing and analysis 
 Imaging data were preprocessed and analyzed using Brain Voyager QX version
2.1.0.1532 (Brain Innovation, Maastricht, The Netherlands). Each functional was 
assessed for subject head motion by viewing cineloop animation and by examin
Voyager motion-detection parameter plots after running 3-D motion correction 
algorithms on the untransformed two-dimensional data. No abrupt movements we
detected in the animations and no deviations larger than 1 mm (translations) or 1° 
(rotations) were observed in the motion correction output. Motion correction was 
performed using BV QX intra-session alignment options (involving resampling with
interpolation) with the reference
 
ing Brain 
re 
 sinc 
 volume taken as the closest volume to the T1-weighted 
participant may have fumbled with the object 
igh-
um 3 runs, average 4.2 runs per subject) and Control runs 
(minimum 3 runs, average 4.1 runs per subject). Each run was z-transformed prior to 
anatomical scan. Error trials (i.e. where the 
or performed the incorrect instruction) were examined off-line from videos recorded 
using an MR-compatible infrared-sensitive camera that was optimally positioned to 
record the participant’s movements during functional runs (MRC Systems GmbH). 
However, due to equipment failure, recordings were available for only 5 participants in 
the group. No trials from these participants contained errors. 
 Functional data were preprocessed with linear trend removal and underwent h
pass temporal frequency filtering to remove frequencies below three cycles per run, and 
aligned to anatomical volumes, which were then transformed into standard stereotaxic 
space (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988). Data were spatially smoothed for group analysis 
using a Gaussian kernel of 6 mm (full-width at half-maximum).  
 Trials were defined as four volume (6 s) events starting at the onset of prime 
events (Figure 4.1D). For Experimental runs, trial types were either Tool Repeated (TR) 
or Tool Changed (TC), and for Control runs, trial types were either Colour Repeated 
(CR) or Colour Changed (CC). Predictor functions for each trial type for each run were 
convolved with Brain Voyager QX “two-gamma” hemodynamic response function 
designed to estimate the spatiotemporal characteristics of the BOLD response. A group 
defined random effects general linear model (GLM) was used for analysis of both 
Experimental (minim
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GLM analysis. Resultant activation maps were set to a statistical threshold of t = 3.6, p < 
 
 
eans 
se-
.005, uncorrected for multiple comparisons. Maps were then corrected using BV QX 
cluster-level statistical threshold estimator which was found to indicate a minimum
cluster size of 135 mm3, corrected at p < .05. To evaluate specificity of priming defined 
areas, Beta weights per individual per trial type for either Control (Figure 4.2) or
Experimental (Figure 4.3) runs were extracted from identified areas, and condition m
were compared using paired t-tests at a significance threshold of p < .05, Greenhou
Geisser corrected. 
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Chapter 5 
eral Discussion 5. Gen
eural 
and beh e 
and 3) ing (Project 1). Neural recording 
neuron ng of object grasping and manipulation (Chapter1, 
(area F nical neurons) and viewing object-
respon
 
knowle
use grasping. Movies of grasping actions that were typical of how tools are normally 
 
not allo
ty 
for view n of areas closely aligned with the ventral visual 
observed in parietofrontal areas thought to underlie learned motoric aspects of tool use.  
In Project 2, behavioural priming of tool use grasping was examined and 
compared across two types of tasks: grasping-to-use (GTU), where participants grasped 
and demonstrated the use of tools, versus grasping-to-move (GTM), where participants 
grasped and moved tools. Actions were preceded by a visual preview (prime) event 
involving the presentation of a single tool, either congruent or incongruent in identity to 
that which was then acted with. A reaction time advantage for congruent trial types was 
Broadly speaking, the goals of my thesis were to gain new insights into the n
avioural mechanisms underlying learned tool use. My approach focused on th
activation of tool use representations in response to viewing and using tools (Project 2 
and in response to observing tool use grasp
studies in monkeys reveal that viewing objects or object directed actions activates 
s underlying motor programmi
section 1.3.1). Neurons in both anterior intraparietal (area AIP) and ventral premotor 
5) cortex respond to viewing objects (cano
directed actions (mirror neurons), and this activity coincides with the motor properties of 
these cells for object grasping and manipulation. My studies were designed so that 
se selectivity for tools (Projects 2 and 3) and tool use grasping (Project 1) would 
indicate sensitivity to learned features of tools not accessible without access to stored
dge. 
In Project 1, I used fMRI to visualize brain activity in response to viewing tool 
grasped for use (Typical Grasping, TG) were compared with atypical grasping that would
w for easy use (Atypical Grasping, AG). Differential activity was taken to 
indicate sensitivity to learned aspects of tool use grasping. We found preferential activi
ing TG movies in a collectio
pathway; however, contrary to our expectations, no such preferential activity was 
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taken to indicate priming. Tools had ide es and thus priming did not reflect 
d to structural object properties important for grasping, but 
instead was related to knowledge of identity and learned use. In a first experiment, we 
found t
ent 
ls 
al 
ity, 
digm is a neuroimaging variant of the 
behavioural priming approach used in Project 2 and follows directly from the theory of 
use-bas
 a 
l 
 
parietofrontal areas. Neural prim
5.1). 
 
ntical handl
facilitation of processing relate
hat when GTU and GTM tasks were presented separately, priming was detected 
for the GTU task only. We also found that grasping kinematics split apart according to 
tool identity when the task was GTU but not GTM, revealing robust differences in the 
way the hand shaped to grasp tools according to intention and use. A second experim
involving both GTM and GTU tasks randomly intermixed in the same block of tria
revealed priming effects for both tasks. This finding indicates the importance of goal-set 
in shaping effects of priming, likely driven by differences in the allocation of attention
resources. Differences in attention to particular object features, in this case tool ident
modulate affordances driven by those features which in turn determines priming. 
In Project 3, I presented a new imaging method to study real tool manipulation 
that controls for various confounds that have plagued previous fMRI studies of tools (as 
discussed in Section in 1.4.2.). The para
ed affordances developed from Valyear et al. (2007). With a visual priming 
paradigm I am able to selectively probe the neural correlates of learned tool use. My 
general approach relies on well established neuroimaging findings known widely as 
stimulus specific repetition suppression; yet, my design is unique in that it involves
visual-only event followed by a visual-action task. To demonstrate specificity of priming 
for learned tool use, I introduced a control task whereby actions were guided not by too
identity but instead by arbitrarily learned associations with colour. The results show
specificity for tool use priming in a selective mainly left-lateralized network of 
ing of tool use is taken to reflect a form of experience-
dependent plasticity, driven by continual reinforcement of tool-action pairings. 
My discussion is divided into four main sections. First, I consider my findings 
with respect to the ventral stream and stored conceptual knowledge of tools (section 
The question of ventral stream importance for tool use is addressed in light of the 
findings from each project in turn (section 5.1.1), followed by an expanded discussion of
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the evidence for and against the importance of explicit conceptual knowledge in planni
and using tools (section 5.1.2). Second, I discuss behavioural (section 5.2.1) and neural 
(section 5.2.2) priming of tool use, Projects 2 and 3 respectively. Both types of priming
are thought to reflect the activation of tool-specific motor plans implicitly triggered by 
the visual presentation of tools (i.e. use-based affordances). Third, section 5.3 provides 
summary of both sets of neuroimaging findings from Projects 1 and 3, followed by a 
consideration of two interrelated theoretical themes in light of these new findings: 
schema theory of tool use and divided parietal streams for action (section 5.3.1). Final
I conclude with specific suggestions as to the most important and promising future 
directions that follow directly from the findings of the current thesis (section 5.4). 
5.1. Conceptual object knowledge and the ventral stream 
ng 
 
a 
ly, 
5.1.1. Is the ventral stream important for tool use? 
 
 and 
‘where
 
arising implicitly. In our task participants were not asked to evaluate movies with respect 
The findings from Project 1 (Chapter 2) showed a collection of areas within the 
ventral visual pathway as preferentially active for observing typical tool use grasping 
(TG) (Figure 2.5). While this was not what we had in mind when we set out with this 
experiment, this pattern of specificity falls in line with thinking about the ventral stream
as important for conceptual knowledge of objects and tools. Just as TG actions make 
sense with respect to ‘how’, they make sense with respect to ‘what’; that is, these actions 
fit with the way tools are normally grasped for use (how) insofar as the tools themselves 
are known and can be recognized (what). In essence, this feature of tool use, the 
necessary marriage between ‘what’ and ‘how’, is exactly what I looked to exploit; only 
my sights were more narrowly focused on the procedural side of things – hoping to 
activate associated parietal regions by way of implicit motor simulation. As Scott Frey so 
cleverly states in the title of his recent review paper on the cortical basis of tool use: 
“What puts the how in where? Tool use and the divided visual streams hypothesis” (Frey, 
2007). The title is both a question and an answer; ‘what’ refers to the ventral stream
’ refers to the dorsal stream, and thus the suggestion is that the ventral stream 
works with the dorsal stream to contribute and help mediate the ‘how’ of tool use.  
Prior to Project 1, I had not thought of such processing within the ventral stream
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to conceptual content in any explicit sense – they were asked to detect relatively 
infrequent instances of repeated movies; a task that was intended to simply keep subjects
attending to movies, rather than impose any particular processing demands. And yet, 
simply watching and attending to videos led to robust differences in ventral stream 
activity according to how tools were grasped. Specifically, TG gave rise to greater 
activity compared with atypical grasping (AG) even though participants were not told
explicitly evaluate grasp type. Since this project, a new imaging study by Roberts a
Humphreys (2010) involving the viewing of object pairs positioned correctly versus 
incorrectly for action showed strikingly similar findings. Correct action positioning 
when an ‘active’ object, like a corkscrew, is facing a ‘passive’ object, like a wine b
 
 to 
nd 
is 
ottle, 
e. The assignment of 
‘active’ and ‘passive’ relates to how the two objects influence one another when used 
hange the state of the passive object. 
In this 
 
cts 
atch 
 
e 
related influences from
so that interaction between the pair of objects is immediately possibl
together, where the active object of a pair is used to c
way, active-passive object pairs can be shown as properly or improperly 
positioned for action. Roberts and Humphreys (2010) found that such positioning 
selectively influenced the strength of activity within the ventral stream; when pairs of 
objects were correctly positioned for action, activations within a relatively large swath of
ventral stream cortex showed stronger responses compared with when those same obje
were positioned incorrectly for action. Preferential activity was seen bilaterally in lateral 
occipital temporal cortex, corresponding with LOC, although the effects were much 
stronger in the left hemisphere, extending inferiorly to include fusiform cortex 
exclusively in the left hemisphere. Notably, these position effects were evident even 
when participants were not directly attending to object pairs. Clearly these findings m
well with ours; where Roberts and Humphreys (2010) show implicit ventral stream 
coding for learned object-object positions for action, we show implicit ventral stream
coding for learned hand-object positions for action. Further, as with our findings, Roberts 
and Humphreys (2010) found no concurrent effects in visuomotor areas of the dorsal 
stream. They conclude that their ventral stream effects reflect “a visual response to th
possibilities of action” (Roberts & Humphreys, 2010, p. 1547) not governed by motor-
 parietofrontal areas. We also find that although parietal areas 
were more responsive for grasping versus reaching movies, activity was the same for 
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typical and atypical tool grasping. Together both sets of findings indicate that, at l
the realm of perceptually driven events, the dorsal stream is agnostic to the learned 
functional relationships between stimuli for action.  
Note that ventral stream responses to such learned relations may not reflect 
conceptual knowledge processing or retrieval in an explicit sense, but rather may reflect 
statistical regularities built-up from perceptual experience with ‘the way the world is’. 
That is, perceptual systems may very well be sculpted by the kinds of visual 
consistencies, patterns, and instances normally present in the natural world (Geisler, 
2008; Schwarzkopf & Kourtzi, 2008; Simoncelli & Olshausen, 2001). Perhaps such 
shaping includes influences from the regularities of everyday living, which include how 
objects are normally manipulated and used, and how multiple objects typically interact 
and are arranged (Humphreys et al., 2009). According to this account, our findings 
indicate that seeing a hand grasp a tool in a way consistent with such regularities, 
consistent with everyday interaction, gives rise to greater metabolic activity within the 
ventral visual pathway.  
What is not immediately clear in this account is why the rise in metabolic 
demand/consumption? Why would a match in perceptual consistency lead to greater 
activation in the perceptual system; one might just as easily predict that processing would
unfold more efficiently, and thus with less metabolic consumption and less BOLD 
activity. The explanation I put forth in Chapter 2 suggested that with this better 
perceptual fit, activations in the ventral stream tend to spread, both locally within 
neighbouring populations of cells making up distinct processing modules (e.g. area LO), 
and more distally, to other modules within the network. The example I provided is th
seeing a garden shovel grasped properly may activate other semantic associates like di
and flowers. This argument extends to other information types, like predicted or implied 
motion, and, in accordance with the organizational principles laid down by Simmons a
Barsalou (2003), even low-level visual areas encoding simple visual features that show 
overlap in ‘conceptual space’ may be more strongly activated. This account explains th
widespread distribution of effects we detected, not only within high level object areas,
but also motion area MT+ and more posterior occipital foci (Figure 2.5).  
east in 
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Whatever the driving mechanism, in my view, the sensitivity to conceptual 
aspects of tool use grasping within the ventral stream is consistent with the model of
use and the two visual streams put forth by Milner an
 tool 
d Goodale (1995, pp. 202-204; see 
also Milner & Goodale, 2006, p. 231). In this view, tool use involves the cooperation of 
 do their part. What exactly this role is, and 
how it unfolds at the neural level, represents a fundamental missing link in contemporary 
cortica
 
 function, 
showed robust evidence of priming. Garofeanu et al. (2004) used a more traditional 
both streams, and what is more, the ventral stream is thought to play a specific role in 
both object and action selection. Alongside identification and selection of particular tools 
for action, the ventral stream is thought to flag the part of a tool to be grasped (e.g. its 
handle). It follows that the conveyance of such information is essential to the 
specification of functional features of tool use grasping. That is, as I have shown 
empirically with Project 2 (Chapter 3), functional grasping of tools involves computation 
of a complex array of anticipatory kinematic features in accordance with predicted 
kinetics of upcoming action components. Ventral stream inputs are thought to be vital to 
the specification of such details. Milner and Goodale were also clear that prior to the 
implementation of actual motor outputs by dorsal stream areas, praxis-specialized areas 
within inferior parietal cortex would need to
l theories of tool use.  
Keeping with the current focus, how do my findings from Projects 2 and 3 
integrate with this model of ventral stream involvement for tool use? Recall that while the 
dorsal stream is thought to operate on a moment-to-moment timescale, ventral stream
processes are thought to operate over much longer timescales (Chapter 1, section 1.2.1). 
Differing timescales translate into contrasting predictions about priming: while functions 
of the ventral stream are expected to show sensitivity to priming, functions of the dorsal 
stream may not. At the most conservative end of this view, real actions are programmed 
from the bottom-up, based only on information currently available to the system, not 
subject to prior events, and thus not expected to show priming. In an earlier study, we 
provided evidence for this conservative account by showing no indication of behavioural 
priming in accordance with repeated versus non-repeated object orientation in a real 
grasping task (Cant, Westwood, Valyear, & Goodale, 2005). Conversely, with the same 
setup, stimuli, and timing of events, a naming task, dependent on ventral stream
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repetiti y 
 
as 
d 
& 
ing 
eral, 
 
 
t with the idea that the GTM task can be performed based 
entirely on dorsal stream
. 
ings 
 and 
on-priming paradigm whereby a set of common objects were shown in a stud
phase followed by presentation in a test phase along with ‘new’ objects, not shown 
during study. Priming was observed for repeated objects in the test phase when the task 
was naming, but not for grasping. The findings support the view of visuomotor processes
as reliant on moment-to-moment computations, relatively insensitive to priming, where
object recognition is fundamentally dependent on memory, highly sensitive to priming 
(see also Kroliczak, Westwood, & Goodale, 2006). Notably, the concept of priming an
real actions is not without its opponent views (e.g. Craighero, Fadiga, Umilta, 
Rizzolatti, 1996; Jax & Rosenbaum, 2007); it appears as though the picture of prim
and actions depends greatly on the specific details of experimental design (for relevant 
discussion, see Kroliczak et al., 2006, p. 140). Nevertheless, if we accept that in gen
ventral stream processing is more susceptible to priming than is dorsal stream processing,
my findings from Project 2 showing robust priming for grasping-to-use tools provides
support for the idea that familiar tool use involves ventral stream contributions. 
Conversely, when participants performed the grasp-to-move (GTM) task priming was 
much less evident (Figure 3.5), and in the case of Experiment 1 altogether absent (Figure 
3.2). This pattern is consisten
 function, without ventral stream involvement. With respect to 
the model outlined in the General Introduction (section 1.4), differential priming for the 
grasp-to-use (GTU) versus the GTM task is consistent with the distinction between 
systems for grasping based on learned object properties, as aligned with a lateral-IPL 
pathway and the ventral stream, versus structural object properties, as aligned with a 
medial-SPL pathway and the dorsal stream (Figure 1.3).  
It is important to recognize that this separation of priming according to task was 
not completely rigid, but instead showed sensitivity to whether or not tasks were 
presented together, in a mixed task setting, or in separate blocks, in a single task setting
In the mixed setting, both GTM and GTU trials showed priming. How do these findings 
fit with the model of distinct pathways to grasping? In Chapter 3, I discussed the find
with respect to attention and affordances. The motor system takes on unique strategies 
depending on both immediate action goals and overall context, including task setting 
(blocked or mixed). I used the term goal-set to capture these adjustments in behavior
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underlying motor strategies. The complete set of findings from both experiments can b
explained by the idea that goal-set determines the specific allocation of attentional 
resources which in turn determine affordances and priming. In the mixed setting, priming
for the GTM task reflects attention to tool identity and function, spilled over from the 
need to attend to these features in GTU trails. Under the model of distinct routes to 
grasping, these findings may indicate a shared attentional system. With attention to tool
identity in place, priming unfolds even for GTM trials. Alternatively, when trial types 
were intermixed, perhaps the brain’s solution was to simply perform both tasks w
same route to grasping; namely, the lateral-IPL route specialized for functional grasping
and tool use. That this route can actually penetrate the programming and control of moto
outputs for grasping is evidenced by the findings from optic ataxic patient AT 
(Jeannerod, Decety, & Michel, 1994). Recall from Chapter 1 (section 1.4.1), this patient 
showed improved grasp scaling for familiar versus semantically-neutral objects. 
Finally, how do my findings from Project 3 fit with the model of ventral stream
involvement for tool use? Right away, lack of neural priming effects in ventral stream 
areas appears at odds with an account of ventral stream importance for tool use planning. 
Areas important for retrieval and implementation of stored tool-specific action plans were 
expected to show reduced BOLD activity for Tool Repeated (TR) compared with Tool 
Changed (TC) trials. We identified a selective network of parietofrontal regions that 
followed this pattern, and left parietal activations were localized to lateral intraparieta
cortex overlapping with IPL, in line with its proposed specialization for tool use and the 
two action route model of PPC. If ventral stream input is an important component of the 
lateral-IPL system, why then did ventral stream areas not al
e 
 
 
ith the 
 
r 
 
l 
so show neural priming of 
tool us , 
& 
 
, 
e? Rather than reject the model of ventral stream importance in tool use altogether
which would be difficult to reconcile with previous findings (e.g. Carey, Harvey, 
Milner, 1996), I looked to explain these findings by considering the proposed underlying 
nature of BOLD-based priming effects more closely. The theory posits that priming 
(reduced BOLD) comes about when successive events activate overlapping neural 
processes. In the case of my experiment, repeated tool identity will activate more of the
same neurons than when identity is changed, and given the context of the tool use task
some of this activity will underlie the retrieval/implementation of tool-specific action 
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plans. We can break the process down further and consider the expected ventral stream 
responses to both the prime and probe events in turn. Vision of prime events activat
neural populations coding tool identity, and volleys of action potentials are sent forth to 
inferior parietal areas to communicate this message; evidence for such parietal activity
for viewed tools in the absence of overt action is clear from my previous imaging 
findings (Valyear et al., 2007) as well as others (Chao & Martin, 2000). At the onset of 
probe events, the same processes unfold, except, of course, this time retrieval and 
execution of motor plans is explicit, as the actions themselves are then actually carried 
forth. Although an obvious oversimplification, if we define this as an activation loop 
between ventral and inferior parietal areas, we can say that ventral stream components 
represent primary senders of information while parietal components represent p
receivers. As I suggest in Chapter 4, this difference between output and input roles may 
have important consequences at the level of detection of activation changes. Prev
e 
 
rimary 
ious 
findings indicate that BOLD activity is more strongly correlated with local field 
I 
) 
 
potentials which reflect the inputs-to and local processing within an area versus single 
and multi-unit spiking activity which reflect long-range outputs (Logothetis, Pauls, 
Augath, Trinath, & Oeltermann, 2001; Logothetis & Wandell, 2004). Thus, activation 
changes due to repeated tool identity may be detected at the level of inputs to an area 
(inferior parietal cortex) but missed at the output level (ventral stream areas).  
The above hypothesis gains support from the following study by Tolias et al. 
(2001). The authors used an fMRI adaptation paradigm to measure direction selective 
responses to motion stimuli in macaque monkeys. Motion stimuli moving in a single 
constant direction were shown continuously for several seconds. This is called the 
adaptation phase, where motion responsive neurons selective for the presented direction 
of motion will show decreased firing (i.e. adaptation). Direction selectivity is then 
measured by introducing a change in direction of motion. A corresponding increase, or 
‘rebound’ from the adapted level of activity then indicates sensitivity to motion 
directionality. Notice that the logic of this paradigm is essentially the same as what 
called neural priming in Project 3; repeated events lead to decreased activity in an area(s
of interest, which is detected and measured by comparison with non-repeated or changed
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events3. Tolias and colleagues found that area MT showed a robust rebound from BOLD
adaptation, indicative of strong motion directionality. The findings matched well with
previous neurophysiological studies showing that spiking activity in a high proportion of
MT neurons indicate direction selectivity (Albright, 1984; Maunsell & van Essen, 1983
What was surprising, according to BOLD measurements area V4 showed even gre
direction selectivity than MT, even though according to neurophysiology much fewer 
neurons show direction selectivity in V4 (Desimone & Schein, 1987). To account f
discrepancy, the authors explained that such apparent direction selectivity may come 
about as a consequence of the dense connectivity between direction selective neurons 
MT and non-directionally selective neurons in V4. In other words, the activation change
in V4 reflect changes at the level of inputs, proposed to stem from changes in output 
firing from MT. This account was also used to explain higher than expected direction 
selectivity in others visual areas such as V1. The findings highlight key differences 
between classic neurophysiological investigations focused on spiking activity of 
and BOLD imaging, where imaging is highly sensitive to network dynamics and may b
biased to detect activity at the level of inputs and local synaptic events.  
 Priming effects aside, the model of ventral stream involvement in tool use 
predicts that activation in ventral stream areas will rise and fall in time with tool use 
planning and execution. As a simple test of this prediction, I performed a whole-volum
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ith 
ise contrast of action events (either Experimental or Control) versus rest. Ven
stream activity was detected bilaterally, although with a strong left hemisphere 
prevalence. Two distinct hotspots were evident in left temporo-occipital cortex, one 
lateral and anterior (Figure 5.1A) and one more inferior near fusiform cortex (Figur
5.1B). For both areas, the activation time course shows a rise onset consistent with visual
responsiveness to prime events, followed by a more pronounced increase in time w
                                                 
3 Indeed, the terms fMRI adaptation, repetition suppression, and neural priming have all
used interchangeably n neuroimaging research; although, adaptation usually indicates that blo
of repeated events were used rather single repeats as with event-related designs.  
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action (probe) events. For comparison, activation in an area overlapping with 
somatomotor cortex shows a much later response onset, consistent with distinct motor-
driven activity (Figure 5.1C). As with ventral stream areas, early visual cortex was 
activated early on, in sync with the onset of prime events (Figure 5.1D). Further analyses 
according to trial types showed no indication of priming in ventral stream areas for eith
tool use and Experimental runs or colour-defined actions and Control runs. Activation 
time courses also indicate similar responses to both Experimental and Control tasks. 
Nonetheless, elevated BOLD activity in concert with prime and action events was clea
evident. Although minimal, this provides some support for the hypothesis that tool use 
involves the ventral stream.  
  
er 
rly 
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Figure 5.1. Non-specific task-related activity (Project 3). Activation maps were generated from the 
contrast of Experimental and/or Control actions > rest, based on group random effects general linear model. 
The goal of this additional analysis was to determine if ventral stream areas were activated by tool use. 
Two distinct foci in the left ventral stream were identified (A-B) at reliable statistical thresholds (t = 6.6, p 
< 1.0 x 10-4; cluster-sized corrected, min = 162 mm3, p < .05). The strongest activity based on this contrast 
was revealed in left somatomotor cortex (C), and for additional comparison, activity is shown for early 
visual cortex (D). Averaged activation time courses are shown for each area, based on a maximum 
selection of 10 mm3 set of active voxels centred on the local activation peak. No differences between 
Experimental versus Control actions are evident in any of these areas. Notably, the onset of activity is much 
earlier in both ventral and early visual areas compared with left somatomotor cortex. The results indicate 
elevated ventral stream activity in time with action events. As shown, ventral stream activations were much 
stronger in the left hemisphere, revealed bilaterally only at reduced thresholds. 
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Further, it may well be significant that ventral stream activations were so strongly 
left lateralized. Typically, objects activate ventral stream areas in both hemispheres to 
much the same degree; but, tools as a category selectively activate left posterior middle 
temporal gyrus (pMTG), as shown in our Localizer results of Project 1 (section 2.3.2; 
Figures 2.2A-B, 2.4). Comparison revealed partial overlap between this tool selective 
pMTG and the dorsal lateral ventral stream activity we observed when participants 
performed real actions with tools (Figure 5.2). Such a finding provides additional support 
for the idea of ventral stream involvement in tool use. Selectivity for tools in pMTG has 
been shown with many different kinds of tasks and defining contrasts (Lewis, 2006); this 
area may represent a convergence point whereby multiple information types from 
separate modalities are integrated (e.g. Beauchamp, Lee, Argall, & Martin, 2004). We 
show a very consistent spatial relationship with this area and areas LO and motion area 
MT+ in individuals; tool selective pMTG sits just anterior and lateral to both areas 
(Figure 2.4). Although speculative, its position is well suited to mediate integration and 
exchange of information between dorsal and ventral pathways. On the basis of 
preferential responses to tool versus body motion, Beauchamp and colleagues 
(Beauchamp, Lee, Haxby, & Martin, 2002) proposed that tool selective pMTG may play 
a specialized role in processing the typical motions of tools in action (Beauchamp & 
te 
ral.  
Martin, 2007). We extend these findings in Project 1 to show preferential activity for TG 
versus AG movies (Figures 2.2A-C), and suggest that coding in this region may integra
hand and tool motion. Activation of this area in time with our tool use task in Project 3 
may indicate additional contributions to real tool use; however, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that this activity may also simply indicate visual responses to tools in gene
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Figure 5.2. Ventral stream activity for real tool use overlaps with tool-selective pMTG
Activity for real tool use (Project 3, Figure 5.1A) is shown in yellow-orange while activity 
selective for viewing pictures of familiar tools versus bodies, non-tool objects, and scra
images (Project 1, Figures 2.2A-B, 2.4) is shown in green. Activity for both maps are b
group averaged results in standardized space shown on a single individuals’ anatomica
image (left) and 3D cortical reconstruction (right). Overlapping activation suggests partial 
correspondence between tool-selective pMTG and ventral stream activity for real tool use. 
Superior temporal sulcus (yellow) and posterior middle temporal gyrus (blue) are marked for
anatomical reference.  
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In my view, several lines of evidence suggest possible correspondence between 
particular neuron types in monkey STS and this tool selectivity observed in human 
pMTG. Response characteristics of certain STS neurons indicate multimodal integration 
of sights and sounds of actions (Barraclough, Xiao, Baker, Oram, & Perrett, 2005). 
Human pMTG shows selectivity for both viewing and hearing tools in action 
(Beauchamp et al., 2004; Lewis, Brefczynski, Phinney, Janik, & DeYoe, 2005). STS 
neurons show high level selectivity to viewing the actions of others (Barraclough, Keith, 
Xiao, Oram, & Perrett, 2009; Perrett et al., 1989; Perrett, Mistlin, Harries, & Chitty, 
1990), including not only response specificity for particular action outcomes but also 
conjoint sensitivity to the direction of an actor’s gaze, consistent with encoding of action 
intentionality (Jellema, Maassen, & Perrett, 2004; Jellema & Perrett, 2006). In Project 1, 
I observed differential activity for viewing typical versus atypical grasping actions in tool 
n 
rise 
s are 
ding in STS neurons in responses to the monkey’s own movements 
ith and without an object in hand (Hietanen & Perrett, 1993, 1996).  
argue that these response similarities between tool selective pMTG in 
humans and STS areas in monkey suggest possible functional correspondence. 
 STS, others have noted 
more posterior correspondence in humans (Orban, Van Essen, & Vanduffel, 2004). For 
example, motion areas MT/MST in the macaque are situated within the STS (Van Essen, 
Maunsell, & Bixby, 1981), whereas in humans, MT+ is located further back, in middle 
temporal cortex at the junction of inferior temporal and lateral occipital sulci (Dumoulin 
et al., 2000). These differences have been attributed to the great expanse of inferior 
parietal cortex in human brain evolution (Bruner, Manzi, & Arsuaga, 2003; Holloway, 
1996), which is thought to have ‘pushed around’ existing areas; in the case of STS, 
expansion appears to have forced many areas backward (Orban et al., 2004). Such 
selective pMTG (Figure 2.2A-C), consistent with an area showing sensitivity to actio
intentions. Finally, as I covered in section 1.3.2, tool use learning in monkeys gives 
to extensive changes in the physiology of neurons in anterior IPS (Iriki, Tanaka, & 
Iwamura, 1996; Ishibashi et al., 2002), in parallel with the emergence of new incoming 
connections stemming from areas within STS (Hihara et al., 2006). New connection
thought to carry forward visual information important for skilful tool use. Others have 
shown differential co
w
 I would 
Importantly, with other functionally defined areas in monkey
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 cells may 
l 
tool use; considerable room for progress in this area remains. Given that the model of 
l 
e 
ce is consistent with my argument for putative functional overlap between cell 
types identified in monkey STS and human tool selective pMTG. Monkey STS neur
may represent important functional precursors in human brain evolution, present in a 
common hominid ancestor, necessary for further development and specialization of 
advanced tool use. With the massive expansion of inferior parietal cortex these
have migrated posteriorly, to take up position in and around posterior middle tempora
cortex; an area which appears to be a critical part of the human cortical network 
specialized for complex tool use (Lewis, 2006).  
 Upon concluding, is the ventral stream important for tool use? While my current 
findings are merely suggestive on this front, evidence sides with the view that ventral 
stream contributions are indeed important. Results from Project 1 are most clear, but 
since the task was only tool action viewing, extension of these findings to real tool use is 
necessarily speculative. Project 2 shows that priming unfolds more robustly for grasping 
tools when the goal is to demonstrate their use (versus grasping-to-move only); results 
that can be taken as support for preferential ventral stream involvement for tool use. 
Finally, although neural priming of real tool use was not observed in ventral stream areas 
in Project 3, activity was seen in time with action events, and left lateralization showed 
overlap with tool-selective activity in pMTG (as defined in Project 1). Overall, my 
findings provide indirect support for the account of ventral stream involvement in learned 
ventral stream contributions to tool use makes clear predictions about the flow of 
information from ventral to inferior parietal areas, future experiments using methods 
designed to capture functional interactions between brain areas may be particularly 
fruitful. For example, ERP/EEG imaging allows for high resolution mapping of tempora
dynamics and thus may be particularly well suited to test this account. The paradigms 
developed here should be transferable to such an approach. For example, perhaps 
tracking the time course of neural events for grasping-to-use versus grasping-to-move 
tasks with ERP would reveal early ventral stream involvement specific to the tool us
condition. Finally, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) techniques may also be 
particularly informative. Stimulation of ventral stream areas, like area LO or tool-
selective pMTG, may selectively disrupt grasping-to-use tools, and/or the priming 
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thereof. Further, combined with detailed tracking of kinematics of functional grasping
(Project 2, Chapter 3), TMS to ventral stream areas at different times during the planning
of tool use actions may give rise to different effects. Again, the kinds of tool use tasks
have developed in Projects 2 and 3 may be well suited for transfer to investigation w
such an approach. In brief, the topic of ventral stream importance for tool use planning 
and implementation is ripe for future experimentation and discovery. I hope that my 
current findings will provide a springboard for which these future experiments m
propel forward.  
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 5.1.2. Is explicit conceptual knowledge important? 
While I have taken a stance in favour of ventral stream importance for tool use,
have not been overly clear about the content of information likely to be sent forth to 
inferior parietal areas. Beyond visual recognition of tools, is explicit declarative 
conceptual knowledge needed for tool use? The most powerful insights with regards to 
this topic have undoubtedly come from the study of patients with semantic deficits. The
picture that has emerged, however, is not so clear cut.  
Sirigu et al. (1991) describe a patient with associative agnosia who is utterly 
puzzled about the identity and function of most common objects, but nonetheless can 
sometimes manually gesture how those same objects are typically used. Notably, the 
patient showed great appreciation of object mechanics; a comment from the patient while 
visually exploring a safety pin is particularly telling in this regard: “You open on one 
side, stick something on it, close it, and it stays in.  I can tell you how it works, but I 
don’t see its exact use.  I don’t think I’ve seen one like this before, it is not a very 
common object” (Sirigu et al., 1991, p. 2555). MRI scans showed bilateral damage to 
anterolateral temporal cortex (anterior temporal poles, aTP). Buxbaum and colleagues 
(1997) studied a patient with semantic dementia (SD) who also suffered from bilateral 
damage to aTP. Despite profound semantic impairments, the patient showed surprisingly 
good performance in gesturing the proper use of objects, and in some cases even showed 
seemingly spared knowledge of conventional function (e.g. when demonstrating the use 
of a toaster, the patient also mimed the insertion of bread). Further, on tests of multiple 
object use, he scored much better than expected, even with objects he was impaired with 
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when tested for declarative conceptual knowledge. Finally, another SD patient studied b
Lauro-Grotto et al. (1997) also showed impaired conceptual object knowledge, but 
performed well when tested on a food preparation task requiring multiple steps and the 
combined use of different tools and utensils. The patient showed worse performance on 
semantic tests involving verbal versus visual materials, and the authors proposed a 
fractionation of semantic knowledge into separate modality-specific systems. Seemin
normal tool use skills were thought to reflect the patient’s spared visual semantic sys
Consistent with th
y 
gly 
tem. 
ese three cases, other reports indicate that SD patients are competent 
involve the skilled use of objects (Graha
1999), these authors tested two 
SD patients with bilateral aTP dam
s 
those instances where SD patients showed reasonably good tool use performance, success 
with tasks of daily living and may play sports and engage in various hobbies, all of which 
m, Lambon Ralph, & Hodges, 1997; Hodges, 
Patterson, Oxbury, & Funnell, 1992; Snowden, Griffiths, & Neary, 1996). Altogether, the 
message appears to indicate that intact conceptual knowledge is not necessary for tool 
use.  
The findings from two papers by Hodges and colleagues (2000; 1999), however, 
suggest differently. In their initial study (Hodges et al., 
age and a single ideomotor apraxic patient with 
posterior parietal damage on tool naming, picture matching to functional associates, 
actual object demonstrations of use, and a novel tool use task. The novel tool use task 
(designed by Goldenberg & Hagmann, 1998) involved retrieval of a cylindrical object 
from a casing by selecting and using a novel tool from a choice of three tools, where only 
one of these available tools would allow for proper interaction and retrieval of the 
cylinder. The task relies on mechanical understanding of the fit between tool and cylinder 
end (a hook-ended tool will work for a loop-ended cylinder), referred to as mechanical 
problem solving by Goldenberg and Hagmann (1998) who showed that such a task wa
dependent on the integrity of PPC. Consistently, the parietal patient tested by Hodges et 
al. (1999) was unable to solve the novel tool use task; the patient was also poor at 
familiar tool use, but did well with naming and functional associates. Conversely, both 
temporal lobe patients were severely impaired on naming and matching tools with 
functional associates, but performed flawlessly with the novel tool use task. Critical to 
the current discussion, both patients scored badly with familiar tool use. Moreover, for 
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was either due to residual sparing of conceptual knowledge or was based on a gradual 
process of trial and error, dependent on preserved mechanical problem solving. With
latter strategy, performance was better with those tools for which the relationship 
between structure and function was particularly transparent; for which function and use 
could be deduced from an appreciation of structural mechanics. The authors conclud
that “conventional use of objects depends on additional conceptual knowledge for which 
inferotemporal brain structures appear to be critical” (Hodges et al., 1999, p. 9447). 
In a follow-up study, Hodges and colleagues (2000) extend these initial findings 
with more extensive testing of both tool use and semantic performance in a larger group 
of 9 SD patients. Again, patients were shown to be impaired with actual tool use, and 
their performance was highly correlated with scoring on semantic tests; those objects that 
were used correctly tended to be the same objects that patients showed some residual 
conceptual knowledge of. W
 this 
ed 
ith explicit reference to the two visual streams hypothesis, 
the aut
l 
low 
, 
gs, is 
 
 
hors highlight that SD involves extensive ventral stream damage (see p. 1924, and 
also referenced Mummery et al., 2000), and conclude that: 
Under these circumstances, the functioning of the (intact) dorsal pathway must 
become increasingly isolated, leaving patients still able to solve mechanical 
problems such as the novel tool task, but gradually depriving them of the norma
ability to use familiar objects in the conventionally correct, conceptually 
determined, fashion. (Hodges et al., 2000, p. 1924) 
To account for the occasional sparing of seemingly normal tool use ability and success 
with daily living, sports, and hobbies, the authors described five factors that may al
for reasonable compensation in the face of conceptual knowledge impairments. 
Alongside of residual conceptual knowledge of objects and intact mechanical reasoning
they point out that experience and familiarity, including premorbid familiarity, with 
particular tools is likely to be important. As a fourth factor, they suggest that whether or 
not patients are personally familiar with tools and contexts, surroundings and settin
also likely to be important. Notably, in a more recent study (Bozeat, Ralph, Patterson, &
Hodges, 2002), patients were found to perform better when tested with their own 
personal items. Finally, as a fifth factor, the authors suggest that affordances, defined as
an automatic process of motor evocation driven by the inherent structural properties of 
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objects, distinct but likely related to mechanical problem solving skills, may also play a
role. The confluence of all of these factors may help support relatively normal object use 
in patients with SD and other forms of semantic impairment. The cortical events 
underlying tool use in the neurologically healthy individual are supposed to greatly 
benefit from access to stored conceptual knowledge; in particular, when it comes to 
carrying out conventional use of tools.   
 
 The idea of affordances and mechanical reasoning as a route to action that may 
circum
& 
d stored structural 
descrip
route is ally 
do not 
structu t form of learned object 
nce-
ut 
 
 
 
vent the need for explicit semantics overlaps with the dual route to action 
hypothesis of Riddoch and colleagues (Riddoch, Humphreys, Coltheart, & Funnell, 
1988). On the basis of various patient dissociations (Pilgrim & Humphreys, 1991; 
Riddoch, Humphreys, Heslop, & Castermans, 2002; Riddoch, Humphreys, & Price, 
1989), and, more recently, added support from tests with normal individuals (Rumiati 
Humphreys, 1998; Yoon & Humphreys, 2007), these authors suggest that two 
independent routes to learned actions exist, a semantic route and a non-semantic visual 
route. The visual route to action is reliant on what they calle
tions of familiar objects. This element of stored knowledge within the direct visual 
 different from the ideas of affordances or mechanical reasoning, which typic
involve stored representations. The visual route to action has access to stored 
ral descriptions of familiar objects, as an independen
knowledge. Such content is presumably represented within higher order visual object 
areas of the ventral stream.  
Notably, Buxbaum and colleagues (1997) also theorized about an afforda
based account of preserved tool use abilities in patients with SD. However, since the SD 
patient they studied (discussed above) showed some access to conceptual content abo
the contextual relations between objects and their conventional use, Buxbaum and 
colleagues argued that structural affordances alone could not account for this spared 
performance.  Instead, they reasoned that some form of conceptual knowledge must have 
been spared in this patient, not accessible by declarative means. They proceeded to
suggest that conceptual knowledge tapped into by the performance of natural actions can
separate from that of explicit declarative representations. To be clear, according to their
 
179 
 
view, it is not so much the content of conceptual knowledge that is separable, but rather 
the accessibility of that content; with natural tool use, a confluence of activity from 
multiple sources (e.g. visually driven affordances) may allow for access to concep
knowledge not otherwise accessible via explicit declarative means. In other words, t
itself may interact with accessibility of stored knowledge. 
The picture is more complex with co
tual 
ask 
nsideration of the condition known as 
d the 
 
otor 
o 
ten 
l 
ual 
; Ochipa, Rothi, & Heilman, 1989). They may use the wrong 
tool to perform s 
Heilman, 1992). Patients can typically name objects and point to objects by name, and, 
conceptual apraxia. Liepmann (1980) first described this condition in a patient that 
behaved quite differently from what he classified as ideomotor apraxic. Rather than 
showing problems carrying out the motor aspects of actions, this patient was seen to 
make odd errors of substitution (e.g., using a razor as a comb). Liepmann considere
problem to reflect a loss in the patient’s ability to internally conceptualize the idea or
purpose of tool use, and thus termed the condition ideational apraxia. In his view, the 
disorder was a result of damage to a system distinct from that underlying ideom
apraxia; he wrote that ideational apraxia “is determined through diffuse damage of the 
brain, but particularly through lesions on the left in the transition from parietal t
occipital lobe, lying more in the latter” (Liepmann, 1980, p. 80). In more recent times, the 
disorder is known as conceptual apraxia, to emphasize the conceptual aspects of the 
underlying deficits and to distinguish it from ideational apraxia which is now more of
associated with motor sequencing problems (Poeck, 1983). The errors of a conceptua
apraxic patient are fundamentally different from those of an ideomotor apraxic individ
(De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1988
 actions, like attempting to eat soup with a knife, often omit critical step
in multi-step actions, like leaving out the coffee grinds when making coffee, or they may 
perform the correct movements with tools but in the wrong location, like combing 
movements with a comb but near the midline of the body. They are often confused about 
the goals of a particular action and fail to appreciate how a given tool can provide an 
advantage in fulfilling those goals. When faced with a problem, like when trying to drive 
a nail into a piece of wood, these patients fail to see how a hammer would be helpful 
(Raymer & Ochipa, 1997). Perhaps most important to what I have discussed thus far, 
conceptual apraxia separates from generalized semantic deficits (Ochipa, Rothi, & 
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also different from SD patients, conceptual apraxic patients are deeply impaired with 
tasks reliant on mechanical problem solving (Ochipa et al., 1992; Raymer & Ochipa
1997). In short, a consideration of conceptual apraxia reveals additional layers of 
complexity germane to neural systems underlying tool use.  
The above discussion is not only relevant to the broader pi
, 
cture of tool use and its 
cortica am 
tivity 
st 
 
t) 
e 
 
l basis in humans, but also more pointedly to the interpretation of ventral stre
activity in my real tool manipulation task in Project 3 (Figure 5.1, 5.2). Does this ac
reflect access to conceptual content of tool knowledge? On each trial, participants mu
visually recognize tools and call up correct actions from memory. With what has been
discussed thus far in mind, to do so it seems unlikely that the brain would need to access 
deep conceptual knowledge of the declarative type. Instead, a more direct (and efficien
route from tool recognition to stored action plans may have been utilized. This seems 
especially likely since my task involved a limited set of four different tools, tools wer
highly familiar, and tool-specific actions were practiced before scanning. The need for 
explicit access to stored conceptual knowledge on a trial by trial basis would seem
unnecessary. This may explain why aTP activity was not detected even with the simple 
comparison of action events versus rest4. Instead, I suspect that in my tool use task 
ventral stream contributions may be somewhat minimized; activity in these areas may 
reflect a relatively superficial tool recognition process, essentially involving visual 
discrimination between the four possible tool types, and a fast feed-forward of ‘results’ to 
inferior parietofrontal areas for action plan retrieval and implementation. A minimized 
role for the ventral stream in my tool use task may have also contributed to the lack of 
                                                 
4 In general, anterolateral temporal pole (aTP) activity has not typically been reported in pr
imaging studies of tools, even with more explicit semantic tasks (e.g. Boronat et al., 2005). This 
leads to a puzzling disconnect between the findings from patient work and those from 
neuroimaging. What is likely a contributing factor is that these areas are more susceptible to 
signal artifacts with fMRI; close to the air-tissue interface near orbital frontal cortex, the MR 
signal is simply more variable in these voxels. Many potentially relevant studies have not actually 
scanned these areas for such reasons. However, I was sure to include these areas in my covera
in Project 3. Moreover, I found no obvious evidence of unreliable signal in these areas and no 
indication of BOLD signal changes (up or down) in time action events. Thus, it appears as tho
these areas were indeed not engaged in my tool use task.  
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priming seen in these areas. This hypothesis need not contradict the idea that ventral 
stream contributions are necessary for specifying how to grasp tools for use; instead, s
specifications may instantiate at the level of inferior parietal cortex, which may de
the message from ventral stream areas to trigger appropriate 
uch 
code 
action outputs. More 
generally, th
 planning and control of other kinds 
f actions, like grasping in order to simply pick up an object, or to move it from one place 
e identification of multiple routes to stored action plans has broad 
implications for theorizing about how the brain may support tool use differently 
depending on the particular action scenario (Rothi, Ochipa, & Heilman, 1997). Access to 
deep conceptual knowledge may often be unnecessary.  
5.2. Affordances for tools 
 Central to my thesis are the findings that action plans and the motor system can be 
activated by the mere presence of visual stimuli. Contrary to classic views of the motor 
system, current evidence strongly indicates that even primary motor areas may 
automatically specify visual stimuli according to their potential for action, in confluence 
with higher order goals and intentions (Cisek & Kalaska, 2010). With grasping, visual 
object properties register with corresponding motor representations; object size, shape, 
and orientation activate parietofrontal neurons coding these features for the purpose of 
controlling the hand accordingly for grasping (Murata, Gallese, Luppino, Kaseda, & 
Sakata, 2000; Rizzolatti et al., 1988; Taira, Mine, Georgopoulos, Murata, & Sakata, 
1990). When this correspondence is driven by structural object features, I have used the 
term “structure-based affordances”. One of the goals of both Projects 2 and 3 was to test 
the following hypothesis: for familiar tools, affordances reflect the activation of motor 
plans not accessible by way of structural object properties alone, but instead reliant on 
prior experience (i.e. memory). I distinguish these as “use-based affordances”, to indicate 
that visual-to-motor correspondence is necessarily driven by knowledge of tool identity, 
function, and use.  
In the previous section, I emphasized how tool actions likely depend on inputs 
from ventral stream sources, important for the specification of object identity, and 
perhaps, in certain cases, other conceptual aspects of stored tool use knowledge. This 
dependency on ventral stream input contrasts with the
o
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to another. Likewise, use-based affordances likely depend on ventral stream inputs, w
structure-based affordances do not. As Neisser pointed out: “to see that something affords 
posting letters, we must first identify it as a mailbox, and that’s a job for the categorizing
systems – for re-cognition” (1992, p. 11, as cited in Buxbaum et al., 1997).  
But, this aspect of use-based affordances is only half the story. A second major 
theme of my thesis focuses on the receiving end of this output; according to the m
distinct parietal streams for action (Figure 1.3), a left lateral-IPL stream
the retrieval and implementation of stored tool-specific action
hile 
 
odel of 
 should mediate 
 plans. Use-based 
 manifest at the level of left IPL.    
e were 
 
 
 
ool 
 
 
t by the medial-SPL stream (Figure 1.3). Recall from Section 1.4.1, 
the med
like 
 
affordances for tools should
5.2.1. Behavioural priming of tool use 
 Project 2 (Chapter 3) provides behavioural evidence consistent with the 
hypothesis of use-based affordances for tools. Reaction times for grasping-to-us
reliably shortened (primed) when preceded by a visual preview of the particular tool to be
used. The effects were not attributable to structural properties relevant for grasp scaling
according to handle size or shape, as all tools had identical handles. Rather, priming was
driven by information relevant for tool use, carried forward by the specific identity of 
tools. Detailed kinematic tracking revealed distinct patterns of grasping according to t
identity, in accordance with the specific kinetics of the actions that followed. In other
words, the characteristic movements defining particular tool use actions were reflected in
the patterns of grasping kinematics leading up to those movements.  
For comparison, priming and kinematics were tested in a grasping task not 
requiring explicit access to functional knowledge of use; the grasp-to-move (GTM) task. 
Following the model of distinct parietal streams to action, I supposed that while the 
grasp-to-use (GTU) task would be carried out by the lateral-IPL stream, the GTM task 
would be carried ou
ial parietal stream corresponds with the classic dorsal pathway described by 
Milner and Goodale (1995), tuned to object properties directly accessible to vision 
size and shape, and not stored properties like identity and function. The medial stream
provides fast efficient motor programming when access to stored object knowledge is 
unnecessary. Consistent with this basic scheme, Experiment 1 showed no evidence of 
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priming for the GTM task, and grasping kinematics were similar for different tools 
(Figures 3.2-3.4). This clearly contrasted with results from the GTU task, where robust 
priming was evident and grasping kinematics were distinct for different tools. The 
findings were consistent with the model of separate underlying systems for grasping-to-
use versus grasping-to-move (Dapra
 
s 
s well. As I have already 
ing systems may still accommodate such 
ed that reading the 
names of fa
ti & Sirigu, 2006; Johnson & Grafton, 2003). 
Separation between GTU versus GTM tasks was less evident when this 
experiment was repeated with both tasks presented in the same block of trials, in a mixed
presentation setting (Experiment 2, section 3.3; Figures 3.5-3.7). Priming and thu
sensitivity to tool identity was now revealed for the GTM task a
discussed (section 5.1.1), separate underly
findings, by either supposing a common pool of attentional resources, or by supposing 
that in the mixed setting one system took control of both tasks, namely the lateral-IPL 
system sensitive to tool identity. My results indicate that priming of real grasping is 
sensitive to task and task setting, both of which are likely to shape how target object 
features are attended, which in turn will determine affordances and priming. In my view, 
this was the clearest most important contribution of the study.  
In light of these findings, several prior studies may have underestimated the 
importance of task-driven attentional factors. A number of studies have used words to 
show that grasping is sensitive to semantic processing even when such information is 
irrelevant to the grasping task. For example, Glover et al. (2004) show
miliar objects that varied in size (e.g. “apple” versus “grape”) just prior to 
grasping had a predictable impact on subsequent grip aperture measures, especially early 
on in the course of grasping. Similarly, a study by Gentilucci et al. (2000) showed that 
words printed on objects can influence grasping kinematics. When the word “far” versus 
“near” was present, participants made faster movements independent of actual object 
location (although the effects were more evident for the far object location). Since 
actually grasping more distant objects reliably leads to faster movements (Jeannerod, 
1988), the findings were taken to indicate that word meaning had an implicit impact on 
movement programming. Movements were also slowed when word and actual object 
location were mismatched. The findings were extended to grip aperture measures, 
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influenced accordingly by the words “small” versus “large”. In both studies (Gentilu
al., 2000; Glover et al., 2004), even though word reading was irrelevant to grasping, word 
meaning had an impact on action programming. The findings were taken to suggest
information regarding object meaning is automatically taken into account when 
programming otherwise unrelated actions. However, I would suggest that reading i
cci et 
 that 
tself 
necessarily requires orientation of attention ay 
al. (2006) found no evidence for priming with grasping but priming was evident for 
naming  
 is 
 
-
to explicit declarative semantics. This m
have inadvertently imposed a shift in the way actions were programmed. Different routes 
to action are evident from various patient findings (Rothi et al., 1997). Optic apraxic 
individuals can gesture to words and other verbal material describing tools, but cannot 
gesture to the visual appearance of those same tools. Conversely, optic aphasic 
individuals can gesture to visually presented tools, but can only name those tools if 
presented non-visually (e.g. via verbal description). When grasping unfolds in the context 
of reading words, participants may implicitly engage in a more semantic route to action 
programming than they would have engaged otherwise. This possibility may extend also 
to other modes of input, such as with auditorily conveyed object names as primes. In a 
task involving auditory priming of newly learned name-object associations, Kroliczak et 
 and perceptually based size estimations. Whether this kind of insensitivity to
auditory-based priming of grasping with object names would hold with familiar objects
not clear. Certainly the findings of Glover et al. (2004) discussed above with written 
object names as primes would suggest otherwise. 
Other studies, not with words, may have also underestimated how attention as a 
function of task could have influenced their findings. For example, Tucker and Ellis 
(1998; 2004) report automatic affordance effects when viewing pictures of familiar 
graspable objects, but in each case, the task required access to learned object semantics
(upright versus inverted Tucker & Ellis, 1998; man-made versus natural object 
categorization Tucker & Ellis, 2004). Attention to semantics may have influenced task
set and mode of action programming, helping to drive affordance effects. Put differently, 
with action affordances and priming, cross-talk between semantic and action systems 
may be particularly sensitive to relatively subtle details of task and task setting.  
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Previous findings indicate that the action-state of an individual, or what I have 
referred to as goal-set, can influence the way object attributes are visually perceived 
(Humphreys et al., 2009). In my discussion in Chapter 3, I gave the example of a search 
task where differing effects of distractor attributes were observed according to th
action subjects were asked to perform (Bekkering & Neggers, 2002). When asked to 
acquire target objects by grasping (versus pointing), participants made less erroneous 
saccades to distracters of the wrong orientation, as if attention to orientation as an object 
attribute was made more selective in accordance with goal-set. Affordances are tuned
and defined by object attributes. If goal-set modulates the saliency of object attributes, i
follows naturally that goal-set will modulate affordances and priming, as my fin
indicate. In a fascinating case study presented by Humphreys and Riddoch (2001), a
patient with unilateral neglect was found to perform better in a search task when the 
target object was defined by its function (“find the object you could drink from”) versus 
its name (“find the cup”) or even a salient perceptual feature (“find the red object”). The 
goal-set of the patient influenced the detectability of visually presented objects. When th
patient was in the state-of-mind to use an object, oriented towards its function, objects 
were more easily spotted. Further, these enhanced search effects were modulated by 
whether or not the handles of target objects were orientated toward or away from the 
patient; search was best when the handle faced toward the patient, as to make affordances 
for grasping more salient. Important for my main argument, these affordance effects w
only evident when the search task was defined by f
e type of 
 to 
t 
dings 
 
e 
ere 
unction not by object name; further 
evidence of
pic in 
cognitive behavioural science, and this is particularly true for grasping involving different 
 how goal-set determines the impact of object affordances. In other studies by 
this group (Humphreys & Riddoch, 2000; Riddoch, Humphreys, & Edwards, 2000) it was 
shown that impulsive erroneous grasping of objects in a patient with utilization behavior 
was not only dependent on the saliency of affordances, but also on the patient’s goal-set 
as defined by the nature of the (action) task for which they were engaged. Together the 
findings fit with the main message of Project 2 – object affordances and priming depends 
on an interplay between task-defined action goals and corresponding attention-selection 
demands (see also Pavese, Coslett, Saffran, & Buxbaum, 2002).  
To conclude, priming of grasping represents a relatively underexplored to
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goals a
 
, as 
.g. 
n, 
. 
nd intentions. The importance of specific modality (e.g. visual vs. auditory), 
information content (e.g. structure vs. function), information format (e.g. words vs. 
pictures; pictures vs. real objects), timing between prime and probe events, and how these
many factors may interact to modulate action priming is yet poorly understood. With 
functional grasping and tool use, it is of interest to determine if identity-based priming
I have shown with Project 2, may extend to priming by way of functional associates (e
priming of grasping-to-use a peeler by the sight of a potato) or other kinds of 
conceptually based associations. New insights as to the types of information which best 
lead to priming will help constrain future models of tool use planning and execution. 
Such insights will also help explain patient findings in this area, which, as we have see
often manifest as complex patterns of deficits and preserved functions (section 5.1.2)
Also, continuing efforts to characterize detailed kinematics of movements alongside 
priming may uncover fundamental relationships between priming and motor 
programming. In my mind, this represents one of the more important lines of pursuit; 
does action priming actually reflect facilitation of motor plans at the level of 
programming specific kinematics?  
5.2.2. Neural priming of tool use 
At the neural level, object affordances translate to the activation of motor areas. 
Project 3 uses a novel fMRI priming paradigm to find evidence of motor activity 
underlying learned tool use by the visual appearance of tools. Vision of a particular tool 
is expected to activate corresponding motor plans for use, following my hypothesis of 
use-based affordances (section 1.4.3, Valyear et al., 2007). If after a short delay the same 
tool is shown again and used, motor programs supporting its use will have already been 
activated (primed) and overlapping neural processes will translate to better metabolic 
efficiency and reduced BOLD signal. If a different tool is shown for use, new motor 
programs will be activated, which lead to a relative increase in energy demands and 
resultant BOLD activity. This is the fundamental logic of the neural priming paradigm. 
Greater activity for Tool Changed (TC) versus Tool Repeated (TR) trials is predicted for 
areas involved in the recruitment and implementation of stored tool use plans.  
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We identified four distinct areas showing the predicted pattern of activity 
indicative of neural priming of tool use: left inferior parietal lobule (L-IPL), left dors
precentral (L-dPreC), left ventral precentral (L-vPreC), and right superior parietal lobule 
(R-SPL) (Figure 4.2). Specificity of tool use priming in these areas was verified by 
comparison of priming with colour-defined actions and Control runs. If neural priming 
was driven by consistent versus inconsistent cuing of action plans in general, independent 
of familiar tool use, then greater activity is expected for Colour Changed (CC)
Colour Repeated (CR) trials. Instead, only when actions were cued by tools, mapped onto
learned tool-defined action plans, did neural priming in this parietofrontal circuit unfo
Selectivity for tool-action associations indicates specialization of these areas for learned 
tool use, and neural priming indicates experience-dependent plasticity. Specialization a
procedural memory for tool use in left inferior parietofrontal cortex converges nicely 
findings from both neuropsychology and neuroimaging studies of apraxia and
(Johnson-Frey, 2004). Schema theories posit that as tool use learning unfolds procedur
memory representations are developed, specifying the spatiotemporal charact
skilled actions (see also section 5.3.1
al 
 versus 
 
ld. 
nd 
with 
 tool use 
al 
eristics of 
). That damage to left inferior parietal and/or frontal 
ents in these learned motoric aspects of tool use is 
ances; 
why would such a mechanism have evolved? In my view, visuomotor affordances are 
likely to represent a neural-behavioural adaptation designed to provide more efficient 
cortex often leads to selective impairm
taken as evidence that these areas normally represent a specialized repository for 
procedural memories underlying tool use (Buxbaum, 2001; Heilman, Rothi, & 
Valenstein, 1982; Rothi et al., 1997). My findings coincide nicely with these schema 
theories. Keeping with the focus of affordances, neural priming also indicates that the 
visual properties of tools are tightly coupled with stored action programs, presumably as 
these procedural representations are built-up and shaped through experience. Established 
connections ultimately translate visual recognition of tools to partial activation of 
corresponding motor plans for use, even in the absence of overt actions. In other words, 
neural priming reflects experience-dependent plasticity of parietofrontal representations 
underlying tool use; the emergence of visual response properties consistent with the 
hypothesis of use-based affordances.   
What is the functional significance of such experience-dependent afford
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motor r ngs. 
 
ay 
responses aligned accordingly, tool use-based 
ly, to my knowledge, direct comparisons 
betwee
ns 
esponses to overlearned and/or particularly important stimulus-action pairi
They provide a fast route from visual stimuli to the most likely of appropriate motor 
responses based on prior experience. It is easy to appreciate how such a mechanism could
offer a survival advantage. For example, monkeys learn to associate the visual 
appearance of threatening stimuli, like the sight of a snake, with a powerful fear-
avoidance response. Such behavior is not innate, but learned through experience 
(Schiller, 1952). Once learned, fast efficient triggering of appropriate action plans by w
of visual-to-motor affordances would be an adaptive mechanism that would provide a 
clear survival advantage. In other words, affordance properties of motor-related neurons 
offer a ‘short circuit’ to appropriate learned behavioural outcomes. In humans, 
affordances for tools may reflect a hold-over of this natural tendency to link stimuli to 
their most commonly associated action plans at the neural level; it follows that mappings 
of tools-to-actions would correspond with conventional motor plans for use.  
How might use-based affordances for tools be mediated at the neural level? In the 
General Introduction I provided coverage of the neurophysiology of both grasping and 
tool use in monkeys (section 1.3). Within the neural circuitry underlying the control of 
grasping, (anterior intraparietal area AIP and ventral premotor area F5), the response 
properties of canonical neurons offer a mechanism for which motor affordances tied to 
structural object properties may be instantiated (Jeannerod, Arbib, Rizzolatti, & Sakata, 
1995). Visual responses code object size, shape, and orientation in alignment with 
corresponding motor requirements for grasping. At the same time, Iriki and colleagues 
report remarkable changes in the physiological properties of anterior intraparietal neurons 
after tool use training (Iriki & Sakura, 2008; Iriki et al., 1996). Tool use-based 
affordances could be mediated via the modification of canonical neurons. Tool use 
training could modify both the visual and motor response properties of neurons with 
canonical-like response features. If motor encoding was modified to represent learned 
procedural aspects of tool use, and visual 
affordances would be supported. Unfortunate
n tool-use modified and canonical neurons for grasping in AIP have not been 
reported. Notably, alongside changes in the receptive field properties of bimodal neuro
in anterior IPS, tool use training was also found to induce visual responses in other 
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neurons previously unimodal prior to training (discussed most thoroughly in Hihara et a
2006, p. 2637). Such dramatic examples of training-induced neural plasticity suggest 
modification of canonical neuron response properties in AIP is possible. Also 
noteworthy, when Ishibashi et al. (2000) tested tool trained monkeys with nove
that were very different in shape to that of the rake (e.g. spherical objects), monke
never attempted to use these novel objects to try and retrieve out-of-reach food re
In contrast, when presented with novel rake-like objects, similar in basic shape but 
different in colour and physical dimensions from that which had been used for training
after only brief hesitation monkeys proceeded to use these new rakes with success. Thus, 
monkeys learned to selectively associate the visual appearance of rake objects w
act of retrieving food items. Interestingly, movements with new rakes were somewhat 
clumsy, as if, as the authors had suggested, monkeys failed to adjust for differences in 
rake lengths and weight distributions. Instead, they appeared to implement the
l., 
that 
l objects 
ys 
wards. 
, 
ith the 
 exact same 
motor outputs as they had learned with the trained rake. This suggests a very tight 
f tool-
he 
 
 
& 
correspondence between the visual appearance of rakes and the stored kinematic 
programs defined during training. Although speculative, such correspondence could be 
conveyed via modified canonical neuron mechanisms, transforming visual features of 
tools to learned motor plans for use.  
In Chapter 4, I provide two complementary accounts of parietofrontal selectivity 
of neural priming for tool use. My first hypothesis highlights the relative strength o
action associations. Such pairings are built up over the life span, with relatively 
continuous reinforcement, not only through the performance of actual actions with tools, 
but also through the observation of others using tools, and through the gradual 
development of conceptual knowledge stores about tools and tool use actions. 
Conversely, Control actions involve newly learned colour-action pairings, with no 
correspondence to associations that occur in real life. My second hypothesis relates to t
ecological importance of common tool-action pairings. Tools are used to achieve specific
goals, real world aims with meaningful outcomes. Recent evidence implicate inferior 
parietofrontal regions as coding the goals and outcomes of actions, rather than specific
motor mechanisms, such as the particular effectors or kinematics used to achieve those 
goals (Andersen & Buneo, 2002; Bonini et al., 2010; Fogassi et al., 2005; Hamilton 
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Grafton, 2008; Umilta et al., 2008). Action associations that coincide with ecologically 
valid behavioural outcomes may be a prerequisite to lasting encoding within 
parietofrontal areas. Again, this contrasts with arbitrarily assigned colour-actio
which are not routinely matched with real world goals outside the confines of our 
particular experiment. To perform our Control task participants were likely to have on
kept colour-action rules in mind temporarily. The particular pattern and distribution of 
neural priming effects for colour-action associations and Control runs is likely to ref
such a strategy. Specifically, I hypothesized that activity within left ventral premotor 
cortex may reflect rehearsal and maintenance of colour-defined rules, while concurrent 
effects in early visual areas may relate more directly with distinguishing between 
different handle colours (as consistent with findings from Mohr, Goebel, & Linden, 200
Yee, Roe, & Courtney, 2010). In contrast, extensive experience and continuous 
reinforcement paired with true ecologically meaningful outcomes together may comprise 
the key features underlying specificity of neural priming for tool use within the 
parietofrontal areas identified.  
Lastly, my findings in Project 3 appear to have important implications for future 
patient rehabilitation programs. Bozeat a
with semantic dementia who was unable to
n pairings, 
ly 
lect 
6; 
nd colleagues (2004; 2002) studied a patient 
 use many common objects following loss of 
object 
erimenter 
se of a 
d by 
conceptual knowledge and meaning. However, the patient showed dramatic 
improvements in object use following repeated exposure to the same object exemplars 
(Bozeat et al., 2002), and, in a second study with a new set of tools, similar 
improvements in tool use were observed after a simple training program was 
implemented involving brief demonstration of appropriate object use by an exp
(Bozeat et al., 2004). Tool use learning was thought to indicate that “repeated u
specific object establishes a set of automatic, stereotyped responses that are triggere
that particular object without activation of, or reliance on, general semantic knowledge” 
(Bozeat et al., 2004, p. 353). The authors stressed that this learning corresponds with 
learning at the level of procedural memory representations. Such an account overlaps 
remarkably well with my own conception of what use-based affordances for tools in 
parietofrontal areas are likely to represent. The author’s note that after four weeks from 
training, the patient’s performance shows some regression, and emphasize that with 
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regular reinforcement and practice rehabilitation would likely be lasting, and perhaps 
even permanent. They conclude that such a training program “may provide a 
opportunity for improvement in the face of this progressive disease: a glimmer of hope 
while many other cognitive functions are deteriorating” (p. 362). If the neural mec
of such learning and recovery were to map onto use-based affordances as represented 
within parietofrontal areas, tracking the emergence of neural priming effects with a 
longitudinal fMRI approach as healthy individual learn the use of novel tools would 
provide a powerful template for which to guide rehabilitation strategies. Differences in
the strength and/or onset of priming effects in accordance with difference in training 
strategies could be used as an index to predict the effectiveness of training strategi
patients. Testing of SD patients with a tool use fMRI priming paradigm such as the one I 
have designed in Project 3 may also be helpful. Indeed, a convergent behavioura
and fMRI approach may provide compelling evidence as to the neural basis of patient 
recovery with using tools after profound loss of conceptual knowledge and objec
meaning. Such a direction for th
rare 
hanism 
 
es with 
l training 
t 
is research would be of clear importance, not only in the 
sense of improving the daily lives of patients with SD, but also in its potential to reveal 
new insights as to the cortical mechanisms underlying tool use in the healthy brain.  
5.3. Summary of neuroimaging findings  
Figure 5.3 provides a schematic summary of the brain areas identified in Projects 
1 and 3. Shown are those areas activated by my primary contrasts of interest. For Project 
1, temporo-occipital areas were preferentially activated for viewing tool grasping typical 
of use compared with grasping that was atypical of use. Activations were observed in 
both hemispheres, although more anterior lateral activations in posterior middle temporal 
gyrus and more inferior activity in fusiform cortex were specific to the left hemisphere. 
For Project 3, priming of tool use was identified within parietofrontal areas, mainly in the 
left hemisphere with right hemisphere activity exclusive to an area within SPL.  
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Figure 5.3. Summary of neuroimaging findings. Project 1 revealed preferential activity for 
viewing tool grasping actions typical of use (orange) in several distinct lateral temporo-occipita
foci. Activity was seen to overlap with bilateral motion area MT+, and object area LO of the 
ventral visual pathway. The effects were more prominent in the left hemisphere, extending
include more lateral anterior cortex overlapping with posterior middle temporal gyrus and more 
inferior to include posterior mid-fusiform cortex. Project 3 revealed neural priming of tool use 
(blue) in left anterior intraparietal cortex, overlapping with inferior parietal lobule, left dorsal an
ventral premotor areas within precentral cortex, and a single right hemisphere focus within 
l 
 to 
d 
intraparietal cortex overlapping with superior parietal lobule.  
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My summary of findings fits rather well with the results of a recent meta-analysis 
of tool-related neuroimaging results from 35 studies involving 64 paradigms (Lewis, 
2006). In his summary, Lewis distinguished a “tool-use motor skill network” from a 
“conceptual and semantic network”. The motor skill network included critical nodes 
within SPL and IPL, dorsolateral premotor and ventral premotor cortices. The network 
was represented bilaterally but with clear left-hemisphere prevalence in the strength and 
extent of reported activations. Conversely, the conceptual tool network comprised left 
inferior frontal gyrus, left pMTG, and bilateral fusiform cortex. According to this 
organization, my findings from Project 1 overlap with the conceptual tool network while 
my findings from Project 3 overlap with the tool use production network.  
 This separation makes intuitive sense given that Project 3 involved the 
se 
 
 as 
 
ests 
separate systems, with little evidence of cooperation between them. Responses to 
ntral but not parietofrontal 
areas, while planning and carrying out real actions with tools showed activation priming 
in parietofrontal and not ventral stream areas.  
 In line with the distinctions emphasized by Lewis (2006), I suggest that this 
apparent disconnect between parietofrontal and ventral stream systems reflects:  i) the 
particular paradigms I used to identify areas, and, more importantly, ii) the fundamentally 
different functional contributions of each system. The ventral stream is tuned to learned 
conceptual aspects of tools, sensitive to action viewing, uncovered by preferential 
activations for typical versus atypical tool use grasping. In contrast, parietofrontal areas 
are tuned to learned procedural aspects of tool use, untapped by neural priming of real 
familiar tool use actions. As I have elaborated on in section 5.1, these findings do not 
necessarily indicate that actual tool use does not involve ventral stream areas, or that 
performance of real actions and thus may be expected to activate motor areas for tool u
most strongly, while Project 1 involved passive viewing of tool-related action movies and
thus may be expected to activate perceptual areas for tool use most strongly. However,
I have discussed at length throughout the thesis, learned tool use is thought to involve the
integration of both stored motor and conceptual knowledge. Cooperation between ventral 
and parietofrontal areas is expected. Instead, the basic summary of my findings sugg
observed tool use grasping showed preferential activity in ve
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concep
 
y 
 
chema d 
t 
areas showing tool use priming is thought 
to reflect processing underlying retrieval of stored tool-specific action plans. Processing 
ade m
tual knowledge of tools is unimportant when planning tool use actions. But rather, 
neural priming by repetition of tool identity in the context of real tool use may 
preferentially uncover parietofrontal contributions, as more intimately connected with
motor plan retrieval and output. I suggest that further experiments are needed to clarif
the importance of ventral stream regions and conceptual tool use knowledge.   
In my General Introduction I reviewed evidence for a theory of divided parietal 
streams to action which separates a left lateral-IPL stream from a bilateral medial-SPL
stream (section 1.4). The lateral-IPL pathway is connected with ventral stream areas and 
is thought to mediate learned aspects of tool use while the medial-SPL pathway is 
thought to mediate online visuomotor control. In concert with this basic distinction, 
s  theories of tool use propose a specialized role for left IPL in storage an
recruitment of procedural memory representations underlying learned actions. In this 
section, I consider these concepts in light of my new findings.  
5.3.1. Left inferior parietal specialization 
Schema theory 
Perhaps the single most important contribution of my thesis is that it provides 
compelling evidence of memory for tool use within parietofrontal areas. Given tha
neural priming was specific to tool use and did not also emerge for colour-defined 
actions, the most parsimonious explanation is that these effects operate at the level of 
memory for tool use. Activity in parietofrontal 
is m ore efficient and neural priming unfolds when actions are preceded by 
information regarding the correct tool to be used. Neural priming in parietofrontal areas is 
not attributable to correct action cuing in general, or else similar BOLD reductions would 
have been detected for repeated colour trials for Control runs, where actions were cued 
by colour. Instead, priming effects were specific to tools and tool use actions. Such 
specificity is best accounted for as evidence for the activation of memory-based 
representations, shaped by extensive experience using tools. 
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These conclusions match closely with schema theories of tool use. Such accounts 
posit that procedural memories of learned actions are stored cortically. In the ca
use, this encoding specifies how tools are used motorically. The origins of these ideas 
trace back to the work of Hugo Liepmann at the turn of the 20th century. For Liepmann, 
procedural memory stores for tool use, what he called “movement formula”, we
se of tool 
re 
thought to encode “kno
ores 
up 
g-advantage" to describe 
on to reconstitute 
That specificity of neural priming for tool-action and not colour-action pairings relates to 
ndent plasticity intersects directly with this argument for stored motor 
schema  
 
 
Such a 
 tool use in these areas. I 
consider concurrent neural priming in L-dPreC and R-SPL as evidence for a more 
expansive interactive network important for retrieval and implementation of stored motor 
wledge of space-time sequences”, which specify the “course of 
the procedure to be realized” (Liepmann, 1980, p. 43). The central concept and 
importance of stored motor schema is nicely captured by the following statement from 
Rothi and colleagues (Rothi et al., 1997): 
To acquire skilled motor behaviour implies that the central nervous system st
information that the individual has previously experienced and that this stored 
information expedites future behaviour. Therefore, rather than portions of the 
process being reconstructed de novo with each experience, they may be called 
from memory and reutilised. We use the term "processin
the assistance provided by a system that can be called up
previously constructed programs (Rothi et al., 1997, p. 33). 
experience-depe
. Only overlearned tool-action associations and not newly learned colour-action
associations mapped onto stored programs in parietofrontal areas.  
My findings identify a primarily left-lateralized circuit including left IPL, left 
inferior (L-vPreC) and superior lateral frontal (L-dPreC) activations centred within 
precentral cortex, and an area of activity within right SPL. That activity in left IPL 
corresponds with procedural memory stores underlying tool use is predicted from
existing models of ideomotor apraxia (IM) that narrowly implicate left IPL as the cortical 
area underlying storage of tool use schema (Buxbaum, 2001; Heilman et al., 1982; Rothi 
et al., 1997). According to the model of Rothi et al. (1997), IM as a result of left inferior
frontal damage reflects disrupted access to stored schema in left IPL. Functional 
connectivity between these two key areas is vital for praxis and learned tool use. 
model nicely supports my interpretation of neural priming for
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plans. T
 as 
were most commonly observed within left 
supram
upcomi as 
sensitiv  
(see als
plan-re 40, y = -43, z = 40, 
r, ventral, and lateral 
to tool- e 
for 
hary 
 more 
he complete circuit overlaps with part of the tool use production network 
specified by Lewis (2006), commonly activated in tasks involving tool use pantomimed 
actions (Johnson-Frey, Newman-Norlund, & Grafton, 2005; Lewis et al., 2005) as well
real tool use (Inoue et al., 2001).  
In a neuroimaging experiment involving tool use pantomimed actions, Johnson-
Frey and colleagues (2005) were able to separate planning related activity from activity 
corresponding with actual motor outputs. Further, tool use plan-related activations were 
identified in individuals, which allowed for detailed characterization of function-
anatomical correspondence. Activation peaks 
arginal gyrus, and this was independent of which hand was used to perform 
ng actions. In contrast, tool use pantomime execution-related parietal activity w
e to which hand was used, and was distinctly more anterior to plan-related activity
o Fridman et al., 2006). Tool use priming in L-IPL appears close to the location of 
lated activity from Johnson-Frey et al. (2005, left hand: x = -
right hand: x = -40, y = -44, z = 39). Such correspondence is consistent with my 
interpretation of neural priming for tool use as directly related to the retrieval of stored 
tool use plans.  
Finally, tool use priming activity in L-IPL was more anterio
selective activity identified in Project 1 with our “Localizer 1” paradigm (Figur
2.2D-E), as well as that revealed in our previous study (Valyear et al., 2007). More 
anterior-lateral activity for priming real tool use actions versus category selectivity 
viewing tool pictures may reflect closer ties to motor stores. Recently, Stark and Zo
(2008) identified a posterior-to-anterior continuum of visual-to-motor response 
specificity in IPS during tool grasping, with more posterior areas tied to tools (and their 
location in the visual field) and more anterior areas tied to the hand used for grasping. 
More anterior lateral localization of neural priming in L-IPL may correspond with
motorically driven parietal areas, consistent with my account of this activity as related to 
recruitment and implementation of learned procedural schema for tools.    
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Divided parietal streams theory 
According to several recent models of PPC in action, a laterally oriented pathway
projecting to inferior parietal lobule (lateral-IPL stream) is specialized for tool use, 
distinguished from a medial pathw
 
ay running through parieto-occipital cortex to superior 
parietal lobule (m
ial 
-
l use 
so to the upper part of this space in particular, so that tool identity can be 
recognized and distinguished. W
Experimental actions. If R-SPL activity was related to processing an objects’ potential for 
action, why would priming show selectivity for the Experimental task only? Instead, I see 
no compelling reason why this R-SPL activity should be considered different from neural 
edial-SPL stream) devoted to basic online visuomotor control (section 
1.4.1., Figure 1.3).  
While tool use priming in left IPL is consistent with this model, my findings in 
Project 3 provide only partial support for this distinction between lateral and med
parietal streams to action. First, the model predicts concurrent effects in the ventral 
stream, which, as I have already discussed (section 5.1), was not observed; only non
specific task correlated activity was evident in ventral stream areas (Figure 5.1). Second, 
the model of separate parietal streams does not predict R-SPL specificity for tool use 
actions. Indeed, neural priming for tool use in R-SPL seems directly at odds with this 
account. I have considered that this activity somehow relates to spatial attention; that 
perhaps this area is important in the control of attention, and in the case of the too
task participants preferentially attend not only to the area of space where tools are 
presented, but al
hen tools are repeated, perhaps this process is made 
more efficient (e.g. shorter duration of underlying neural events) and BOLD activity is 
reduced. However, it is unclear why the same logic would not also apply to Control 
actions, where attention should then be preferentially directed to space where tool 
handles are presented, and repeated colour trials should afford the same reduced 
processing demands. I have also considered that perhaps this area somehow relates to the 
activation identified by Gallivan et al. (2009) who showed that right superior parieto-
occipital cortex shows selectivity for objects in reachable space. This activity was 
thought to reflect processing related to encoding an object’s potential for action. 
However, the focus of activity found in that study was medial and posterior to the R-SPL 
activity I detected, and again it is unclear why such an account would only hold for 
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priming for tool use observed in left IPL, vPreC, and dPreC areas. Finally, and perhaps 
most re
ions 
as compared with Experimental tool use actions. To test this 
particular model m
t 
 
rsus 
n, tool 
ol use 
een 
levant, my approach was one-sided with respect to the model in question; my aim 
was to identify areas underlying stored knowledge of tool use, not to also exploit reg
more distinctly engaged in online visuomotor control.  The purpose of my Control task 
was to provide a set of actions that were comparable in kinematic complexity and 
processing demands 
ore directly, learned tool use should be compared with an action task 
requiring more precise or elaborate online control. While tool use should activate lateral-
IPL areas, the more demanding online visuomotor task should activate medial-SPL areas. 
Such an experiment highlights the importance of continuing efforts to develop improved 
methods for tracking kinematics while in the scanner, alongside behavioural kinematic 
testing with mock-MR-scanner setups to closely mimic the unique constraints of the 
scanner environment. 
Previous neuroimaging work has shown that pantomimed tool use activates lef
IPL independent of the hand used to perform actions (Bohlhalter et al., 2009; Johnson-
Frey et al., 2005; Kroliczak & Frey, 2009). This contrasts with other actions like 
grasping, which typically show stronger anterior intraparietal (AIP) activity contralateral 
to the hand used to perform grasping (Begliomini, Nelini, Caria, Grodd, & Castiello, 
2008; Culham, Cavina-Pratesi, & Singhal, 2006; Culham et al., 2001; Stark & Zohary, 
2008). These findings have been taken as support for a variant of the divided parietal
streams model whereby separate systems are thought to underlie object grasping ve
tool use (section 1.4.1) (Daprati & Sirigu, 2006; Johnson & Grafton, 2003). Agai
use is thought to correspond specifically with left inferior parietal areas. In Figure 5.4, I 
compared the location of tool use priming in L-IPL with an estimated location of 
grasping area AIP based on the average Talairach coordinates reported from eight 
published studies of grasping (see Figure caption). The area I detected showing to
priming is distinctly lateral to the estimated location of AIP, consistent with the model of 
separate parietal systems for tool use versus grasping. However, partial overlap betw
areas is also evident, and this approach can only provide rough indication; further 
clarification is needed involving comparisons between grasping-defined and tool-use-
defined activity in single subjects 
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Figure 5.4.  Comparison of grasping area AIP with tool use priming. Shown in cyan is the 
boundar
I 
 
ns. 
y of the L-IPL activation showing tool use priming in Project 3 (see Figure 4.2A). The 
pink crosshairs represent the mean Talairach coordinates of area AIP from eight published fMR
studies of real grasping (Begliomini, Caria, Grodd, & Castiello, 2007; Binkofski et al., 1998; 
Cavina-Pratesi, Goodale, & Culham, 2007; Culham et al., 2003; Frey, Vinton, Norlund, &
Grafton, 2005; Grafton, Arbib, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Kroliczak, Cavina-Pratesi, Goodman, 
& Culham, 2007). The extents of the crosshairs represent 95% confidence intervals ( x = -35 to -
41, y = -37 to -45, z = 39 to 49) shown for posterior-anterior (x) and lateral-medial (y) directio
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Overlapping theories 
Distinctions between lateral-IPL and medial-SPL systems directly intersect with 
schema theories of tool use. It is the stored aspects of left IPL that readily distinguish the 
functions of this system from SPL areas devoted to visuomotor control. Presumably, 
alongside this special role in stored action schema, the left IPL has unique ties to ventral 
stream areas. Such connections presumably offer an exchange between conceptual 
knowledge stores and procedural knowledge stores. While inputs from neural sources 
underlying conceptual knowledge provide a means to activate stored tool use plans, 
feedback connections allow procedural memory stores to enrich the content of conceptual 
knowledge stores. In contrast, SPL areas are supposedly tuned to dynamic aspects of 
action programming and control, thought to transform incoming sensory information to 
motor outputs from the bottom-up, de novo, and not based on stored representational 
knowledge. My findings show some consistency with these accounts; namely tool use 
ic visuomotor control mechanisms based on the situational specifics of a 
, 2001). That is, for example, stored schema for hammering is not 
predicted to specify the particular kinematic or force requirements for a specific hammer, 
or for a given set of spatial constraints, but rather would only specify the gross ‘invariant’ 
movement features of hammering. Consider the act of pantomiming a hammering action 
without a hammer in hand. In this case, obviously only the basic invariant features of 
hammering would be called to action. It is these invariant features of learned actions that 
comprise procedural memory for tool use, generalizable across different tool exemplars, 
stored within left IPL. Real tool use requires additional computations related to dynamic 
features of actions and tools. Presumably such computations are carried out within the 
priming within L-IPL and preferential activity within the ventral stream for observing 
typical versus atypical tool use grasping. However, distinct roles for medial-SPL versus 
lateral-IPL with respect to visuomotor control versus learned tool use require further 
clarification. 
Worth noting, dexterous tool use requires both aspects - retrieval of stored action 
plans and dynam
given action (Buxbaum
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medial-SPL stream to action. It follows that real tool use must involve cooperation 
betwee
iscussion of the most important areas of future 
researc
n lateral-IPL and medial-SPL streams5.  
Future imaging studies will hopefully find ways to test more and more natural 
tool use tasks, not only involving real tool manipulation but also actual interactions 
between tools and their recipients. According to the above account, the inclusion of more 
dynamic aspects of tool use is predicted to involve more medial-SPL systems. Close 
tracking of kinematic measures of actions while in the scanner will be important for 
analysis and interpretation of such experiments. A combined schema and divided parietal 
streams theory predicts that while the activation of medial-SPL areas should correlate 
with various kinematic measures, left lateral-IPL activity should correlate with tool use 
experience and procedural familiarity.   
5.4. Future directions 
Progress in research usually follows such that with every new insight, new 
unknowns are revealed. The current thesis is no exception. My findings make several 
new and important contributions, but also generate new hypotheses that require further 
clarification. I will conclude with a d
h that follow directly from the current findings. 
5.4.1. Linking behavioural and neural priming of tool use 
I found that preceding tool use with a visual preview of the tool to be used leads 
to reliable behavioural priming, measured as shortened reaction times to initiate 
movements (Project 2). Time to movement onset is known to be a sensitive measure of 
action planning (Klatzky, Fikes, & Pellegrino, 1995; Rosenbaum, van Heugten, & 
Caldwell, 1996), and thus behavioural priming of tool use is taken to reflect facilitation of 
motor planning. I also found that preceding tool use with a visual preview of the tool to 
                                                 
5 Of course, many other areas including cerebellum, basal ganglia, premotor, supplementary, and 
primary motor cortices are also important for skilled action. In fact, even dynamic aspects of 
learned actions are likely stored as motor plans once sufficient skill is reached. For example, 
learned motor sequences may be partially stored in supplementary motor area (Watson et al., 
1986), and dynamic internal models underlying the acquisition of novel tool use skills may be 
represented and stored in cerebellar cortex (Imamizu et al., 2000; 2003).  
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be used leads to reliable neural priming, measured as reduced BOLD activity (Proje
Neural priming of tool use was specific to four d
ct 3). 
istinct parietofrontal areas, including left 
inferior p
(Rothi et al., 1997). Neural prim
, behavioural and neural priming of tool use 
me experiment. At the moment, Project 3 
shows neural priming of tool use independent of behavioural priming. Ideally, the same 
tool use on 
 
experiment in hand, new and 
sed 
priming of
ask 
accompanied by robust differences in grasping according to tools. Participants took on a 
ect 
arietal cortex, previously implicated in the storage of learned tool use plans 
ing was taken to reflect increased efficiency in the 
activation and implementation of such plans. Thus, my two sets of findings are 
complementary; behavioural priming reflects less time needed to plan actions while 
neural priming reflects less brain activity underlying action plan retrieval. Shortened 
temporal duration of neural firing has been hypothesized to account for BOLD priming 
effects (Grill-Spector, Henson, & Martin, 2006; James & Gauthier, 2006). It is possible 
that such a mechanism may underlie both behavioural and neural priming of tool use.  
To make this connection stronger
should be looked at concurrently, in the sa
 actions should be compared inside and outside the scanner. Such comparis
would allow for behavioural priming to be tracked at the neural level. Presumably the 
same brain areas identified in Project 3 would show neural priming, but would other 
areas also show effects? Further, would the strength of activation priming correspond
with the strength of behavioural priming? With such an 
important steps could be made toward understanding both behavioural and BOLD-ba
 tool use. It is possible that multiple mechanisms are at play, some which 
correspond with behavioural and kinematic differences in action planning, and some of 
which are independent of such.  
In Project 2, I found behavioural priming for the grasping-to-move (GTM) t
(Experiment 2; Figure 3.5) despite the fact that these actions involve similar kinematics 
according to different tools. Conversely, effects with the grasp-to-use (GTU) task were 
highly strategized approach that appeared to reflect an optimal path to grasping tools 
according to the next steps of actions. An fMRI version of this experiment would 
presumably reveal priming in the same areas showing tool use specific priming in Proj
3. But, would the magnitude of BOLD priming according to task match that of 
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behavioural priming? Would such correspondence be evident in all areas of this network, 
or only in specific areas? This experiment would help tease apart potential relationships 
between kinematic complexity of action programming, behavioural priming, and fMR
priming of grasping and tool use. 
As follow-up study to Project 3, it would also be of interest to test tool-defined 
and colour-defined actions in the same runs. Would the same areas again show task-
specific priming, and which brain areas would show activity changes selective for task 
switch periods? That is, with task cuing spaced far enough apart in time from action 
events, brain areas important for executive control may be separated from areas showing: 
i) stimulus (tool/colour)-specific priming, and ii) those more directly involved with action 
I 
output.
d help validate existing models of tools 
use (e.g
taken to indicate visually driven (primed) activations of use-dependent motor 
  
Finally, conjoint behavioural and fMRI priming studies provide a powerful 
approach to address new questions. As noted previously, new insights into brain 
mechanisms underlying learned tool use may be gained by exploring the types of 
information that lead to behavioural priming. Contributions of conceptual knowledge 
stores to tool use planning may be addressed by testing for priming based on functional 
associative knowledge (e.g. testing if a potato or carrot primes the use of a vegetable 
peeler). Parallel fMRI priming experiments may reveal neural sources of conceptual 
content. Different modalities (e.g. auditory versus visual) and format (e.g. words/pictures 
versus real objects) of prime stimuli may also reveal distinct brain networks involved. 
Comparison with lesion studies of patients showing modality-specific tool use deficits 
(e.g. De Renzi, Faglioni, & Sorgato, 1982) woul
. Rothi et al., 1997) as well as inform new ones. With a better understanding of 
the multiple routes to learned action, perhaps new and improved patient rehabilitation 
programs could be developed, tailored to individual patient profiles according to which 
pathways are likely spared.  
5.4.2. Procedural motor learning 
 My findings in Project 3 were taken to indicate activation of stored procedural 
representations for tool use. That is, tool use specific priming in parietofrontal areas was 
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representations, what I have called use-based affordances. I have tried to indicate how 
evidence from neurophysiological studies of grasping and tool use in monkeys make this
account feasible; anterior intraparietal neurons are modified following tool use training, 
and other presumably nearby neuro
 
ns important for grasping show visual selectivity for 
particular object properties (affordances). Fu
tor 
her behavioural-kinematic or force-kinematic measurements. A large enough set 
of new object-action (tool use) 
 
s 
r 
volving similar motor outputs (i.e. same actions). A 
ecessarily tied to different time periods within and 
rther, at least some of the areas showing 
priming, namely left inferior parietal and frontal cortex, correspond well with 
neuropsychological evidence which implicate these areas as critical to storage and 
implementation of learned tool use schema. Still, direct links between procedural mo
learning and tool use priming are missing. How might such links be established? 
Future studies will need to track motor learning of novel object-defined actions, 
using eit
pairings must be established showing reliable, tractable 
patterns of behavioural changes throughout stages of procedural learning. Further, new
tool use actions must be appropriate for fMRI. Procedural learning should be established 
behaviourally in a mock-MR setup, with the same subject configuration and space 
constraints as experienced in the scanner. Once behavioural measures of motor learning 
were established, transfer to fMRI can be used to track concurrent changes in brain 
activity.  
Changes in brain areas underlying motor learning would be expected to 
correspond with changes in behavioural measures. Comparison between early and late 
instances of the same tool use actions could be used to demonstrate such changes. Area
overlapping with acquired motor skill would be expected to show preferential responses 
to late, more practiced trials, corresponding with robust levels of motor refinement. 
Conversely, areas important for the initial stages of tool use learning may show stronge
activity to early, less practiced trials. An advantage of this approach is that it allows for 
comparisons between trials in
disadvantage is that these trials are n
across runs. Order effects not related to differences in tool use learning may superimpose 
on effects of interest. Fortunately, order effects related to novelty, task difficulty, 
attention, or non-specific habituation each predict that activation should decrease over 
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time (i.e. early > late trials). Areas underlying procedural skills should show the opposi
pattern (late > early trials). In particular, areas underlying storage of procedural tool use 
plans (e.g. left IPL), should show a shift to greater activity as tool use actions become 
more refined. Further, different tool use actions may be included that have different time
courses of procedural learning. Tool-action pairings that take longer to acquire proced
expertise may be contrasted with pairings that are more quickly acquired. In th
activity should correspond with stages of procedural learning rather than extent of 
previous exposure (early versus late). This would be a way to control for potential 
confounds due to order effects. Finally, if instances of common tool use were also
te 
 
ural 
is case, 
 
included, then both early and la
distinct and reliable behavioural markers of 
challenge. Transfer to fMRI would require 
new ad , but 
 
ect 3 
 
te trials of these types should activate representations 
overlapping with stored tool use schema.  
A priming version of this experiment is then simple to employ. Priming in 
parietofrontal areas identified in Project 3 is predicted only for well established object-
action associations, after procedural learning had reached a robust level of sustained 
skilled performance.  
It should be acknowledged that such an endeavour would not be easy. 
Establishing a novel tool use set that provides 
procedural motor learning would be a great 
vanced methods to track behavioural kinematics in the scanner; available
uncommon to most MR units. Plasticity at the neural level may also take more than a 
single fMRI session to establish, requiring multiple sessions to identify. Still, if 
successful, the upshot of such a project would be of clear importance for future models of
tool use, procedural motor learning, and experience-dependent cortical plasticity in 
general.    
5.5. Conclusions  
 Together, the set of neuroimaging findings from Projects 1 and 3 highlight 
distinctions between systems important for tool use. Project 1 uses a perceptual task 
involving the viewing of actions and highlights temporo-occipital areas while Proj
uses a real action task and highlights parietofrontal areas. Findings from Project 1 show
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sensitivity to learned object-action associations in perceptual but not visuomotor areas. 
Findings from Project 3 show the reverse pattern, activation priming for learned tool use 
in parietofrontal but not temporo-occipital areas. Differences are thought to reflect both
the driving influence of task as well as distinct functional roles of each system.  
Project 2 also indicates the importance of task; behavioural priming of grasping 
tools depended on both task and task setting. These effects were interpreted as changes in 
goal set and motor strategy, which in turn determined affordances and priming. Future 
progress in this area will benefit from a clearer understanding of the relationships 
between behavioural priming of tool use and actual motor programming (e.g. 
kinematics). As an imaging paradigm, the priming approach has clear advantages for 
studying the production of complex actions - good control over concerns about 
 
compar ral and 
 
isons between actions that greatly differ in kinematics. Combined behaviou
fMRI action priming studies hold great promise for new discoveries in understanding 
human tool use. 
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